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Introduction 
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below. Specific symbols which are not listed may be used locally and in a 
specific context. As these symbols are locally explained and not used further 
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A Building surface area [m²] 
Amax maximum fire area [m²] 
Ao Area or weighted area of opening [m²] 
AT Total internal enclosure surface area [m²] 
b slope of the best fit [-] 
C concentration [ppm] 
c constant  
D exposure dose for incapacitation [%COHb] 
E load effect  
F frequency [1/year] 
Ho height of the opening [m] 
h convective heat transfer coefficient W/(m2K) 
hL smoke layer height m 
F frequency [-] 
fs fire frequency [1/year] 
!̇# mass loss rate of fuel [kg/s] 
!̇$ mass loss rate of air [kg/s] 
N number of fatalities [-] 
Pf probability of failure [-] 
Q heat Release Rate [kW] 
QAct heat Release Rate at sprinkler activation [kW] 
q the radiant flux from the fire or smoke layer [kW/m²] 





stoichiometric fuel-to-air ratio 
The radiant heat exposure dose 
[-] 
[kW/m²] 
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T temperature  [K] 
Tskin skin temperature [K] 
t time [s] 
ticonv the time to incapacitation due to convective heat  
transfer 
[min] 
tirad the time to incapacitation due to radiative heat 
transfer 
[min] 
V coefficient of variation [-] 
VX coefficient of variation of the parameter X [-] 
VCO2 multiplicity effect of inhaled CO2 [-] 
VE volume of air breathed each minute [l/min] 
w Weighting function  
% the walking speed [m/s] 




α Fire growth coefficient [kW/s2] 
βα Coefficients for response surface modelling [-] 
∆ Difference between two values  
&' safety factor [-] 
&( Error term [-] 
ε emissivity [-] 
εreg regularization parameter [-] 
λig yearly fire ignition frequency [1/(year·m²)] 
λ Failure rate [1/year] 
µ mean value  
µX mean value of the parameter X  
σ standard deviation  










ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable  
ASET Available Safe Egress Time  
CDF Cumulative Density Function  
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics  
DET Deterministic  
DOE Design of Experiments  
EDK Erica Dawn Kuligowski  
EDM Evacuation Decision model  
EE Elementary effect  
ERI Early Risk Injury  
ERL Early Risk to Life  
ETA  Event tree Analysis  
FDS Fire Dynamics Simulator  
HRR Heat Release Rate  
HRRPUA Heat Release Rate Per Unit Area  
HSE Health and Safety Executive  
FCE Fire Cost Expectation  
FED Fractional Effective Dose  
FFM Fire Field Modelling  
FID Fractional Incapacitation Dose  
FORM First Order Reliability Method  
FSE Fire Safety Engineering  
FTA Fault Tree Analysis  
HRR Heat Release Rate  
IMLS Interpolation Moving Least Squares  
IR Individual Risk  
ISO International Organization for Standardization  
LHS Latin Hypercube Sampling  
LN Lognormal  
MC (crude) Monte Carlo  
OAT One at a time  
OGS Optimal Grade Spread  
OH Ordinary hazard  
PADM Protection Action Decision Model 
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PCE Polynomial Chaos Expansion  
PDF Probability Density Function  
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
RSM Response Surface Modelling  
RSO Relative safety level for occupants  
SA Sensitivity analysis  
SHC Smoke and Heat Control  
SPLR Sprinkler  
SSE Sum of Squared Errors  
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment  







Het doel van brandveiligheid in publieke gebouwen is om de gevolgen voor de 
gezondheid, eigendom, continuïteit van activiteiten, milieu en erfgoed in geval 
van brand zo optimaal als mogelijk te beperken. Om deze doelstellingen te 
bereiken worden brandveiligheidsmaatregelen geïmplementeerd dewelke 
zowel de kans op het ontstaan van brand als de mogelijke effecten ervan 
verminderen. De keuze van maatregelen wordt meestal bepaald door 
overheidsinstellingen via regelgeving. Historisch gezien zijn twee belangrijke 
wettelijke nalevingsmethoden ontwikkeld, namelijk prescriptieve en 
performantiegerichte ontwerpmethodieken. Prescriptieve ontwerpen worden 
in principe ontwikkeld op basis van ervaringen uit eerdere brandincidenten die 
specifieke veiligheidskwesties aan het licht brengen. In een prescriptief 
regelgevingssysteem voor brandveiligheid wordt impliciet aangenomen dat 
wanneer alle regels van de wet worden toegepast, het niveau van 
brandveiligheid aanvaardbaar is. Voorgeschreven codes zijn zeer praktisch 
voor het ontwerp van gebouwen en vallen binnen de beoogde scope van de 
reglementering. Toenemende architecturale creativiteit, functionele vereisen, 
verbeterde bouwtechnieken en materiaalwetenschappen hebben echter geleid 
tot ontwerp en constructie van gebouwen die niet altijd kunnen worden 
uitgevoerd binnen de bestaande regels voor brandveiligheid. 
Naarmate het domein van Fire Safety Engineering zich ontwikkelde, 
veranderden meer en meer landen hun brandveiligheidswetgeving om 
gebouwen te ontwerpen in termen van doelstellingen en prestaties. 
Reguleringsvormen zijn daarbij objectief, waarbij prestatie-gebaseerde en 
risico-geïnformeerde methoden het meest worden toegepast. In deze 
regelgeving wordt het acceptabele veiligheidsniveau expliciet en dient het 
veiligheidsniveau door analyse aangetoond te worden. Deze methodieken zijn 
al toegepast in een aantal wettelijke kaders (bijv. VK, Zweden, Nieuw-Zeeland 
en Australië). Het voordeel is dat deze regelgevingen flexibiliteit, 
innovativiteit en kosteneffectiviteit bevorderen. Het nadeel is dat de 
kwalitatieve of beschrijvende aard van de prestatie-eisen soms worden 
bekritiseerd vanwege het feit dat ze anders kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd en 
dat er geen kwantificeerbare of verifieerbare prestatie-eisen en criteria zijn. 
Bovendien vertrouwt de methode op de professionele en ethische competentie 
van de brandveiligheidstechnicus. Om deze redenen hebben bepaalde landen 
aanpassingen gedaan om de onduidelijkheid van deze regelgevingen te 
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verminderen, waarbij een verschuiving werd toegepast van een totale 
performantiegerichte regelgeving naar een "prescriptief" performantiegerichte 
kader. In een poging om een uniformer veiligheidsniveau te bereiken, werden 
specifieke scenario's en parameters geïntroduceerd die in de analysemethodiek 
dienen te worden toegepast. Afhankelijk van het project kunnen sommige 
brandscenario's en belangrijke invloedsfactoren niet worden geïdentificeerd en 
geadresseerd. Bovendien wordt de effectiviteit van de geïmplementeerde 
veiligheidssystemen vaak niet kwantitatief in rekening genomen.  
Omdat de bovengenoemde methoden tekortkomingen vertonen, bestaat er een 
algemene consensus dat een meer holistische benadering noodzakelijk is, 
waarin de gebouwconfiguratie, gebruikers, inhoud, veiligheidssystemen en 
procedures samen worden geanalyseerd. Risicogebaseerde methodieken 
bieden een manier om te evolueren naar een dergelijke holistische benadering. 
Daarom wordt in dit proefschrift een probabilistische 
risicobeoordelingsmethodologie ontwikkeld om het risico voor 
personenveiligheid te kwantificeren in het kader van brandveiligheidsontwerp. 
Om deze vraagstelling aan te pakken, worden in deze thesis verschillende 
bestaande risicoconcepten en -modellen geanalyseerd. De sterke en zwakke 
punten worden onderzocht, zodat de beste onderdelen van elk in de 
methodologie kunnen worden opgenomen. Op basis van de literatuurstudie 
wordt een deterministisch en probabilistisch kader ontwikkeld. In het 
deterministisch deel wordt de nadruk gelegd op de ontwikkeling van een 
holistische benadering van meerdere submodellen om de verschillende 
invloedsfactoren van veiligheidssystemen, ontwerpscenario's, evacuatie, 
rookverspreiding en gevolgenmodellering te combineren tot één geheel. Om 
rekening te houden met de onzekerheid van ontwerpparameters en de 
betrouwbaarheid van veiligheidssystemen, wordt een probabilistisch kader 
ontwikkeld. De methode bestaat uit meerdere probabilistische technieken die 
het veiligheidsniveau kwantificeren door een kans op overlijden, individueel 
en groepsrisico. De kern van de methode bestaat uit een methodologie met 
responsoppervlakken in combinatie met steekproeftechnieken en 
convergentiemethoden voor betrouwbaarheidsanalyse. Het resultaat is een 
computationeel efficiënt model voor een nauwkeurige kwantificering van de 
prestaties van brandveiligheidsontwerpen. Om het rekenmodel verder te 
optimaliseren, is een vereenvoudigd model voorgesteld. De belangrijkste 
verschillen met het vereenvoudigde model zijn de toegepaste submodellen 
voor analyse van rookverspreiding en evacuatie. Voor rookverspreiding wordt 
een zonemodel voorgesteld in plaats van een veldmodel. Voor evacuatie wordt 




De uitgebreide en vereenvoudigde probabilistische modellen worden 
onderworpen aan een gedeeltelijke verificatie- en validatieanalyse. Op basis 
van een reeks testen blijkt het model een goede modelleringsnauwkeurigheid 
te hebben met betrekking tot de methodologie van het responsoppervlak. De 
testen die werden toegepast voor het vereenvoudigde submodel van het 
evacuatienetwerk zorgden ook voor een voldoende 
modelleringsnauwkeurigheid. 
Na de validatie en verificatie wordt de toepasbaarheid van de methodologie 
getest op verschillende case studies. Er zijn twee case studies gekozen, 
namelijk een eenvoudige en een meer complexere gebouwconfiguratie. De 
vereenvoudigde en uitgebreide QRA-methode wordt getest in beide 
casestudies en er wordt een vergelijking gemaakt tussen de resultaten. De 
resultaten tonen aan dat beide methoden kunnen worden toegepast op de 
eenvoudige en uitdagende casestudies. De berekende foutverschillen voor de 
meer uitdagende case study geven aan dat de eenvoudige methode slechts een 
ruwe schatting geeft van de gevolgen voor de bestudeerde gevallen. Vanuit een 
ingenieursperspectief gezien, is een positief aspect van deze foutenmarge dat 
de vereenvoudigde methode over het algemeen conservatievere resultaten 
oplevert dan de meer accurate methode. Daarom kan bij het ontwerpen van 
brandtechnologie een eerste schatting worden gemaakt op basis van de 
vereenvoudigde methode. In het geval dat de resultaten op de grens van 
aanvaardbaarheid liggen kan de beslissing worden genomen om de uitgebreide 
methode toe te passen. 
Het uiteindelijke doel van het proefschrift was om het brandveiligheidsniveau 
van een gebouwontwerp te kwantificeren en het berekende veiligheidsniveau 
te evalueren aan de hand van een vooraf gedefinieerd acceptabel 
risicocriterium. Daarom wordt een voorstel gedaan voor een acceptabel sociaal 
risiconiveau. Het voorgestelde aanvaardbare risicocriterium wordt getest voor 
een case study van een winkelcentrum. De case study is ontworpen volgens het 
vereiste regelgevingskader voor brandveiligheid in drie landen: België, 
Zweden en Nieuw-Zeeland. De Belgische configuratie wordt gekenmerkt door 
grotere uitgangsbreedtes, een rook- en warmteafvoerinstallatie (RWA) en een 
sprinklerinstallatie. De Zweedse en Nieuw-Zeelandse configuratie worden 
gekenmerkt door kleinere uitgangen en enkel een sprinklersysteem. De 
resultaten geven aan dat de Belgische case conservatiever is dan de Zweedse 
en Nieuw-Zeelandse cases. Het veiligheidsniveau van de laatste twee cases is 
vergelijkbaar en vereist een verbeterde redundantie van het sprinklersysteem 
om aan het voorgestelde aanvaardingscriterium te voldoen. 
 
 




The aim of fire safety in buildings is to reduce the consequences for life, 
property, continuity of operations, environment and heritage as much as 
reasonably possible in case of fire. In order to achieve these objectives, fire 
safety measures are implemented to reduce the probability and mitigate the 
possible effects of fire. The choice of measures is often defined by 
governmental institutions through regulatory frameworks. Historically, two 
main regulatory compliance methods have been developed, namely 
prescriptive and performance-based design approaches. Prescriptive designs 
are in principle developed based on trial and error experiences from past fire 
incidents revealing particular issues in safety. In a prescriptive fire safety 
regulatory system it is implicitly assumed that when all the rules of the 
regulation are applied, the fire safety level is acceptable. Prescriptive codes are 
very practical for the design of buildings within the intended scope of the 
regulation. However, advancements in architectural creativity, functional 
demands, structural engineering as well as material sciences have led to design 
and construction of buildings that cannot be covered within these existing fire 
safety related codes.  
As the field of Fire Safety Engineering has evolved, more and more countries 
changed their fire safety legislation proceeding to design buildings in terms of 
objectives and performance. Regulatory formats are objective-based, with 
commonly used performance-based and risk-informed methods, where the 
acceptable safety level assumption becomes explicit and the safety level must 
be demonstrated. These methods have already been applied in some legal 
frameworks (e.g., UK, Sweden, New-Zealand and Australia.). The advantage 
is that these codes promote flexibility, innovativeness and cost-effectiveness. 
The disadvantage is that the qualitative or descriptive nature of the 
performance requirements is sometimes criticized for being subject to 
interpretations and for lacking quantifiable or verifiable performance 
requirements and criteria. Furthermore, the method relies upon the professional 
and ethical competence of the fire safety engineer. Due to these reasons, some 
countries have made efforts to reduce the ambiguity of these codes and 
introduce a shift from a total performance-based code to a “prescriptive” 
performance-based framework by specifying scenarios and parameters to be 
implemented in the analysis, in an attempt to achieve a more uniform safety 
level. However, depending on the case, some fire scenarios and important 
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influence factors might not be addressed. Moreover, the effectiveness of the 
implemented safety systems is often not considered quantitatively. 
As the aforementioned methods show shortcomings, there is a consensus that 
a holistic approach is necessary, in which the building configuration, user, 
content, safety systems and procedures are analysed together  Risk-based 
methods provide a way to evolve towards such a holistic approach. Therefore, 
in this dissertation a probabilistic risk assessment methodology is developed 
to quantify the life safety risk of occupants in the context of fire safety design.   
In order to tackle the challenges, several existing risk concepts and models are 
analysed. Strengths and weaknesses are investigated to incorporate the best 
parts into the methodology. Based on the literature study, a deterministic and 
probabilistic framework is developed. In the deterministic framework focus is 
put on the development of a holistic approach of multiple submodels to 
combine the different influence factors from safety systems, design scenarios, 
evacuation, smoke spread and consequence modelling into one framework. In 
order to take into account the uncertainty of design parameters and reliability 
of safety systems, a probabilistic framework is developed. The method consists 
of multiple probabilistic techniques that quantify the safety level through a 
probability of fatality, individual and societal risk. The core of the method 
consists out of a response surface methodology in combination with sampling 
techniques and convergence methods for reliability analysis. The outcome is a 
computationally efficient model for accurate quantification of the performance 
of fire safety designs. In order to further optimize the computational model, a 
simplified model has been proposed. The main differences from the simplified 
model are the applied submodels for smoke spread and evacuation analysis. 
For smoke spread, a zone model is proposed instead of a field model. For 
evacuation, an in-house network model is developed instead of a continuous 
model.  
The full probabilistic and the simplified models are subjected to a partial 
verification and validation analysis. Through a set of test cases, the model 
proves to have a good modelling accuracy with respect to the response surface 
methodology. The test cases applied for the simplified evacuation network 
submodel also provided a good modelling accuracy. 
After the validation and verification, the applicability of the methodology is 
tested on different case studies. Two case studies are chosen, namely a simple 
and a more challenging building configuration. The simplified and 
comprehensive QRA method are tested on both case studies and a comparison 
is made between the results. The results show that both methods can be applied 
to the simple and challenging case studies. The observed error differences for 
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the more challenging case study indicate that the simple method only provides 
a rough estimate of the consequences for these types of cases. From an 
engineering perspective, a positive aspect of these relative errors of the 
simplified method is that it in overall yields more conservative results. 
Therefore, in fire engineering design, a first estimate can be made based on the 
simplified method. In case the results are on the border of acceptability, the 
decision can be made to apply the comprehensive method. 
The final objective of the thesis is to quantify the fire safety level of a building 
design and to evaluate the calculated safety level against a predefined 
acceptable risk criterion. Therefore, a proposal is made for an acceptable 
societal risk level. The proposed acceptable risk criterion is tested for a 
shopping mall case study. The case study is designed according to the required 
fire safety regulatory framework of three countries: Belgium, Sweden and New 
Zealand. The Belgian case is characterized by larger exit widths, a smoke and 
heat control (SHC) and sprinkler system. The Swedish and New Zealand cases 
are characterized by smaller exits and a sprinkler system. The results indicate 
that the Belgium case is more conservative than the Swedish and New Zealand 
cases. The safety level of the latter two cases is similar and requires an 
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 Context of the research topic 
The aim of fire safety in buildings is to reduce the consequences for life, 
property, continuity of operations, environment and heritage as much as 
reasonably possible in case of fire [1]. In order to achieve these objectives, fire 
safety measures can be implemented to reduce the probability and mitigate the 
possible effects of fire. The choice of measures is defined by governmental 
institutions and is incorporated in their regulatory framework. Sources have 
been found from the 17th century and onwards, indicating development of 
regulations based on experience and rules of good practice. These guidelines 
were applied to traditional building layouts like row houses. Initially, the aim 
of these codes was to ascertain a minimum safety level while keeping the 
impact low [2]. During the past decades, modern building design has become 
more and more influenced by fire safety considerations [3]. Regulations, 
standards and guidelines have been developed and extended in such a way that 
the impact of these requirements has become increasingly significant in the 
decision making process [4,5]. This increased impact is mainly due to the 
higher cost of fire safety measures (up to 10% of building cost [6]), 
technological advancement in industry, and architectural developments. The 
consequence is that building fire safety regulations receive increasingly more 
attention from different stakeholders. Therefore, more and more governmental 
institutions have their current regulatory framework reviewed by fire safety 
and law experts, and look into the possibility of adapting their code to 
overcome the limitations of the regulations [7–9].  
Historically, two main regulatory compliance methods have been developed, 
namely, prescriptive codes and performance based design (PBD) codes [10–
14]. Prescriptive designs or “deemed-to-satisfy” methods are principally 
developed based on trial and error experiences from past fire incidents 
revealing particular issues in safety to the occupants, the fire fighters and the 
community (e.g., Great Fire of London [15], Innovation fire [2], WTC attacks 
[16], nightclub fires [17], Grenfell façade fire [18], etc.). In a prescriptive fire 
safety regulatory system, it is implicitly assumed that when all the rules of the 
regulation are applied, the fire safety level is acceptable [10], [19]. These 
methods are typically applied in civil law regulatory frameworks [7] (e.g., 
Belgium, USA, Germany, France and the Netherlands) because they facilitate 
the implementation and enforcement in this type of legislation [2]. Prescriptive 
codes are very practical for the design of buildings within the intended scope 
of the regulation. However, with the advancements in architectural creativity, 
functional demands, structural engineering, as well as material sciences, 




always be built in accordance with these existing codes. Prescriptive codes do 
not always provide a proper safety level for configurations outside the scope 
of the regulatory framework. Additionally, these codes might not always 
foresee the implications of new technologies that meet the ‘requirements’ yet 
perform substantially differently. An example of this is the relationship 
between fire resistance and cross laminated timber (CLT). Additionally, 
prescriptive fire safety regulations do not provide insight into the obtained fire 
safety level, and compliance with these code requirements does not ensure that 
all buildings are constructed to the same level of safety [20,21]. 
As the field of Fire Safety Engineering (FSE) has evolved, more and more 
countries changed their legislation regarding fire safety and have proceeded to 
design buildings in function of objectives and performance [9]. Developed 
regulatory formats are objective-based [22,23], with commonly used 
performance-based [19,24,25] and risk-informed [26,27] methods, where the 
implicit acceptable safety level assumption in prescriptive rules now becomes 
explicit by showing the verified safety level. These methods have also already 
been applied in several law frameworks [7] (e.g., UK, Sweden, New-Zealand 
and Australia.). The advantage is that these codes promote flexibility, equality, 
innovativeness and cost-effectiveness. Additionally, the actual safety level can 
be quantified [28]. The disadvantage is that the qualitative or descriptive nature 
of the performance requirements is sometimes criticized for being subject to 
interpretations and lacking quantifiable or verifiable performance 
requirements and criteria. Furthermore, the method relies upon the professional 
and ethical competence of the fire safety engineer. Typical PBD methods 
demand various input parameters for analysis of the different fire and 
evacuation scenarios. Some of these variables are the fire growth rate, the 
maximum Heat Release Rate (HRR), pre-evacuation time, affiliation, etc. [29–
31]. The selection of appropriate values to each of these variables requires 
profound expertise in FSE. In traditional available safe egress time (ASET) 
versus required safe egress time (RSET) approaches, the choice of the input 
parameters will have an important influence on the outcome of the safety factor 





Two different FSE analyses of the exact same fire safety design with different 
input parameters will result in different safety factors [32]. For example, an 
engineer adopting non-conservative input values with a lower fraction on the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) ( Figure I.1) will obtain a higher safety 
factor than a FSE adopting conservative input values corresponding to a higher 
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fractile of the CDF. The results obtained from these different input parameters 
will give a distorted view of the actual safety level [33].  
 
Figure I.1: Cumulative distribution function of the fire growth rate for 
warehouse occupancies [34]. 
Due to the reasons stated above, some countries have made efforts to reduce 
the ambiguity of these codes and shift from a total performance based code to 
a “prescriptive” performance based framework by specifying scenarios and 
parameters to be implemented in the analysis [35,36]. This leads to a 
significant reduction in variability in obtained safety levels. However, 
depending on the case, some fire scenarios and important influence factors 
might not be addressed. Moreover, the effectiveness of the implemented safety 
systems is most often not considered quantitatively. In traditional fire safety 
designs, reliability and efficiency are not incorporated in the design fire 
scenarios. Once a safety system is implemented, it is assumed to work and have 
the same reliability during the entire life span of the building. Modern PBD 
codes incorporate a robustness scenario [25,37,38] into their code to take the 
possible failure of active fire protection systems into account. In this scenario, 
the FSE needs to choose one system that fails and analyse the consequence in 
case of this failure. However, the safety system considered to be ineffective 
can be freely chosen by the FSE, which means that the engineer might choose 
a more favourable system to fail. Additionally, effectiveness is not always 
properly implemented. From inspections [39] it is observed that a significant 
portion of active safety systems have a reduced performance when activating 
on demand. This reduced effectiveness should be incorporated into the fire 




inspection should be considered as well. Another disadvantage of defining a 
prescriptive format in a performance-based code is that the responsibility shifts 
back to the regulator and the code becomes less open to creativity and 
technological advancements. 
As the aforementioned methods show shortcomings [27], there is a consensus 
that a holistic approach is necessary, in which the building configuration, user, 
content, safety systems and procedures are analysed together [9]. Risk-based 
methods provide a way to evolve towards such a holistic approach. More 
specifically, quantitative risk assessment (QRA) techniques provide an 
opportunity to determine the safety level in a representative manner because 
both the magnitude and likelihood of hazards versus safeguards can be 
determined [40–41]. One of the main advantages of risk-based probabilistic 
methods is that they take uncertainties into account [5] (in addition to the 
deterministic quantification of scenarios and consequences), whereas in 
deterministic performance based designs uncertainty is generally dealt with by 
using safety factors [42,43].  
 Research scope 
The aim of this study is to develop a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 
methodology to quantify the life safety risk of occupants in the context of the 
creation of a fire safety design. The goal is to objectify prescriptive and 
performance-based design methods by taking the uncertainty of design 
parameters and the reliability of safety systems into account. This is achieved 
by means of implicitly linking the degree of conservative values of the input 
parameters to the output results, through probabilistic methods. The final goal 
of the thesis is to develop a methodology that serves as a guideline for fire 
safety engineers to determine the safety level of various types of fire safety 
designs for different types of buildings. 
Based on the scope of this research, the main objective can be divided into 
different sub-objectives. The first sub-objective is to analyse and situate 
current state-of-the-art risk analysis methods. The purpose is to generate a 
reference level for further analysis. The second sub-goal is to propose a generic 
quantitative risk analysis method that is able to evaluate fire safety designs. 
The method should be able to analyse complicated building configurations and 
take the different important aspects of fire safety design into account. More in 
particular, fire and evacuation scenarios should be quantified objectively, and 
the effectiveness of safety systems needs to be considered. The method should 
be capable of comparing the level of safety of prescriptive and performance-
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based design provisions, to verify performance-based designs with a pre-
defined reference level and to compare different alternative solutions to each 
other. The third sub-goal is to develop a simplified version of the methodology 
that enables to provide a first estimate of the fire safety level. The aim of the 
simplified method is to analyse relatively quickly challenging projects and to 
distinguish between conservative fire safety design options and projects which 
are not on the safe side. The latter will be analysed more in depth with the 
advanced method. The fourth objective is to validate the methodology and 
apply the model to multiple case studies in order to test the feasibility and 
practicality of the QRA-model.  
 Outline 
This thesis contains 9 chapters, grouped into two major parts: 
− In Part A, Chapter I to V, state-of-the-art methods are analysed and 
the generic QRA-framework and simplified method is developed; 
− in Part B, Chapter VI to VIII, the generic QRA-method is subjected 
to validation and testing. The results are compared with proposed 
acceptable risk levels. 
 
After the general introduction in the current Chapter I, a literature study is 
conducted in Chapter II, focusing on different risk analysis tools for life safety 
in case of fire, more specifically on the analysis of existing quantitative 
methods that contain both fire and evacuation analyses. An overview is 
provided of current use of risk assessment methods and their added value in 
FSE. Chapter III describes the deterministic framework. The objective is to 
develop a combination of sub-models that provides consequence outputs for 
the probabilistic analysis. In Chapter IV the probabilistic framework is 
presented. The objective of the framework is to develop a methodology that 
provides a representative quantification of the safety level while considering 
the significant parameters. This is the core of the research. The final goal of 
the chapter is to design a methodology that guides the fire safety engineer 
through the probabilistic analysis to determine the safety level of various types 
of fire safety designs for different types of buildings. In Chapter V, a 
simplified model is proposed to serve as a pre-analysis tool to determine an 
initial estimate of the obtained safety level. The model essentially applies less 





The developed QRA-model is validated and tested in part B. The validation is 
executed in Chapter VI. Multiple parts of the probabilistic methodology are 
validated based on simplified and more complex case studies. The focus is on 
the error estimation of the different models. In Chapter VII, the method is 
tested on two case studies. First a simplified case study analysis is conducted 
as a proof of concept. Secondly, a more challenging case study is investigated 
to assess the validity, feasibility, and applicability of the method. In Chapter 
VIII, research regarding acceptability and comparison of safety levels of 
different countries is performed. A proposal is made for an acceptable societal 
risk level. The proposed acceptable risk criterion is compared with the result 
obtained in Chapter VII. 
Finally, general conclusions and a summary of the research presented in this 
thesis are given in Chapter IX, along with suggestions for further research. 
At the end of the thesis, several appendices are attached regarding studies 
performed during the research that give a wider view on the methods discussed 
in the main part of the thesis.   
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 Introduction and objective 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, a literature study is conducted on different risk 
analysis tools for life safety in case of fire. Many recent publications employ 
the term risk without providing a clear definition of its concept. This might be 
due to the fact that the term risk has wide-ranging meanings, interpretations, 
and methods in disparate disciplines, such as engineering, economics, politics, 
philosophy, etc. Hence, it is necessary to take a closer look at the term risk and 
its corresponding ideas, methodologies, and assumptions with a special focus 
on its application in FSE. In the following sections, an introduction into (fire) 
risk assessment will be provided. The focus is put on the analysis of existing 
quantitative methods that target both fire and evacuation analysis. First, a 
general introduction about risk and risk assessment is given. Next, the 
quantification of risk is discussed. Hereafter, a literature study is performed 
analysing different fire risk assessment models developed during the past 50 
years. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
 Risk 
 Definition of risk 
The aim of building fire risk analysis is to gain insight into fire-related risks to 
better inform stakeholders about the wide range of decisions that must be taken 
as part of building design, construction, and operation. From a general point of 
view, it is very difficult to give a clear definition of risk. Many attempts have 
been made, but one unambiguous definition of the concept of risk is not 
available. Instead of trying to give one definition to the subject, other paths 
have been followed. 
One of those approaches is followed in [1]. In order to cope with risk, an 
answer needs to be provided for the following three questions: 
1. What can happen or what is the scenario? 
2. How likely is it that it will happen or what is the probability? 
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences or what is the damage? 
 
By answering these questions for a specific case, the engineer will be able to 
get an idea of the possible risks related to the project. In [2] an in-depth analysis 
of different views on risk is discussed. In the above consideration of risk, fire 
is the hazard that may induce the loss or harm to that which is valued (e.g. life, 
property, business continuity, heritage, the environment, or some combination 
of these) [3].  
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From an engineering point of view it is practical to consider, for a particular 
scenario (question 1), risk in terms of likelihood (question 2) and consequences 
(question 3) of incidents that could expose people, property and the 
environment to the effects of fire. Likelihood is determined in terms of either 
frequency (how often can it happen?) or probability (what are the chances that 
this will happen?). This can be mathematically expressed as: 
 
./01	or	. = 5 ∗ 7 = 	589: ∗ 	7;<0 (II.1) 
where R is the risk, F is the likelihood of an event and C are the consequences. 
As used in this chapter, risk is defined as the possibility of an unwanted 
outcome in an uncertain situation, where the possibility of the unwanted 
outcome is a function of three factors: loss of or harm to something that is 
valued, the event or hazard that may cause the loss or harm, and a judgment 
about the likelihood that the loss or harm will occur [1]. Specifically for fire 
safety, fire risk is the possibility of an unwanted outcome in an uncertain 
situation, where fire is the hazard that may induce the loss or harm to that which 
is valued (e.g., life, property, business continuity, heritage, the environment, 
or some combination of these). Building fire risk analysis, then, is the process 
of understanding and characterizing the fire hazard(s) in a building, the 
unwanted outcomes (relevant losses or harm) that may result from a fire, and 
the likelihood of fire and unwanted outcomes occurring. 
The purpose of a fire hazard assessment is to identify possible sources of fire 
ignition and various conditions that may result from the fire without 
considering the likelihood of occurrence. Fire hazard assessments typically 
involve surveys of facilities or processes in order to obtain information such as 
potential ignition sources, potential fuel sources, arrangement of fuel packages, 
building and compartment configurations, and presence of fire safety features. 
Armed with this information, one assumes ignition or burning and estimates or 
predicts the fire growth, spread, and impact under a variety of fuel, 
compartment, and fire protection system configurations.  
 Risk assessment and risk management 
Risk assessment is a part of the risk management process which consists of a 
risk analysis and a risk evaluation. The third step in risk management, risk 
reduction, is not included in a risk assessment (Figure II.1). The purpose of a 
risk assessment in general is to assess the risk. In this thesis, the final aim is to 
assess the risk of fire in buildings. The first step of the risk assessment is the 
risk analysis. This is a general term for a large family of different 
methodologies and models. According to the ISO definition, risk analysis is 
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the “systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk”. 
In other words, the analysis includes identification of all possible negative risk 
scenarios. Depending on the type of analysis, this includes a collection of 
quantitative information of frequencies, probabilities and consequences.  
The second step in risk management is the risk evaluation process. Together 
with a risk analysis, an evaluation of the risk is always necessary. According 
to the ISO definition, risk evaluation is “the process of comparing the estimated 
risk against given risk criteria to determine the significance of the risk”. This 
means that risks can be evaluated with a given acceptable minimum criterion 
(Discussed in Chapter 8). During the evaluation process, different alternative 
solutions can be compared to each other.  
In short, the advantages of a risk assessment methods can be explained as 
follows: 
- It describes qualitatively or quantitatively were the problems are in a 
design; 
- It gives a measure of the safety level of a design which can be 
compared to a minimum safety level; 
- It gives flexibility to the designer or architect; 
- It gives the possibility to compare between different alternatives; 
- It allows for optimisation of costs. 
 
 
Figure II.1: Schematization of the risk assessment and management 
procedure. Taken from [4]. 
Risk in FSE 17 
 
 Measure of fire risk 
In order to quantitatively asses the fire risk, it is essential to determine its 
measure. Philips [5] discusses that it is difficult to express risk to life in a way 
that can be understood by the community. This leads to the consideration of 
other metrics for risk. On the other hand, financial damage is the perfect metric 
for the property related risk. However, the primary focus of fire codes is life 
safety, which then requires that risk to life must include a measure of the value 
of human life. This considers the economic value of an individual as the present 
value of the stream of income that he or she expects to earn during the rest of 
his or her working life [5]. The concept that some people have less value to 
society than others has encountered great objection. Thus risk to life is usually 
assessed separately to avoid the difficulty of assigning a monetary value to 
human life. In most risk assessment models fire risk is measured separately 
using different comprehensive parameters. An example is the expected risk to 
life (ERL) and the fire cost expectation (FCE) [6]. ERL is defined as the 
expected number of deaths over the design life of a building, divided by the 
population of the building and the design life of the building. FCE is defined 
as the expected total fire cost, divided by the cost of the building and its 
contents. The ERL value and FCE value can be used for the decision making 
process [7]. 
Frantzich [8] divided life risk into two different types: the individual and the 
societal risk. This was done to make a distinction between the risk to an 
individual and to a group of people. Further, the suggestion was made to link 
the traditional safety factor obtained from ASET/RSET methods with a failure 
probability [9]. The former two types of risk quantification are explained in the 
following sections.  
II.2.3.1 Individual risk 
The principle of individual risk (IR) is defined as the probability of death or 
serious injury to which specific individuals are exposed, and this for a 
particular scenario. Typical individual risks of concern include general health 
risks (e.g., cancer, respiratory disease, heart disease, acute or chronic toxicity), 
safety risks (e.g., burns, asphyxiation, acute or chronic toxicity) associated 
with localized technological hazards (e.g., localized fire, explosion, chemical 
release), risks associated with accidents/unintended incidents (e.g., slips, falls, 
cuts from glazing). Individual risk can also be of concern when related to 
natural hazards and large technological events. 
The individual risk can be expressed in several ways. The way of 
characterisation will depend on the way in which the risk information is 
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intended to be used. As an example, the risk can be characterized using annual 
mortality and population figures. Often a time-based average, or an average  
based on age and gender, is used. In some cases, only specific target 
populations are considered (typically those considered vulnerable 
populations). Significant challenges exist in identifying populations of 
concern, hazards to which they are exposed, means to reflect the risk, data for 
analysis (historical) and data for prediction (e.g., see discussion in Stern and 
Fineberg [10]). In chapter VIII, an in-depth analysis is performed to define 
acceptable individual risk criteria. 
II.2.3.2 Societal risk 
Societal risk is often used when discussing risks associated with hazards or 
events that impact large geographical areas and therefore large numbers of 
people (e.g., natural hazards, such as earthquakes and cyclones, or large 
technological hazards, such as open air chemical releases). A widely cited 
representation of societal risk is the relationship between frequency and the 
number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population 
as a result of the realization of specified hazards. In this way one can 
differentiate between high-frequency/low consequence events and high-
consequence/low-frequency events. This is important because society tends to 
be less tolerant for high-consequence events (consequence aversion).  
Societal risk is most often expressed in terms of the frequency distribution of 
multiple casualty events in an FN-curve. An example is given in Figure II.2. 
FN-curves were developed in the nuclear industry in the 1960s  as a means for 
analysing and communicating the different levels and natures of risks, 
particularly those with the potential for high consequences, but with low 
frequencies [11]. The formula for the curve is given as: 
 





where n is the steepness of the limit line and C the constant that determines the 
position of the limit line. A line with a steepness of n = 1 is called risk neutral. 
If the steepness n = 2, the criterion is called risk averse. In this case larger 
accidents are weighted more heavily and are thus only accepted with a 
relatively lower probability. In chapter VIII, an in-depth analysis is performed 
to define acceptable societal risk criteria. 
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Figure II.2: Example of an FN-curve for a rail connection [12]. 
 Risk models 
Currently, no codes exist that outline detailed methodologies to execute a 
quantitative fire risk analysis. Some codes are under review to provide 
procedures [13]. Some basic guidance is provided in standards [14–16], 
engineering rules of good practice [7,17] and in literature studies [18–25]. 
These guidelines provide a good insight in how to structure a risk analysis. 
However, they often lack details or only focus on specific parts of the method 
or problem at hand. Therefore, in the last decades multiple quantitative risk 
analysis models have been developed. A summary is given in the following 
sections in which a distinction is made between single and multi-submodel 
systems, and integrated fire risk approaches.  Single model systems consist out 
of one deterministic submodel while multi-model systems exist out of a 
combination of multiple deterministic submodels to quantify the risk level. 
Integrated fire risk approaches provide general guidelines and can also have 
multi-model systems, however, the focus is put on the framework and the sub-
models are interchangeable. 
II.2.4.1 Single-model systems 
The first fire risk assessment models were developed in the 70s and consisted 
of single-model systems mainly based on statistical data for dwellings [26] and 
hospitals [27]. These methods, developed by Aoki and Beard, used stochastic 
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techniques to determine the fire risk. In the same period, Ramachandran 
introduced a revolutionary approach in which he combined stochastic 
techniques and correlations for fire loss data to determine the financial and life 
safety risk in case of fire [28,29].  
The COFRA method, developed in the 80’s, systematically assesses the fire 
risk associated with individual, discrete spaces in telecommunication facilities 
by measuring and reporting fire risk values for life safety and network 
integrity. In this method, the focus is put on hierarchy levels of fire safety 
concepts, systems and components. During this period, Ramachandran 
presented his framework for fire growth and probabilistic fire ignition to assess 
property damage [30,31]. In later work (90s), his publications advocate non-
deterministic risk assessment as a useful approach to the problem of fire safety 
[32,33].  
At the end of 90s, fire risk ranking techniques were suggested for fire safety 
analysis [34]. In this method the fire safety level is a function of a list of fire 
safety attributes which are not directly measurable. Although these attributes 
are numerous, it can be said that a relatively small number of factors account 
for most of the problems, and it is possible to reduce the large number of 
parameters to make them easier to work with. Since the number of attributes 
that need to be handled is large, the mathematical operation will be 
complicated if they are all analysed in one operation. Instead, a hierarchy of 
three or more levels can be established in which similar attributes are grouped. 
Each group is then analysed, and the result is used for the analysis at the next 
level in the hierarchy. A weight is assigned to each attribute and criterion. To 
determine these weights, pairwise comparisons are done. To facilitate the 
assessment, surveyors evaluate each attribute in a linguistic score, and all 
scores provide a fuzzy set to determine an overall risk evaluation. 
Several years later, further work was performed based on previous research of 
Ramachandran. Two risk assessment models were developed: the first based 
on the “Probability Tree Method” and the second based on the “Markov 
Analysis” method [35]. Both models incorporate fire test data in combination 
with the two zone model CFAST [36]. 
In the beginning of the 21th century research was done to incorporate Monte 
Carlo methods in statistical fire safety engineering [37]. Further research was 
done by Hostikka who utilized statistics to collect information and gain an 
understanding of elements affecting fire risk [23]. He compared the statistical 
data to that of other countries such as Canada. A fire risk assessment was made 
of residential buildings in China with the obtained statistical data. To this end 
the authors considered the risk of occupant deaths and the risk of the direct 
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property loss. The occurrence of fire was determined by dividing the total 
residential building area by the number of fire ignitions. The risk of occupant 
deaths (resp. risk of direct property loss) was calculated by combining 
occurrence of fire and fire deaths (resp. direct property loss). 
II.2.4.2 Multi-model systems 
With the development of computer science, fire safety researchers were able 
to implement more complete and complex models, and especially multi-model 
systems, which can predict fire and occupant behaviour. These new systems 
permit a better estimate of risk for life than previous ones. These systems are 
mainly based on a sequence of several specific sub-models. 
In the middle of the 80s, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
developed a probabilistic model called the Building Fire Simulation Model 
(BFSM) [38]. The model examined the interrelationships among fire 
development, spreading of combustion products and movement of people. Fire 
growth is defined by discrete steps representing the different observable phases 
of growth. The model developed by NFPA is a step-transition model to 
measure and compare the fire safety levels and building alternative 
configurations. The BFSM consists of five sub-models to quantify the risk 
level. These submodels were analytical models, hence needing few 
computational power. 
In the following two decades, more quantitative fire risk analysis models were 
developed. The most known are FiRECAM [5,39], CESARE-Risk [40], 
FIERAsystem [41], CRISP [42], B-RISK [43], CUrisk [44], SCHEMA-SI 
[45], HAZARD [46], and other probabilistic methods [47]. 
In the 90s, the National Research Council of Canada (NRCC) developed 
FiRECAM (Fire Risk and Evaluation and Cost Assessment Model), a risk 
assessment and evaluation model tailored to the Fire Code of Canada. The 
main philosophy of FiRECAM is based on the work of Beck [48–51] and is 
developed for office and apartment buildings. FiRECAM calculates an 
estimate of the number of deaths and financial losses; these numbers are then 
combined with those of the probabilities of occurrence for various scenarios to 
provide information about the ERL and the FCE. ERL and FCE provide 
valuable information to anticipate the levels of human and financial risk for 
the entire building life. FiRECAM belongs to the modern generation of 
probabilistic assessment models and is built in a modular way. 
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Figure II.3 Flowchart FiRECAM [52]. 
Closely related to FiRECAM is CESARE, which was developed in Australia 
for similar purposes [40,53,54]. It consists of a number of sub-models that 
simulate the dynamic interaction of fire growth, smoke spread, occupant 
response, and fire department intervention. Each of these models calculates a 
different set of simulations for fire growth, occupant behaviour, fire 
department response, and smoke hazards. The probabilistic approach is 
implemented by means of six design scenarios with according probabilities 
based on statistical data. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed 
HAZARD to assess the fire hazard [47]. The methodology consists of a set of 
procedures combining expert judgment and calculations for estimating the 
consequences of a specified fire. The core of HAZARD is a sequence of 
procedures, implemented in a computer software, to calculate the development 
of hazardous conditions over time, to calculate the time needed by building 
occupants to escape under those conditions, and to estimate the resulting loss 
of life based on assumed occupant behaviour and tenability criteria. The 
centrepiece of HAZARD is a zone model of fire growth and smoke transport.  
The CRISP model has a similar structure as the FiRECAM and CESARE 
models [4,55,56]. The model is developed to evaluate the risk of domestic 
houses. However, it is not limited to these types of buildings. It uses random 
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methods to produce possible fire scenarios. The basic concept of the model is 
that a system may be treated as a collection of objects, which may interact in a 
number of ways. The model uses a zone-model for smoke spread and analytical 
models for evacuation and fire brigade intervention. 
 
Figure II.4: A schematic representation of the model CURisk [57]. 
The FIERAsystem sub-model is developed by the same institute as the 
FiRECAM model. The model is developed to evaluate fire protection systems 
in industrial buildings, with a primary focus on warehouses and aircraft 
hangars [59]. The model uses similar sub-models as the FiRECAM model with 
different fire scenarios and the same way of using event trees.  
The CUrisk model is developed to evaluate timber-framed commercial 
buildings [44]. The model uses a deterministic analysis of separate fire 
scenarios (based on event tree model) to calculate the smoke temperatures and 
toxic smoke concentrations. The approach uses a smoke spread, boundary 
failure, occupant response and evacuation model to determine the 
consequences. The model calculates the ERL and the expected risk injury 
(ERI). CUrisk uses Bayesian networks to simulate the fire spread process [59].  
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In France, the Scientific and Technical Centre for Buildings (CSTB) has been 
working on a system called SCHEMA-SI (Stochastic Computation and Hybrid 
Event Modelling Approach) [45,60]. This system is based on hybridization of 
two sub models. On one hand, a sub-model calculates the expansion of fire and 
smoke movements over time. This is a two-zone model named CIFI2009, also 
developed by the CSTB. On the other hand, discrete events, mainly 
representing human behaviour and operation of security systems, are modelled 
using specific Petri nets. CIFI2009 is a multi-compartment two-zone model 
that processes buildings with several compartments. The model uses Monte 
Carlo simulations to take the variability of system components into account. 
Thus, this simulation allows performing many experiments while varying, for 
example, the time of ignition, the location of occupants, and opening doors. 
CIFI2009 is validated for classical geometric shape compartments 
(rectangular). 
B-RISK allows the user to perform Monte Carlo simulations by using 
randomly sampled parameters according to input distributions. In addition to 
the calculation of the fractional effective dose, reduced visibility is also taken 
as a hazard. However, these parameters are calculated for a fixed position in a 
specific room. While egress paths can be specified by the user, the life hazard 
of occupants calculated by using this method is problematic due to the high 
randomness of human behaviour [61]. 
From the above investigated risk models it is observed that most of the 
analysed methods use a combination of simple deterministic sub-models with 
low computational affordance to analyse a large number of scenarios. The 
majority of these risk models implemented similar techniques to analyse the 
life safety problem. The most important are analytical sub-models for e.g. fire 
spread, fire brigade intervention and consequence analysis, zone-models for 
smoke spread and hydraulic or network models for evacuation analysis. The 
probabilistic techniques used in the models are often a combination of event 
tree and simple sampling techniques (e.g. Monte Carlo, etc.). The output is 
presented in terms of fatalities, ERL or FCE. The scope of these models is 
mostly limited to simple office, commercial, and apartment buildings because 
of the simplified methods.  
II.2.4.3 Integrated risk approaches 
The main advantage of the above discussed risk models is the level of 
quantification in relation to the speed of execution. However, the 
disadvantages are the limited scope and the lack of accuracy of the sub-models 
(e.g. smoke spread, evacuation, etc.). Therefore, the focus of the research in 
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the last decades shifted towards the development of more accurate techniques 
and probabilistic frameworks to provide for a more holistic approach.  
Frantzich was one of the main founders for defining a probabilistic risk 
assessment framework in fire safety engineering [8,62]. His work was based 
on the combination of event tree scenarios and simplified deterministic 
techniques. Later on, he refined his technique by means of more accurate sub-
models (e.g. FDS+EVAC) and probabilistic techniques (e.g. Monte Carlo and 
Latin Hypercube sampling) [63]. 
In [64,65], a generic QRA method was proposed to combine engineering and 
data driven approaches. The method is composed of multiple sub-models and 
is supported by state-of-the-art probabilistic techniques using Monte Carlo 
simulations. The model evaluates cost expectation and life safety. The 
advantage of the method is the level of interaction between the different sub-
models over time. The disadvantage is the lower accuracy due to 
simplifications in the different submodels. In [28], an integrated QRA 
approach was presented to quantify the risk for people present in a tunnel in 
the context of a fire hazard in a railway tunnel. The model is composed of a 
smoke spread, an evacuation, and a consequence sub-model in combination 
with probabilistic techniques (bow-tie, limit state design, etc.). The 
methodology enables the user to determine the societal risk and to compare the 
different alternative solutions against each other, with predefined acceptable 
risk criteria. The advantage of the model is that it integrates more advanced 
submodels (e.g. field models, human behaviour, probabilistic toxicity analysis, 
etc.). The disadvantage is that it aims at passenger transport in tunnels and rail 
stations only.  
In [66–68], a probabilistic response surface method (RSM) in combination 
with multiple sub-models was developed. The underlying mathematical 
technique for the RSM is based on Interpolating Moving Least Squares 
regression. The main sub-models used are the Fire Dynamics Simulator FDS 
[69] and its corresponding EVAC software [70]. The method shows promising 
results with respect to combining computational affording models (CFD, 
continuous evacuation models, etc.) and probabilistic techniques. However, 
the framework still shows some important shortcomings to analyse more 
complex designs. The main shortcomings are considered fourfold. Firstly, the 
method is only valid for simple geometries were evacuation and smoke spread 
are straightforward. In case of a more complex geometry, the number of 
volumes and manual actions in applying the model increases significantly. This 
will reduce the efficiency of the model. Secondly, the focus of the method is 
only on RSM for smoke spread, while other submodels such as evacuation 
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could also benefit from the approach. Thirdly, evaluation of risk was 
considered based on a fixed location (e.g. toxicity analysis in front of a door) 
rather than occupant movement based. Fourthly, no extensive validation and 
testing was done for the RSM and several important parameters with respect 
to life safety (e.g. human behaviour, scenario analysis, etc.) were not 
considered.  
More recently, Van Coile did extensive research on reliability and fire risk 
assessment of structural elements [71–73]. In his work he proposed a new 
framework which is included in the new BS 7974 [74]. The framework 
describes the necessary steps to be taken to perform a proper risk assessment. 
His work focuses also on risk acceptability and the role of the ALARP (As 
Low As Reasonable Possible) principle in fire risk engineering. 
 Uncertainty in risk analysis 
In order to perform a QRA, the FSE needs to consider the different types of 
uncertainty related to the choice of the method and take actions to show the 
impact of these uncertainty and how to deal with it. Three types of uncertainty 
can be defined. These are parameter uncertainty, model uncertainty and 
completeness uncertainty [75].  
The first type parameter uncertainty relates to the choice of the parameter value 
for specific input in the models used in the method. These can be ignition 
frequency, fire growth rates, system component failures, etc. Two types of 
parameter uncertainty exist, i.e. epistemic and aleatory uncertainties.  
Epistemic uncertainty is mainly related to the lack of data. This uncertainty can  
be reduced by obtaining more data through tests or keeping historical data. 
Aleatory uncertainty is more related to the randomness of an event.  
The second type, model uncertainty, is related to the uncertainty generated by 
the assumptions and simplifications in the underlying methods of the model. 
This type of uncertainty is further discussed and analysed in Chapter VI. 
Completeness uncertainty is related to whether all the significant phenomena 
and all the significant relationships and scenarios have been considered in the 
QRA. Examples of completeness uncertainty might be that some scenarios 
might be forgotten in setting up the event tree. Others can be that specific 
failure modes in fire safety systems might exist that are not taken into account. 
Specific phenomena (e.g. the effect of wind) might not be taken into account.  
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 Reliability based design 
When evaluating the reliability of a design one has to calculate the probability 
for the design to reach an undesired or unsafe state. Limit state design in fire 
safety engineering has been inspired by structural safety engineering because 
of the extensive experience with reliability analysis in the field. The general 
case of a limit state of a cross-section or construction element can be 
formulated in a limit state equation [76]:  
 
g(H) = Z = R − E = 0 (II.3) 
where	. is the resistance and , is the load. The vector M consists of n basic 
variables. For all the different variable an appropriate probabilistic distribution 
has to be chosen. In case a basic variable has a negligible variation or 
uncertainty, the variable can be considered as deterministic. The function is 
defined so that g(X) > 0 corresponds to a safe condition, while g(X) < 0 
corresponds to failure. For life safety analysis this unsafe state would be 
reached when untenable conditions occur in the considered compartment or 
building before the egress has been completed. Such a limit state function is 
reached when the available safe egress (ASET) is equal to the required safe 
egress time (RSET). In mathematical form: 
 
g(H) = NOPQ − ROPQ < 0 (II.4) 
When fx(x) is considered as the n-dimensional probability density function of 
the n basic variables Xi, then the probability of exceeding the limit state 
condition can be calculated: 
S# = T UV(W)XW
Y(W)Z[
 (II.5) 
Based on the philosophy of structural reliability approached, a third type of 
criterion can be considered, i.e. related to a probability of failure [7]. The 
failure probability can be estimated on system or on concept level. The former 
represents the reliability of fire safety systems (e.g. sprinkler system). The 
latter can be defined in terms of injury, fatality, monetary loss, etc. The period 
is typically one year or the lifespan of the building. In this thesis, when 
discussing the results, the concept of failure probability is defined as the 
probability of a fatality over a one-year period. 
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 Conclusions 
This part of the thesis provides a comprehensive review of available 
probabilistic risk assessment methods applied in the fire domain. Three 
important gaps are identified on the basis of this review: 
- The importance of new models that can account for the stochasticity of 
the phenomenon (fire) and at the same time encompass the accuracy of 
deterministic approaches. 
- The importance of optimization of computer time in order to support 
heavy all-round equations that can describe the phenomenon in its 
totality as well as support multi-room simulations 
- The importance of standardization of data collection from experiments 
and real fire events. There is a need for a database to provide input for 
probabilistic assignment of fire parameters. 
 
From the study it can be observed that the risk assessment community faces an 
important limitation in the availability of accurate data. State-of-the-art models 
with the ability to calculate risk with a high amount of detail are fed with 
inaccurate data. The EU with its member states does not have a common 
protocol for data collection. As mentioned above, adequate statistical data is a 
prerequisite for a full probabilistic risk assessment to quantify the overall life 
safety risk. Local conditions, political decisions and the absence of appropriate 
training dictates the type and form of the fire code, pushing probabilistic risk 
assessment to the periphery of risk science. The absence of this data at a local, 
national or trans-national level moves the focus of data collection to the risk 
assessor making it even more difficult.  
Another important issue that arises from the review is the fact that although 
detailed and thorough risk assessment models exist, they are not used widely 
in practical applications (such as the design of new constructions). Only few 
official legislations and guidance documents advocate the use of probabilistic 
risk assessment for the design of new infrastructure.  
 Suggested approach 
Based on the studied literature and the conclusions drawn from the 
investigation, the remainder of the thesis will focus on the development of a 
probabilistic risk assessment method that deals with the shortcomings 
discussed above. The goal of the method is to objectify designs by taking the 
probability of design parameters and the effectiveness of safety systems into 
account. The framework, that will be developed in chapters III and IV (Figure 
II.5), is a combination of deterministic and probabilistic techniques to assess 
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the reliability of the design and quantify the risk level. The deterministic 
framework is a combination of analytical (fire spread, etc.) and numerical 
(detection time, smoke spread, evacuation, etc) interacting sub-models. These 
submodels give the possibility to analyse complicated building designs and 
analyse the effectivity of safety measures. The probabilistic framework is 
based on a combination of numerical sampling (e.g. LHS and Sobol sampling), 
RSM and reliability techniques to effectively quantify the life safety risk for 
individuals and occupant groups. 
 
Figure II.5: Proposed approach for the PRA method. 
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 Introduction to the framework 
In this chapter, the focus is on the deterministic part for the development of the 
framework to quantify the life safety risk to people in complex buildings in 
case of fire. The objective of the deterministic framework is to develop a 
combination of sub-models that provide explicit outputs for the probabilistic 
framework. The target of the deterministic models is to quantify the injury to 
occupants due to the effects of fire. In the following chapters, these models are 
developed and boundary conditions are set.  
 Problem description 
The main problem for the development of the deterministic framework is to 
design a model that is able to accurately quantify the life safety level in case 
of fire. The challenge for developing such a framework is to choose or create 
different sub-models that provide representative results which are sufficiently 
accurate. Currently, multiple deterministic models exist for analysis of specific 
parts (fire spread, smoke spread, evacuation, toxicity effect, fire brigade 
intervention, etc.) of a fire with respect to life safety. These models do not 
define representative scenarios which should be taken into account for a 
specific problem. Further, they are normally not designed to efficiently interact 
with each other in one holistic risk model and if they are designed to interact, 
they are only applicable to a very small part of building types [1–3]. Therefore, 
research is needed to investigate and develop different model types and to 
design the most optimal models depending on the boundary conditions. 
 Objective 
The main objective of the deterministic framework is to provide accurate life 
safety consequence outputs for deterministic design scenarios in case of fire. 
To achieve the challenge, the following objectives are set: 
1. The model should consider the effectiveness of the safety 
systems.  
2. The framework should assist in defining representative design 
scenarios for fire and evacuation modelling. 
3. The framework needs to consider the most important boundary 
conditions and take into account the different influence factors 
in order to assess the life safety risk.  
4. The models need to be compatible with each other for efficient 
interaction and analysis.  
5. Keeping in mind that the probabilistic framework will demand 
multiple simulations, the deterministic method should be 
designed within computationally affordable limits. 
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 Framework 
In the following sections, the deterministic framework is presented. The 
framework is composed out of different models that interconnect with each 
other (Figure III.1). Based on the first objective, the safety system submodel is 
proposed. The model provides parameter inputs that relate to the effectiveness 
of the implemented safety systems. The efficacy is translated in event tree 
scenarios to determine the consequences. The reliability is determined based 
on fault tree techniques and provided as input for the probabilistic framework. 
For the second objective, the design fire and evacuation scenarios are defined. 
The model defines multiple fire and evacuation scenarios that provide time 
dependent parameters for further analysis in subsequent models. The design 
scenarios provide input for the Smoke Spread model, to analyse the smoke 
spread through the building. The Smoke Spread model provides input 
concentrations and visibility data for the evacuation model that, in its turn, 
provides toxic doses to the consequence model. The final result of the 
deterministic framework is a FED-value for each occupant in the considered 
design scenario. The results from the deterministic analysis output are provided 
as inputs for the probabilistic framework for further analysis to quantify the 
life safety risk level. 
 
Figure III.1: Deterministic framework. 
 Safety System 
The purpose of the safety system submodel is to quantify the effectiveness of 
the different safety systems. First a general description of the concept 
effectiveness is given. Second, methods to determine the effectiveness are 
elaborated. Third, the effectiveness of five types of safety systems is 
elaborated. 
 General  
In order to quantify the effect of safety systems on fire safety designs, the term 
effectiveness is implemented in the model. The overall effectiveness of a fire 
safety system is, in engineering terms, the combination of efficacy and 
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reliability [4–6]. The functional effectiveness gives a measure of whether the 
system will perform adequately for the chosen fire scenarios (e.g., control a 
fire for a sprinkler system). The reliability is a combination of the availability 
of the system and the operational reliability. The availability is the probability 
that the system is available (e.g., water supply) and the operational reliability 
is the probability that the system will work on demand (e.g., pump activation). 
In Figure III.2, a breakdown of effectiveness is given. Efficacy is typically 
determined by the considered fire scenarios (e.g., car vs. retail fire) and 
environmental factors (e.g., wind). The reliability mostly depends on proper 
design (e.g., NBN EN 12845), installation (testing) and maintenance 
(procedures). 
 
Figure III.2: Breakdown structure of effectiveness [4]. 
 Methods to determine the effectiveness 
Three methods are defined to determine the effectiveness of a fire safety 
system: the use of statistical data; fault tree analysis; and event tree techniques.  
III.5.2.1 Statistical data 
The application of statistical data in risk analysis is a powerful tool to quantify 
the effectiveness of safety systems. Based on past incidents, experiments, and 
testing data, frequencies can be obtained for both efficacy and reliability 
analysis. For instance, data on past incidents with sprinkler systems can define 
the level of mitigation in a frequentist approach. The same form of data can 
derive the reliability of a sprinkler system by defining the activation 
probability. Important for statistical data is to understand the scope and 
boundary conditions on how the data has been obtained.  
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III.5.2.2 Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis or FTA is a top-down deductive failure assessment method 
in which a failure of a system is analysed, using Boolean logic to combine 
lower event levels. It is based on the principle of “backward logic”: an event 
delves back into its possible causes and provides a structured method to 
quantify the frequency or probability of initiating events. The advantage of 
FTA, in case of fire, is that it provides a decomposition of the top initiating 
event into factors that contribute to the failure and ignition potential. The 
frequencies and probabilities used in the FTA can include a combination of 
equipment and human failure rate data, plant specific data, probabilities 
supported by deterministic modelling and subjective expert opinion 
probabilities. A general fault tree exists out of the following parts [7]: 
- Initiating top event: an unwanted event or incident at the top of the 
fault tree that is traced down to more basic failures, using logic gates 
to determine its causes and likelihoods. 
- Intermediate events: an event that propagates or mitigates a basic 
event during accident sequences, e.g., smoke detector failure. 
- Basic events: a fault event that is sufficiently basic that no further 
development is judged necessary, e.g., equipment failure rates, human 
failure, and external events. 
- Logic gate: a relationship between input events and a single output 
event. Most typical gates are “And” and “Or”. An “And” gate means 
that all underlying elements are necessary to initiate the event while 
an “Or” gate is used when the underlying elements can each 
individually initiate the top event. 
An example of a fault tree is given in Figure III.3. The fault tree represents the 
fire triangle.  
 
Figure III.3: General fault tree logic. Taken from [7]. 
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FTA is an effective technique to determine the reliability of safety systems. It 
gives insight in the structure of the failure mechanism and provides an 
understandable deduction to basic events. The disadvantage of FTA is that it 
is difficult to use when only a limited amount of data are available. 
III.5.2.3 Event tree technique 
Event tree analysis or ETA is the most frequently used risk assessment 
technique for structuring fire loss scenarios. ETA brings the initiating event, 
sequences, incident outcomes, consequences, and frequencies together. It is 
based on the principle of “forward logic”: from an event people look further 
into possible consecutive consequences. The advantage is that quantitative 
probabilities and consequences can be incorporated into a scenario. In order to 
successfully complete an event tree analysis, the engineer must identify the 
initiating source events, evaluate the performance of the different steps in the 
event tree, and evaluate incident outcomes and consequences. ETA has the 
following advantages [7]: 
- It provides systematic organization of fire loss event stages. 
- It orders events in time-related sequences. 
- It identifies significant top fire loss events for subsequent FTA and 
probability modelling. 
- It allows evaluation of fire detection and protection systems 
alternatives. 
-  It demonstrates the relationship between the success of fire 
performance systems and the potential fire incident outcomes, 
consequences and risk levels. 
A typical ETA model consists of the initiating event, the intermediate or 
pivotal events and the outcomes. It is important that the event tree is structured 
following a timeline. The initiating event consists of a probability or a 
frequency. The intermediate events need probabilities for each branch in order 
to provide a final probability or frequency for every outcome. The 
consequences are determined for each outcome.  
ETA is a very effective technique to determine the efficacy of safety systems. 
Like FTA, ETA gives insight into the structure of the failure mechanism and 
provides an easy-to-understand procedure. The disadvantage of ETA is that an 
extensive amount of information and statistical data needs to available. When 
this is not the case, expert judgement can provide a solution. Also, the number 
of possible outcomes can create problems concerning computational power. 
Grouping outcomes can provide an acceptable solution. 
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 Sprinkler system 
A sprinkler system is an active fire protection system consisting of a water 
supply system, providing adequate pressure and flowrate to a water distribution 
piping system, onto which fire sprinklers are connected. The purpose of the 
fire sprinkler system in the context of this thesis is to mitigate the fire 
conditions during evacuation and fire intervention. Different types of sprinkler 
systems exist, such as pre-action, wet-pipe, dry-pipe, and deluge systems [8]. 
The most used system in public buildings in Belgium is the wet pipe system. 
For the remainder of the thesis, the focus is on this system. Two types of wet-
pipe sprinkler systems are typically implemented: these are the standard 
control mode fire and the ESFR (Early Suppression Fast Response) sprinkler.  
In global terms, sprinkler performance in fires may depend on a series of 
different factors [6] such as building design (e.g., geometry, fire load, HVAC), 
other FSE-systems (e.g., SHC), sprinkler system design (e.g., characteristics, 
technology and redundant elements), lifespan (e.g., inspection, testing and 
maintenance) , and external factors (water supply).  
The objective of the sprinkler system sub-model is to consider the effectiveness 
of this system. To this purpose, the reliability and efficacy need to be 
determined. The reliability will be determined based on available data. The 
efficacy, which reflects the mitigation effect, will be determined based on 
experimental data. Additionally, a sprinkler activation sub-model is 
implemented to determine the time to sprinkler activation.  
III.5.3.1 Sprinkler reliability  
III.5.3.1.1 General 
The reliability of a sprinkler system is the measure of the probability that a fire 
protection system will operate as intended when needed [9]. Two general 
approaches have been used in previous studies to quantify sprinkler 
effectiveness: the component-based (FTA) methods; and the system-based 
(incident data) methods.  
III.5.3.1.2 System based calculation 
For the system based approach, extensive reliability literature studies have 
been done in past research [4–6,9–17]. Surveys from research give figures 
ranging from 38 to 99.5 % [16]. The wide range is partially due to the fact that 
the collection of statistics does not recognise whether or not the fire was large 
enough to activate the sprinkler system or if the sprinkler system failed to 
operate when the fire was large. U.S. statistics [13] indicate that the fire is too 
small to activate sprinkler heads in 44 to 87 % of the fires. The study gives 
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operational reliability ranges between 75 % for educational facilities, 88 % for 
hotels, 90 % for health care buildings, 96 % for apartments, stores and offices, 
and 97 % for public assemblies. 
Studies have reported that the main reason for sprinkler system failure, ranging 
from 33% to 100%  of the reported failure, is that the system was shut off [4]. 
Inappropriate systems, lack of maintenance, and manual intervention are 
reported at frequencies from 5% to 33%.  
Since fires are rare events, system-based studies often do not provide detailed 
information on specific types of sprinkler systems, specific sprinkler system 
configurations, or other present systems. Thus, it is difficult to estimate how 
system improvements such as electrical surveillance of the main valve, or 
improved inspection, maintenance, and testing practices, will improve system 
reliability from system-based studies. Therefore, it is suggested that, given the 
limited amount of information available, the recommended approach to 
estimate the reliability for a specific system is to determine the reliability for a 
general sprinkler system from system-based studies, and to modify the 
probability of failure or success using data from component-based approach. 
The relative contribution of each component to system effectiveness can be 
estimated from the component data, and then the effect of making a change to 
the sprinkler system should then be considered on a comparative basis with the 
base system, rather than on an absolute basis [6].  
In order to estimate the reliability of a general sprinkler system, an in-depth 
analysis of multiple statistical studies was performed for sprinkler systems, 
designed and maintained according to proper standards [18]. Based on these 
studies, a system-based average is defined in Table III.1. 
Table III.1: Reliability of sprinkler systems [18]. 
Assessing general reliability of sprinkler from literature [%] 
Miller [19] 95.8 
Miller [18] 94.8 
Powers [16] 96.2 
Richardson [20] 96.0 
Finucane et al [21] 96.9 
Marryat [22] 99.5 
 Poon [18] 95.5 
Average reliability 96.1 
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From the reference sprinkler system, upgrades can be implemented for various 
components [18]: 
- Provision of a backup water tank for the sprinkler system  
- Provision of a sprinkler valve alarm when turned off and flow 
monitoring alarm (to fire panel and fire brigade)  
- Provision of a backup pump. 
- Provision of subsidiary sprinkler valves serving each sprinkler zone  
- Provision of end-of-line testing  
 
The general impact on the sprinkler performance as a result of the above 
improvements on an upgraded system is depicted in the table below. The 
individual improvements to the Australian Building Code compliant system 
are given in the last column. With the above upgrades implemented, the overall 
improvement of the sprinkler operational reliability increased from about 
95.5% to 99.5% [18]. 
Table III.2: Failure probability of key events for sprinkler operational failure. 
Taken from [18]. 






1. No auxiliary water supply from water tank 1 0.00013 23 
2. No external water supply from mains 
3. 
0.04268 0.000102 22 
3. Water supply cut off or local sprinkler valve 
turned off 
0.0019 0.00450 0.95 
4. Water supply line to riser damaged 1.0E-06 0 1 
5. Sprinkler heads faulty 
6. 
1.0E-06 1.0E-06 1 
6. Sprinkler heads do not issue water 0.04450 0.00450 9.9 
 
III.5.3.1.3 Component based static calculation 
In the static component-based approach, time independent fault trees are 
applied to calculate the failure reliability of the sprinkler system. To construct 
the fault tree, the different components of a sprinkler system have to be known. 
The main components are the water supply (e.g., town mains, storage tanks, 
and pressure tanks), power source (e.g., main town electricity network, 
generator, and UPS), pump sets (diesel or electrical), valves, piping, fire panel, 
and sprinkler heads. In the Figure III.4, an example layout of a simple sprinkler 
system is given. 
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Figure III.4: Example of a sprinkler system. 
Based on the top event, the FTA tree is developed (example in Figure III.5). 
The top event defines the sprinkler failure probability. Four intermediate 
events leading up to the top event are the failure of the water supply (e.g., 
town’s main valve shut-off), water distribution (pipework failure), sprinkler 
head and panel failure. The advantage of this approach is that different system 
configurations can be considered. Simple systems are rewarded and complex 
systems are penalized. Secondly, additional safety measures such as electrical 
surveillance of the sprinkler valves can be reflected in the failure probability. 
  
Figure III.5: FTA for part of a sprinkler system failure. 
The approach discussed in documents from New Zealand insurer Marsh 
suggests to approach the reliability analysis as a failure probability distribution 
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a is the lower value, b is the most likely value and c is the maximum. The 
PERT distribution is considered to be more accurate because the triangular 
distribution overestimates the tales [5]. The distribution parameters describe 
the failure probability in a global sense. The lower value should be considered 
for installations with poor maintenance and the higher values for installations 
with improved maintenance and quality [23].  
The data used from Marsh cannot just be copied because differences in quality 
are expected for installation, inspection, maintenance, etc. New Zealand has a 
long tradition and extensive use of sprinkler systems. Additionally, the 
standard is slightly different. For example, the New Zealand standard 
NZS4541 [23,24] implements electrical surveillance of the sprinkler valves, 
which is not obliged in the European standard EN 12845 [25]. Studies [6] have 
shown that on average 73% of sprinkler failure is caused by the fact that the 
system had been shut off. Therefore, the additional failure rate needs to be 
implemented. Periodic inspection is different from the European standard. For 
different system parts, different inspection rates are required for the NZ 
standard [24]. Another difference is that every sprinkler system is directly 
connected to the fire services by a monitoring system [23]. This measure will 
not affect the direct reliability of the sprinkler system but it will reduce fire 
services intervention times. Therefore, the data obtained from Marsh needs 
adaptation to the considered conditions. 
III.5.3.1.4 Component based time-dependent calculation 
In addition to static components failure calculations, time dependent factors 
can be included. One of the most important factors affecting sprinkler 
reliability is maintenance and inspection. Grandison et al. suggested to express 
component reliability using an exponential time dependent function [26]: 
.(\) = 9]^_ (III.1) 
where .(\) is the reliability of the component at time t and	` is the failure rate.  
A failure rate of 0.00036 was found for standard sprinkler systems [26]. Using 
this correlation, the effect of increased periodical maintenance can be 
considered in the reliability calculation of the system. For the failure rate 
discussed above, a yearly or monthly maintenance will obtain a reliability of 
the sprinkler system (PES) of 93.71% for yearly or 99.46% for monthly 
maintenance. In the Figure III.6, the decreasing reliability of the system is 
visualised for both monthly and yearly maintenance. 
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Figure III.6: Reliability of sprinkler system in function of maintenance. 
For systems in parallel, the calculation procedure is different when both 
systems are active or when one system is in stand-by modus. For active 
systems, the standard binomial distribution is applicable for calculation of the 
reliability: 




gEd]c        (III.2) 
Where n is the number of components, r is the number of failures which the 
system can withstand, k is the number of failure events and Q is the failure 
probability. For stand-by systems, the Poisson distribution needs to be applied. 
The system reliability . is: 





        (III.3) 
Where λ is the failure rate is. 
III.5.3.1.5 Practical applications 
Typical applications for public buildings in Belgium according to the NBN EN 
12845 are between OH1-OH4 (restaurants, car parks, shopping mall, etc.). 
These applications only demand one pump set. For applications with higher 
risks a secondary redundant pump set is required. When calculating the 
reliability of the system, the additional backup pump can be used as 
compensating measure in order to increase the reliability of the system. It is 
important to notice that a redundant pump will increase the initial reliability 
but has no effect on the influence of proper maintenance and inspection over 
time on the reliability. 
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In general, it can be assumed that the reliability of sprinkler systems directly 
connected to the public water network will have a high reliability because no 
pump with power supply is necessary. Additionally, less valves with single 
point of failure are necessary in the system. Not only will the initial reliability 
increase, also the influence of proper maintenance and inspection over time 
will be lower. An example of this case with direct mounting on the water 
network is presented in Figure III.7. In this figure, the main contributors to 
unreliability are presented. 
 
Figure III.7:  Sprinkler system utilizing only town main and without pump. 
III.5.3.2 Sprinkler efficacy 
In this section, the efficacy of the sprinkler system is investigated. A distinction 
is made between the activation of the sprinkler and the effect of the sprinkler 
on the design fire after activation. First the activation time is determined that 
will give input to determine the effect on the fire scenario.  
III.5.3.2.1 Sprinkler activation time 
The sprinkler activation time is typically determined by means of a heat 
detector response model. Different response types methods exist to determine 
the activation time. The two main categories are analytical and numerical 
models.  
The estimation of sprinkler activation by analytical models is done by fire 
plume and ceiling-jet models, which estimate the temperature and velocity of 
fire gases flowing past a detection device [27]. The heat transfer from fire to 
smoke and from smoke to sprinkler is calculated by means of explicit formulas. 
The advantage of analytical models is that they give a quick indication by 
means of hand calculations. The disadvantage is that they are less accurate and 
cannot take into account ventilation effects. 
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Numerical models, such as zone-models (CFAST, BRZANFFIRE, etc.) and 
field-models (e.g., FDS, SMARTFIRE, etc.), are used to take case specific 
features into account. Field models are more complex and are used when 
accuracy or special conditions (e.g., geometry, etc.) become significant. 
For the purpose of the thesis it is assumed that sprinkler activation, represented 
by a ceiling jet model, is sufficiently accurate considering that other 
uncertainties are larger (e.g., evacuation into account). The ceiling jet model is 
a simple time dependent numerical model that determines the sprinkler 
activation time by iterating the temperature of the sprinkler bulb and the hot 
gas temperature. The model takes into account different fire, geometry, and 
sprinkler parameters. The Heat Release Rate (HRR) is considered one of the 
most sensitive parameters in the model [28]. For modelling the fire growth rate, 
two main fire size modelling approaches have been applied: the steady-state 
fire and the t2 growing fire [29]. The former is used to obtain a crude estimate. 
The approach is implemented in the DetAct-QS model [30]. The latter is 
considered more accurate considering the detection in the initial stage of the 
fire. The approach is implemented in the DetAct-T2 model and discussed more 
in detail [29]. 
In order consider the effect of a growing fire on the time to sprinkler activation, 
Heskestad and Delichatsios [8] presented functional relationships to model the 
temperature and velocity of fires whose heat release rates grow according to 
the power-law relationship. They developed an analytical solution for the 
change in detector temperature. The approach and procedure is implemented 
in the model by means of Python code [31]. 
III.5.3.2.2 Sprinkler effect 
The purpose of this section is to propose a method to quantify the effect of an 
activated sprinkler system on the fire scenario. This by modifying the HRR 
curve discussed in section 6. 
III.5.3.2.2.1 Literature 
In literature [4], the functional efficacy is often measured based on the number 
of sprinkler heads that should activate. However, this is not necessarily a 
proper measure of functional effectiveness, as an excessive number of 
sprinkler heads may open due to faults with the system or poor operational 
procedures.  
The most common reason for sprinkler systems to operate ineffectively was 
that the water did not reach the fire, ranging from 19% to 55% of the reported 
cases. An inappropriate sprinkler system for the corresponding fire was the 
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second most commonly reported reason, followed by an insufficient amount 
of released water.  
For traditional design fires, the effect of the sprinkler system is taken into 
account by cutting the HRR off at the activation time (curve c in Figure III.8). 
This is considered a conservative approach because it is likely that control 
mode sprinkler extinguish the fire [15,32]. Lindsten concluded that fires are 
extinguished by a sprinkler system in 50% of the fire tests [33]. This percentage 
is also confirmed in Table III.3 In the other fire tests, the HRR was reduced or 
kept constant.   
 
Figure III.8: Effect of suppression system on HRR. Taken from [8]. 
Table III.3: Sprinkler reliability studies [10]. 
System performance Range 
Sprinklers operate 95-97 
Sprinkler control but do not extinguish 64-95 
Sprinkler extinguish     48-96 
 
The effect of sprinkler systems on different room configurations is investigated 
in several experiments [34]. Based on these experiments, an expression was 
developed in order to quantify the reduction of the heat release rate after 
sprinkler actuation [34]: 
g	 = gmn_9[.[[pq_ (III.4) 
Where: 
g HRR rate at a given time after sprinkler actuation [kW] 
 g*r\ HRR at sprinkler actuation [kW] 
t Time after sprinkler actuation [s] 
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The above defined design scenario should be applied to rooms with 
configurations with limited shielding of burning materials. In case of shielded 
fires, the HRR should be analysed more in-depth. 
The effect of sprinkler system activation on the HRR curve is implemented in 
various regulatory frameworks. In New Zealand, a constant HRR after 
sprinkler activation is applied in the C/VM2 [35]. An exponential reducing 
HRR from activation onwards is applied in the UK in the PD7974-4 [36]. In 
Germany, a constant HRR is applied for the first 5 min and afterwards a linear 
reducing HRR is applied for 25 min until the fire is extinguished [37]. In 
Sweden, a constant HRR is utilized for the first minute after activation, 
afterwards, the HRR is kept constant at 1/3 of the HRR at sprinkler activation. 
The Netherlands apply a constant 50% reduction of the HRR after sprinkler 
activation. In France, the effect of sprinkler systems is not directly taken into 
account in the LCPP Guidelines [38]. 
 
 
Figure III.9: The effect of sprinkler activation on the HRR and total heat load 
for different regulatory frameworks. 
III.5.3.2.2.2 Effect of sprinkler system on soot production 
The effect of sprinkler systems on smoke movement and soot production 
should be considered because the water droplets will cool down and partially 
inert the smoke [15,39]. The smoke will descend and the soot production will 
increase [40]. For small compartments, the former is more important and for 
larger compartments the second effect will take the overhand due to large 
distances from the fire [41]. The inertization gives rise to incomplete 
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by up to a factor of 10 [39,42,43]. Other experiments showed that despite the 
elevated toxicity yields per unit fuel, the toxicity levels were still significantly 
lower when sprinkler systems operated, because the full mass loss rate 
decreases significantly.  
III.5.3.2.2.3 Suggested sprinkler design fire scenarios 
Based on the literature discussed above, the efficacy of the sprinkler system 
can be described by an event tree approach [5], i.e. the efficiency can be 
represented by multiple realistic fire scenarios: 
- Sprinkler failure: effectiveness of the sprinkler is 0%. The HRR is not 
affected by the sprinkler system. 
- Sprinkler shielded: efficacy of the sprinkler is reduced1 so that the 
HRR is reduced to a fire in the largest shielding object. 
- Sprinkler control mode: the efficacy of the sprinkler is considered cut 
off. In specific applications a reduction of the HRR after the cut-off 
can be applied as presented in Figure III.9. 
- Sprinkler extinguishment: the sprinkler operates better than designed 
for and extinguishes the fire. 
 Fire Detection 
III.5.4.1 General  
A key aspect of fire protection is to identify a developing fire emergency in a 
timely manner, as well as to alert the building's occupants and fire emergency 
organizations. This is the role of the active fire detection and the alarm systems. 
Depending on the anticipated fire scenario, building and use type, number and 
type of occupants, and criticality of contents and mission, these systems can 
fulfil several main functions. The purpose of the fire detection sub-model is to 
determine the detection time between the start of the fire and the time at which 
the transmission of an alarm notification signal is sent to the control panel. 
From the control panel, different actions are taken, depending on the fire safety 
design. The system may activate the alarm, alert security and emergency 
services, shut down electrical and air handling equipment or special process 
operations, and it may be used to initiate automatic suppression systems. 
Different types of fire detection systems exist. The most important systems are 
smoke, heat, and flame detection. A description of different fire detection 
systems was elaborated in [44]. In the following sections, the focus is on smoke 
and heat detection. The reliability and efficacy of the fire detection system is 
                                                        
1 The sprinkler standards typically take this into account in the form of a safety a factor 
by increasing the operational discharge area. 
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investigated considering that the system is in compliance with standard NBN 
S21-100 [45]. 
III.5.4.2 Reliability 
Several system based studies have been performed to analyse fire detection 
system reliability [4,5,11,46]. A summary of reliability estimates are presented 
in the table below.  
Table III.4: Smoke Detection System Reliability [11]. 







Residential Apartments 0.693 0.699 0.687 
 Hotels/motels 0.778 0.793 0.764 
 Dormitories 0.863 0.884 0.843 
Commercial Public assembly 0.679 0.698 0.659 
 Stores & Offices 0.717 0.735 0.699 
 Storage 0.682 0.7 0.663 
 Industry 0.802 0.813 0.791 
Institutional Care of aged 0.849 0.866 0.833 
 Care of young 0.84 0.863 0.816 
 Educational 0.769 0.796 0.741 
 Hospital & clinics 0.833 0.854 0.812 
 Prisons and jails 0.842 0.859 0.825 
 care of mentally 
handicapped 
0.875 0.903 0.848 
 
The results depicted in the table above show high failure rates for smoke 
detection systems. The reliability values are potentially low due to the share of 
smouldering fires in which ionization and heat detectors are more likely to fail. 
In other studies [47], failure rates are determined from testing and inspection 
for smoke and heat detectors for systems maintained according to the NFPA 
72 [48]. The results are presented in Table III.5. 
Table III.5: Smoke and heat detector failure rates and main cause of failure  
[48]. 
System type Annual failure rate Main cause 
Photoelectric Smoke Detectors 0.0041 Alarm test failed 
Ionization Smoke Detectors 0.0089 Failed sensitivity 
Heat detector 0.0018 Alarm test failed 
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Besides the studies mentioned above, other research has been done regarding 
reliability analysis of smoke and heat detection systems. From these studies, 
the reliability rates varied between 60% and 94% [4]. 
III.5.4.3 Efficacy 
In the next phase, the efficacy of the detection system is evaluated. For fire 
detection systems in general, the performance measure is that the system 
detects the fire in a timely manner and passes the signal to the main fire panel. 
According to [4], the efficacy is highly dependent on the design basis and fire 
scenario. Specifically, the selection of a detector type suitable for the fire 
scenario is important (Table III.6). 
Table III.6: Failure probabilities for different detector types in multiple fire 
scenarios [4]. 
Detector type Smouldering fire Flaming fire 
Ionisation 0.558 0.198 
Photoelectric 0.041 0.04 
Fusible link 0.999 10-8 
 
In this thesis, the functional effectiveness of the detection is considered as a 
measure of the time to a non-false detection. A distinction is made between 
smoke and heat detection. 
Predicting smoke detector response to a growing fire requires calculating the 
time dependent evolution of the smoke concentration in the ceiling jet. 
Typically, the temperature rather than the smoke concentration is used to 
predict smoke detector response due to the availability of correlations for 
ceiling jet temperatures and the assumption that smoke concentration can be 
related to ceiling jet temperature. Using temperature to predict smoke detector 
activation is a conservative approach [49] because of delays due to heat 
transfer [29]. This makes them practical for engineering purposes. However, 
Davis et al. discussed that these methods are less realistic because they ignore 
differences in the production of smoke by burning materials that may 
completely invalidate a temperature/smoke prediction correlation [49]. 
Therefore, algebraic correlations for smoke and CO concentration in the 
ceiling jet in the presence of a smoke layer are developed [49]. The algebraic 
method is investigated by means of a case study in which the model is 
compared with the ceiling jet [30] and field model [50] described in the 
sprinkler sub-model.  
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The efficacy of the heat detection system is determined in the same way as the 
sprinkler activation method. The time to activation is obtained from 
implemented methods.  
 Fire Alarm system 
The alarm can be triggered automatically by detection devices, if installed, 
such as smoke detectors, sprinklers, or heat detectors, or by an occupant 
activating a manual pull station. In the context of the thesis it is considered that 
detection devices are present in the building.  
The main issue regarding the reliability of the alarm system is procedure 
implemented for the building. Typically, a delay is applied in order to avoid 
false alarm. After this delay the alarm should start automatically. However, 
two problems can occur: the first issue is whether the alarm is wrongly 
considered as false alarm, the second when the automatic alarm system is the 
pre-programmed to be overruled.  
In [4], a differentiation was made between simple and complex systems. The 
reliability of this component for a simple system is relatively high, with an 
assumed expected value of 99.41% based on panel reliability. For variability, 
the distribution is set with one standard deviation giving an upper bound of 
100% reliability. For complex systems the reliability of the system is assumed 
to be similar, to control components of a smoke management system such as a 
stairwell pressurisation system. The expected reliability of this system is 88%. 
The upper bound reliability is estimated as 98.4% and for variability this is set 
as 2 standard deviations from the mean. 
The efficacy of the system is considered 100 % when the system is designed 
according to the standard NBN S21-100 [45] and when no time delay for alarm 
activation has been appointed. 
 Smoke and heat control 
III.5.6.1 General 
A smoke and heat control (SHC) system is an active fire protection system that 
mitigates the fire conditions and controls the effluents of the fire. The objective 
of the SHC system is two-fold. The first goal is to prevent fire spread by 
reducing temperatures and therefore reducing the chance of flashover. The 
second and main goal is to increase life safety of the occupants and assisting 
fire brigade by preventing accumulation of lethal concentrations and exposure 
to heat in the compartment of origin. Two basic approaches can be adopted at 
the design stage: either the smoke must be contained, or it must be extracted. 
Smoke containment may be achieved by use of physical barriers such as walls, 
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smoke screens, downstands, etc. Containment may also be achieved by the use 
of pressurization systems to provide adequate pressure to resist the flow of the 
smoke entering a compartment or staircase. Smoke extraction, natural or 
mechanical, extracts smoke from the compartment of fire origin. The purpose 
is to maintain tenable conditions for evacuation or/and fire brigade 
intervention. For natural systems the size of the openings is determined and for 
mechanical systems the extraction rate is specified per units of volume. 
Depending on the geometry (e.g., inclined roof, etc.), environmental conditions 
(e.g., wind, etc.) and other fire safety systems (e.g., sprinklers, etc.) natural or 
mechanical systems are preferred [51,52]. In the next subsections, the focus is 
on different types of SHC systems. First, the standard SHC systems are 
discussed. Secondly, staircase pressurization system is investigated.  
III.5.6.2 Smoke and heat ventilation 
III.5.6.2.1 Reliability 
Limited research has been done with respect to reliability of SHC systems. 
Zhao estimated SHC reliability using fault tree analysis [53]. The investigation 
concluded that zoned SHC have a reliability of between 52% and 62% for 
buildings with more than 5 and less than 20 floors. In Figure III.10, the top 
level of the designed fault tree developed in this research is depicted. In order 
to use the discussed reliabilities, the design is considered to be designed 
according to the NBN S21 208-1 [54] or standard 12101-5 [55]. 
 
Figure III.10: Smoke control system fault tree [53]. 
Klote reviewed the reliability of five smoke management systems with 
increasing system complexity [56]. The research showed that the reliability of 
the system declined rapidly based upon the assumption that there was no 
redundancy in the system’s design (i.e. any single failure would be critical). 
The results of the research is shown in Table III.7.   
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Table III.7: Smoke System Reliability [56]. 
Case # of HVAC 
fans 
#  of other 
components 
Reliability 
1 3 0 0.97 
2 0 3 0.83 
3 3 9 0.56 
4 5 18 0,31 
5 5 54 0.03 
 
Twelve existing buildings were inspected for reliability of their fire protection 
systems in Denmark [57]. The research concluded that all twelve buildings had 
deficiencies that can result in a situation where parts of the system will be non-
functional. One of the reasons for the high failure rate is because at that 
moment only smoke detection and sprinkler systems are being inspected 
properly by an independent accredited company. Maintenance and inspection 
are not properly performed on SHC systems. 
III.5.6.2.2 Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the smoke and heat control system is determined by 
analysing deterministic fire scenarios with the Smoke Spread model discussed 
in section 6.  
III.5.6.3 Pressurization system 
The objective of staircase or compartment pressurization is to prevent smoke 
infiltration through openings into the zone of overpressure. Staircases for high 
rise buildings are equipped with pressurization systems in order to provide safe 
escape for longer evacuation times. The code requirements for these systems 
typically demand a pressure difference to the adjacent floors or a minimum air 
inflow velocity into the fire floor by upper and lower bounds. Meinert 
summarized different code requirements in [58,59]. 
III.5.6.3.1 Design 
The purpose of the pressurization system is to generate an overpressure in the 
staircase to avoid smoke infiltration in case of fire. A typical design consists 
of a fan inlet, a shaft to distribute the air flow, one or multiple dampers to 
distribute the smoke and pressure relief dampers (Figure III.11). 
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Figure III.11 Schematic representation of pressurization systems. 
Based on experiments and rules of good practice, several standards have been 
developed in different countries [AUS/NZ], [60,61]. The overpressure in the 
staircase should be provided between a lower and an upper limit. The lower 
limit is to avoid smoke entrance in the staircase, typically a minimum of 20 Pa 
is used to obtain a minimum of 1 m/s air velocity when the doors open. The 
upper limit is set to avoid that staircase doors cannot be opened due to high 
pressures. Typically a maximum of 60-80 Pa is used [4,60–62]. This boundary 
condition leads to the necessity for the sectioning of stairwells by means of 
multiple injection points for heights greater than approximately 30 m. Noise 
levels are not considered one of the key performance criteria. In this thesis it 
is assumed that the design corresponds to the Belgian legislation [63] or 
European standard [60]. 
III.5.6.3.2 Reliability 
Limited research has been done with respect to reliability of pressurization 
systems. Zhao assessed the reliability of pressurization systems by fault tree 
analysis  [53]. The research concluded failure rates in the order of 90 %.  
Based on the design of pressurization system, a fault tree can be developed to 
determine the reliability of the system. In Figure III.12, an example is given. 
The top-level failure components are detection system, door and staircase, 
damper, fan, and control panel. From literature it was observed that the main 
failure mode is the failure of the fan and dampers [64].  
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Figure III.12: Efficacy 
The system is considered efficient when no smoke enters the staircase in case 
of fire. This is assumed to happen when sufficient pressure is provided across 
the smoke barrier. The NFPA 92A provides different pressure values necessary 
to overcome smoke entrance under closed doors conditions. The minimum 
pressure requirement in a fully sprinklered building is only 12.5 Pa because 
temperatures are not expected to increase beyond 93°C due to cooling and 
lesser likelihood of smoke generation. 
Table III.8: Proposed min design pressure differences across smoke barriers. 
Adapted from [8]. 

















This means that the efficacy of the system can be defined as the probability of 
obtaining the necessary pressure difference at the level of the incident floor. 
Therefore, an event tree needs to be developed that considers the different 
evacuation and fire scenarios. The output provides, for every design scenario, 
different levels of smoke leakage flow coupled with a probability of 
occurrence. These can be classified in non/minor toxicity (< 50 ppm CO), 
medium toxicity (< 1000 ppm) and high toxicity (> 1000 ppm). 1000 ppm is 
the level of CO toxicity an average healthy adult male can withstand during 
half an hour of exposure before becoming unconscious. 
The multiple deterministic scenarios can be analysed by the smoke spread 
model for staircases. The model is discussed in section 8.  
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 Fire compartmentation 
The performance of passive fire protection systems is typically taken as a 
given, providing they have not been compromised during commission. Their 
effectiveness can however vary widely depending on the nature of the fire 
scenario, the design of the system, and damage to the system. Passive systems 
are arguably more vulnerable to other trades or occupants compromising them, 
to physical damage, etc. in ways other systems are not. These systems are not 
always installed or inspected correctly, and ongoing maintenance is difficult. 
From inspections in public buildings it was observed that there are many 
shortcomings with respect to passive fire protection [65]. Especially 
shortcomings related to doors, ducting, and piping are frequently found in 
buildings. During these inspections, 92% of the analysed buildings had one or 
more shortcomings related to doors and 88% of the buildings had one or more 
shortcomings related to ducting and piping. 
For the purpose of the thesis, the effectiveness is considered optimal when no 
failure occurs. Therefore, the focus is only on the reliability of the systems. 
Two approaches are analysed in order to determine the reliability of the fire 
compartmentation concept: the system based approach and the component-
based approach.  
III.5.7.1 System based calculation 
For the system based approach, the results obtained in [4] can be implemented. 
Depending on the type of building and whether a sprinkler system operates 
(Table III.9), fire spread to other parts of the building can be reported. In this 
way, different design fires can be developed. 
Table III.9: Probability of fire spread to other parts of the building. Taken 
from [4]. 








Confined to object of origin  0.69 0.46 0.68 0.47 
Confined to area of origin 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.23 
Confined to room1 of origin 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.08 
Confined to fire cell2 of origin 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Confined to floor of origin 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Confined to structure of origin 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.15 
Extend to structure of origin 
 
0 0.02 0 0.02 








2 Fire cell as in compartment 
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III.5.7.2 Component based calculation 
When the component-based approach is applied, every type of wall, openings 
or specific penetrations needs to be considered in terms of fire spread. A fault 
tree towards each surrounding compartment needs to be taken into account 
(Figure III.13).  
 
Figure III.13: FTA for fire separation. 
In Table III.10, the data obtained from [4] and the British standard [66] is 
presented. This data can be implemented in the event tree model.  
Table III.10: Reliability data for passive fire protection systems. Adapted 
from [4] and [66]. 
Component Operational reliability 
Masonry wall 0.95 
Drywall 0.95 
Reinforced concrete 0.99 
Self-closing Fire door 0.9 
Probability of fire door being blocked open 0.3 
Probability of self-closing doors failing to close on demand  0.2 
Penetration seals 0.999 
Fire dampers 0.997 
 
 Design Fire Scenario 
In this part of the method, the fire scenario is developed for further analysis in 
the subsequent deterministic models. Design fires have been widely 
investigated in the past [67–69]. Based on the research, the design fire is 
divided into four sub-categories (Figure III.14): location, ignition, fire spread, 
and effluents. The amount of smoke production is determined by the smoke 
spread model. The most important input data required to define the fire 
scenarios are the building configuration, occupation and environmental 
conditions.  
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Figure III.14: Model for developing design fire scenarios. 
In Figure III.15, a timeline is presented for a general fire and evacuation 
scenarios. The purpose of the timeline is to give a visual representation of both 
scenarios. It is important to remark that only the initial phase of the fire, until 
evacuation of self-reliant persons has finished, is analysed in the context of the 
thesis. 
 
Figure III.15: Timeline for the fire and evacuation scenario. 
 Location 
The location of the fire can be determined based on the building layout and 
functionality. The purpose is to choose fire locations which give a proper 
representation of the possible fire locations in the building. Important aspects 
are the size of the room and compartment. A fire in a smaller storage room will 
behave differently from a fire in an open landscape office. For larger rooms, 
multiple fire locations might be necessary to give a proper representation. 
When concealed spaces are present, the additional fire risk should be taken into 
account.   
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 Ignition 
For the quantitative estimation of fire risks, one of the most sensitive 
parameters is the fire ignition frequency. Correlations to determine the fire 
frequency are mostly derived from relevant building stock and fire statistics.  
The probability of a building catching fire has been known to depend on factors 
such as occupancy type and building size [70,71]. In general, it is assessed that 
the larger the building and the more human interaction, the higher the fire 
frequency. A literature review is performed of nine fire frequency data studies 
in Appendix A [72–80]. In the first eight studies, the frequency is determined 
based on occupancy type and surface area. In the last study, the frequency is 
based on occupancy type and building volume. In four of the nine studies, 
correlations that represent the ignition frequency per unit area are developed. 
In Figure III.16, these four correlations are presented for retail premises. The 
results show a significant difference for the different correlations depending 
on the surface area. Based on the literature discussed above, it is suggested to 
consider the correlations in which the frequency per unit area depends on the 
surface area, because it can be assumed that larger buildings will have higher 
general safety measures and procedures (e.g., material housekeeping) that 
reduce the overall fire frequency. Therefore, the larger the building, the smaller 
the likelihood of a fire to take place per unit floor area per year. Based on this 
assumption, the four correlations provided in [75,76,79,80] can be applied for 
retail spaces. It is suggested to apply the average of the four curves (yellow 
curve) and the outer boundaries as uncertainty. The older data provided in [74] 
is not taken into account. It is important to emphasize that the frequency should 
be calculated per building and not per compartment.  
 
Figure III.16: Ignition frequency per unit area for a retail building. 
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 Fire Spread 
III.6.3.1 Initial Fire growth  
From ignition onwards, the initial fire spread is modelled by using a t2 fire. A 
quadratic fire spread is the most common approach to model primary fire 
growth [8]. In [8], several examples of quadratically growing fires are 
presented. The fire growth is expressed by the parameter s and typically 
represented by a log-normal distribution for applications in QRA. In Table 
III.11, parameters for different occupancy types are presented [81]. The 
expected fire growth parameter and 95th percentile values are included to give 
a proper interpretation of the physical meaning of the distributions.  
 
Figure III.17: t2 fire growth application and location of 95-percentile of 
different building types 
Table III.11: Log-normal parameters of the distribution of fire growth 
parameters for each occupancy group in the other sampled building fires. 
Adapted from [81]. 
Occupancy group µtuY stuY E(s) [kW/s2] svw [kW/s2] sxD[kW/s2] 
Care homes -7.7 1.1 0.001 0.003 0.012 
Educational -7.2 0.8 0.001 0.003 0.012 
Hospitals -7.1 1.3 0.002 0.007 0.012 
Hotels -7.7 2.1 0.004 0.014 0.012 
Offices -7.1 1.8 0.004 0.016 0.012 
Schools -7.3 2.0 0.005 0.019 0.012 
Public buildings -6.2 1.9 0.012 0.045 0.046 
licensed premises -6.6 2.2 0.016 0.053 - 
Retail -5.4 1.9 0.027 0.101 0.046 
Factories -5.9 2.2 0.03 0.100 - 
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Albrecht suggested to apply an incubation period to account for the initial 
smouldering combustion [82], because it can significantly impact the course 
of events in life safety analysis, such as the reduction of the pre-movement 
time due to occupant reactions to fire cues (visible smoke, smell, etc.) or the 
activation of smoke detectors [37] and connected systems such as smoke and 
heat exhaustion. However, based on the literature [81], the incubation period 
is indirectly taken into account through the values reported in Table III.11. 
The fire is considered to grow until under-ventilated conditions occur or until 
the fire is considered to reach its maximum surface area limited by building 
configuration, fuel load, fire safety systems, firefighting, etc. It is considered 
here that under-ventilated conditions occur in smaller rooms (e.g., storage, 
office, etc.) mainly due to flashover and that the time to flashover is determined 
by the expected HRR for flashover:  
gyż 	= 610	|ℎc*~*uÄuÅ
Ç/p
         (III.5) 
Where: 
ℎc Effective heat transfer coefficient [kW/m2K] 
 *~ Total internal enclosure surface area [m2] 
*u Area or weighted area of opening [m2]. 
Äu  Height of opening [m] 
 
It is important to mention that this formula is only valid for vertical openings 
and not horizontal openings. When multiple openings *u are present, the 
weighted average is calculated according to the method discussed in [83]. 
These can be fixed openings, doors, broken windows, etc. The probability of 
(fire)doors being open is discussed in part 5. Just like door openings, air supply 
by means of window breakage is implemented in the model. In order to 
determine the breaking point and surface area of failure of windows, an 
analysis of past experiments is performed (Appendix B). Based on the 
literature study, critical gas temperatures at the window pane and associated 
fraction of glass fallout are suggested in Table III.12 for different window 
types and their corresponding thicknesses. It should be noted that, depending 
on the frame and fixation type, better or worse conditions can be expected. The 
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Table III.12: Suggested critical gas temperatures and fall out fraction for 
different window types and thicknesses. 








Single float glass 4 50% 360 - [85] 
 6 50% 450 30 [86] 
Single tempered glass 6 100% Flashover 43 [84] 
Double layered glass 4 50% 375 25 [87] 
 6 50% 600 35 [88] 
Triple layered glass 4 20% 475 30 [87] 
 
 
In case of large rooms, the peak HRR is based on statistical data determined 
from the combination of maximum fire size and HRRPUA [81]. The values 
applied for these parameters in the QRA are presented in Table III.13. The 
convective part of the heat release rate (and not the heat flux) is taken as 0.8 
and reduced to 0.5 in case of a sprinklered fire [55,89].   
Table III.13: Log-normal parameters characterizing the distribution of the fire 
damage area for different occupancy groups [81,90]. 
Occupancy group µtuY stuY E(s) svw µÑÖÖÜáà sÑÖÖÜáà 
   [kW/s2] [kW/s2] [kW/m2] [kW/m2] 
Care homes -0.64 1.44 1 6 250 15 
Educational -0.08 1.28 2 8 250 15 
 
Hospitals -0.29 1.52 2 9 250 15 
Hotels 0.78 1.7 9 36 250 15 
 
Offices 0.69 1.89 12 45 275 15 
 
Schools 1.17 1.84 18 66 250 15 
 
Public buildings 0.56 2.24 22 70 250 15 
licensed premises 0.83 2.14 23 78 450 50 
Retail 1.68 1.91 34 124 500 50 
Factories 1.8 1.92 38 142 500 50 
Warehouse 2.87 2.13 170 586 1750 250 
 
 
After the peak, the fire conditions remain constant until 70% of the fuel is 
consumed [91]. Only an average value is used for the fuel load, because 
preliminary sensitivity analysis showed that the fire load by itself has no 
significant influence on this problem and hence will be modelled 
deterministically using the mean value for the further analysis. These results 
correspond to in [92]. The fire load determines the duration of the fire, but the 
thresholds for life safety are usually reached already during the growth phase 
of the fire. 
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III.6.3.2 Secondary fire spread 
In case of small rooms or compartments, secondary fire spread can be 
considered. From the fully developed fire onwards, fire spread to other rooms 
is considered to occur. Two methods can be used: statistical models and 
deterministic models. In case the statistical approach is used, the data presented 
in Table III.9 can be implemented. For the deterministic approach the failure 
barrier model from CUrisk can be applied [93]. 
 Products of combustion 
The chosen design fire must include estimations of the generation of 
combustion products from the fire. Especially species such as CO, HCN, CO2, 
hydrocarbons, and soot are of interest [83]. These species are important 
because they have a significant impact on life safety by affecting occupants, 
property, equipment and operations. In the next sections these species are 
identified and investigated. First, the most important factors affecting 
production of combustion products are defined. Second, a literature study is 
performed to provide reliable data. Third, a suggestion is done for 
implementing and quantifying toxic species in the risk model. 
III.6.4.1 Factors affecting products of combustion 
Several factors affect the combustion process. The most important are the 
combustion process (i.e., smouldering or flaming), the air supply with respect 
to the fuel that is present and the retardation of the combustion reaction due to 
involvement of chemical agents [83].  
The first factor includes the difference between smouldering and flaming 
combustion. For smouldering scenarios higher yields can be expected (see 
tables below) than for flaming fires, because flaming fires are expected to have 
better mixing oxygen and fuel. Therefore, smouldering has more incomplete 
combustion.  
Table III.14: Suggested yield values for different types of fires. Adapted from 
[83]. 







Post-flashover, primary wooden fuels 0.3 1.1 0.9 - 
Enclosure fires 0.2 1.5 1.8 - 
Smouldering fires 0.5 - - 0.15 
 
 
Deterministic Framework 69 
 
Table III.15: Suggested yield of soot for different types of material. Yields 






Cellulosic 0.01-0.025 0.01-0.17 
Plastic 0.01-0.17 0.01-0.19 
 
In the remainder of the thesis the focus is on flaming fires because of their 
higher frequency and risk factor in non-sleeping premises. Statistically, 92% 
of the fires in residential and public buildings are flaming fires [4]. 
Smouldering fire scenarios should be considered for buildings with sleeping 
functions and concealed spaces such as false ceilings without automatic 
detection.   
The second important factor is the effect of the ventilation conditions during 
the combustion process.  For flaming fires, an important yield determinant is 




        (III.6) 
Where: 
ã equivalence ratio [-] 
 !U mass loss rate of fuel [kg/s] 
!ç mass flow rate of air [kg/s] 
r stoichiometric fuel-to-air ratio [-]   
 
The ratio gives an indication of whether the fire is fuel-controlled (ϕ < 1) or 
ventilation-controlled (ϕ > 1). Depending on the fire conditions, the soot and 
toxicity yields will vary. As mentioned in 4.2.1.3, under-ventilated fires that 
occur due to insufficient oxygen supply or inertization give rise to incomplete 
combustion, which causes higher soot and toxic product yields. The increase 
of soot and toxicity production can be expressed as function of the equivalence 
ratio, which can cause variations up to a factor of 50 [43,95–97]. A correlation 
of the CO yield dependence on the equivalence ratio for wood is given in 
Figure III.18. A similar phenomenon is observed for the CO yield from plastics 
and textiles, with different values but the same order of magnitude.  
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Figure III.18: Data points and fitted curves for CO yield (g/g) as function of 
equivalence ratio (ã) for wood. Taken from [98]. 
Similar to CO production, the production of HCN, for fuels containing 
nitrogen, grows with increasing equivalence ratio. An example of HCN yield 
dependence on the equivalence ratio for wood is given in Figure III.19. 
 
Figure III.19: HCN-yield as a function of equivalence ratio (ϕ) for 
Polyamide 6.6. Taken from [98]. 
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Another correlation of the CO2 yield as function of ϕ for PS is depicted in the 
figure below. Similar values for CO2-yield are obtained for PE, PMMA, 
polyamide, etc. For wood lower values are expected because the stoichiometric 




Figure III.20: CO2-yield as a function of equivalence ratio (ϕ) for PS. Taken 
from [97]. 
7êÄÇpëê + 6ëp → 67ëp + 6Äpë        (III.7) 
The effect of incomplete combustion should be taken into account for the 
different design scenarios. The effect of under ventilated-fires in small rooms, 
false ceilings, sprinkler systems and shielded fires, should be conservatively 
incorporated in the products of combustions yields. On the other hand, the 
positive effect of smoke and heat control systems should be considered, 
because lower equivalence ratios can be expected. These values are between 
0.2 - 0.8, while in normal fires the probability of having partial incomplete 
combustion will be higher. It is suggested to delay the transition from fuel- 
controlled to ventilated-controlled for concepts in which smoke and heat 
control systems are implemented.  
The third factor is the type of chemical agents present in the fire. Different fires 
will give different products of combustion. In general, when different materials 
are decomposed there tends to be a set of basic organic and inorganic 
substances which are produced. These are common to most materials. An 
additional set of substances related to the specific chemistry of the material and 
sometimes unique to that material or class of materials can be produced as well.  
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Traditional fuels such as wood, paper, PE, etc. produce mostly CO and CO2 as 
toxic products, while other products, such as polyamide, also produce HCN 
due to presence of nitrogen in the fuel. In order to illustrate the possible 
different combustion products in various materials, an illustration is given in 
Figure III.21 which discusses the different toxic species that contribute to the 
overall toxic potency of different materials for a well-ventilated fire in ISO 
19706 [14].   
 
Figure III.21: Toxic potencies (1/LC502) for well-ventilated conditions [43]. 
An additional important consideration of toxicity yields is the elemental ratio 
of CO to HCN, because, depending on the ratio, one will become more 
important than the other. HCN is 25 times more toxic than CO. For example, 
considering a furniture fire which has both a high carbon (50-60%) and 
nitrogen (~ 9%) content in the fuel, the toxicity of the developing fire will be 
first dominated by HCN and next by CO, once it starts to become under-
ventilated. When the compartment goes to flashover, then the entire room 
surface fuels the fire. The materials of the entire surface could be mainly 
cellulosic. The carbon will then still be around 50-60% and the nitrogen will 
now be only around 1% of the greater burning fuel package. So, the toxicity of 
the effluent plume flowing from the enclosure down the corridor may be 
dominated by CO rather than HCN. Therefore, the combination of fuel type 
and ventilation conditions is significant for the choice of yield components. 
                                                        
2 LC50: The concentrations of a combustion product in air that kills 50% of the 
test animals during the observation period. 
Deterministic Framework 73 
 
III.6.4.2 Products of combustion in literature 
Prediction of the generation of soot and combustion products is mostly based 
on experiments rather than the fundamental theory of the complex combustion 
reactions [83]. Literature which discusses parameters for products of 
combustion has been analysed. From codes it is observed that only a small 
number of countries directly implement these parameters (Table III.16). The 
research shows that several of these codes consider various toxicity parameters 
under different ventilation conditions.  
Table III.16: Toxicity parameters for different regulatory codes. 
Country Code    reference 
Soot            
[g/g] 






New Zealand C/VM2 0.07/0.141 0.04/0.41 1.5 20 
Sweden BBRAD 0.06/0.12 0.06/0.12 2.5 20 
UK BS PD 7974-2 0.025-0.173 0.013/0.251 - 20 
France LCPP 0.05 - - 25 
Germany vfdb TB 04-01 0.08/0.13 0.05/0.16 1.7 19-32 
Belgium NBN S21-208-2 0.224 - - 24 
1 Pre- and post-flashover fire.  
2 Related to the robustness or the standard scenario 
3 Depending on the material ratio 
4 Only for car parks 
 
Extensive research has been done to obtain products of combustion yields [99–
101]. Most of this research provides toxicity yields for specific materials. This 
means that, to determine a general distribution, the specific fuel distribution 
should be known in order to establish the joint density function. This is 
considered not practical and would shift the problem of this research. In other 
research [82] distributions for production of soot, CO and HCN were proposed 
for a general case in the application of a case study in QRA. However, no 
scientific background was given for the development of the distributions. In 
[102], a more extensive study has been done to develop a dataset for products 
of combustion. The main results are presented in Table III.17. The suggested 
distributions indicate results for well-ventilated conditions. No suggestions are 
made for under-ventilated conditions.  
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Table III.17: Toxicity distribution parameters developed in [102]. 
Country Distribution Par 1 (ï, s) Par 2 (ó, ò)            units 
Soot Weibull 1.67 0.02 g/g 
CO Gamma 0.0541 0.095 g/g 
CO2 Lognormal 1.8 1.47 g/g 
HoC Lognormal 16.8 27 MJ/kg 
 
III.6.4.3 Suggested products of combustion for design fire 
scenarios 
Based on the discussed factors and literature review [97,98], two scenarios 
with corresponding parameters are implemented in the model and presented in 
Table III.18. The suggested parameters are considered normally distributed 
variables. For CO2 a fuel load of 50% wood and paper and 50% plastic and 
textiles (weight based) are assumed. The mean and standard deviation are 
calculated considering a uniform distribution between the lower and upper end 
of the over- and under-ventilated phase. For the HCN-yield parameters, a 20% 
fuel type configuration containing nitrogen is considered. For every project or 
building type, this fuel ratio should be reviewed. 
Table III.18: Suggested distributions of products of combustion for fuel and 
ventilation-controlled fires. 
Ventilation type Ventilation type ï ò            units 
Well ventilated Soot 0.07 0.03 g/g 
(0 < ã < 1) CO 0.04 0.01 g/g 
 CO2 1.9 0.03 g/g 
 HCN 0.001 0.0003 g/g 
Under ventilated Soot 0.2 0.05 g/g 
(ã > 1) CO 0.15 0.03 g/g 
 CO2 1 0.2 g/g 
 HCN 0.005 0.001 g/g 
Any HoC 20 5 MJ/kg 
 
During the fire growth phase, when the fire makes a transition from fuel 
controlled to ventilation controlled, the fire can be expected to be ventilation 
controlled when oxygen levels drop due to lack of sufficient air supply or 
because a part of the flame will be present in the smoke layer. This type of 
modelling may point out the benefits of SHC systems with well-ventilated 
fires.  
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Figure III.22: Suggested CO-yield for ventilated and fuel-controlled fire. 
 Design Evacuation Scenario 
In this part of the method, the evacuation scenario which is analysed in the 
deterministic models, is developed (part 9) .For every fire scenario, at least one 
evacuation scenario should be analysed. In an evacuation scenario, three parts 
can be considered from the initial cues onwards: recognition, response and 
evacuation (Figure III.23). The recognition and response are coupled in the 
pre-movement part. The occupants are considered to be, in either one of three 
states the normal, investigating, and evacuation state [103]. 
 
Figure III.23: Model for developing design evacuation scenarios. 
 Pre-evacuation time 
In order to determine the pre-evacuation time, a simplified model is applied. It 
consists of one phase in which the cue processing, situational assessment and 
response selection and action are implicitly taken into account by a pre-defined 
pre-movement time distribution. In this approach a pre-movement time is 
implemented for each occupant individually. The input is obtained from a 
randomly generated value on the distribution.  
The shape parameters of the distribution depend on the type of perceived cues. 
A lognormal Probability Density Function (PDF) is linked to each cue type. 
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the corresponding agent. It is considered that more intense cues (e.g., visible 
smoke) have PDFs with lower mean and smaller standard deviation than less 
intense cues (e.g., standard alarm). Examples are given in Table III.19. 
Additionally, Lovereglio presented a pre-evacuation data base for use in egress 
simulations [104]. 
Table III.19: Pre-evacuation time Probability Density Functions. 
Warning sources Mean [s] STD [s] Ref 
Flame/smoke 10 5 [8] 
Alarm  60/120 10 [35] 
Voice alarm  30/60 10 [35] 
Fire departments 5 2 - 
 Evacuation 
After the recognition and the decision to start the evacuation, the occupants 
need to decide how and to where they will evacuate. Occupants can use stairs 
or evacuation lifts and evacuate towards exits or safe places where they will 
wait for the fire brigade. Depending on the type of building, different features 
need to be taken into account. An example is a dancing hall. A representative 
evacuation scenario might be a scenario in which a large fraction of the 
occupants are intoxicated. In schools, the age of the occupants is an important 
factor. The evacuation of elderly homes will need to take into account the 
limited mobility of the people.  
Another important part in the development of evacuation scenario is the 
incorporation of familiarity/affiliation towards exits. The purpose of the 
occupant exit choice modelling is to determine the exit choice for every 
occupant in the building during emergency evacuation. In the past, exit choice 
was mainly an optimization problem. Models were designed to assign agents 
to a certain exit depending on the shortest travel time. These algorithms give 
the shortest evacuation times. However, research has shown that people do not 
always know all available exits, or have a clear overview of the fastest route 
[105,106]. Methods can be based on statistical data obtained from experiments 
and on algorithms implemented in the model. Since familiarity mostly depends 
on the building configuration and procedures followed, it is suggested to use 
the combination of engineering experience and data available to determine a 
proper value for the familiarity. In Appendix C, a summary is presented of the 
available data.     
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 Smoke spread model 
The main purpose of the smoke spread sub-model is to analyse the spread of 
effluents of the fire. In order to define a suitable model, several important 
aspects about smoke spread modelling need to be investigated. First, the 
different types of smoke spread models are discussed. Second, important 
aspects of smoke spread modelling are discussed. Third, a concise review of 
current smoke spread models is conducted and specific features for the 
development of such models of research are discussed.  
 Methods of modelling approaches 
In order to accurately assess the effects of a fire scenario, the spread of the fire 
itself as well the transport of the heat and by-products of the combustion, need 
to be simulated. The most traditional method to analyse fire scenarios is to 
utilize analytical or numerical simulation tools of varying accuracy, 
complexity, and numerical effort. Three approaches can be used: analytical 
calculations, zone modelling, and field modelling.  
Analytical plume entrainment calculations represent the simplest approach for 
analysing the volume flow in the smoke layer [52]. By means of simple flow 
correlations, hand calculations can be performed to obtain a first indication of 
the smoke layer depth. The advantage of this approach is the speed and 
transparency. The disadvantage is the lack of accuracy. The model might be 
used to obtain a first estimate of the toxic potency within smaller compartments 
and single rooms. 
Zone models can incorporate the basic principles of thermodynamics and 
conservation of mass. In these models the compartment is essentially 
subdivided into two ”zones,” the upper hot gas layer and the lower ambient air 
layer. The fire drives combustion products from the lower to the upper layer 
via the plume. The temperature within each layer is uniform, and its evolution 
in time is described by a set of ordinary differential equations derived from the 
fundamental laws of mass and energy conservation. The transport of smoke 
and heat from zone to zone is dictated by empirical correlations. Both layers 
are assumed to have homogeneous temperatures and mass concentrations, 
which limits the model applicability to simple compartment geometries, such 
as rectangular rooms with limited ceiling height [107]. 
Field models are the most advanced fire models. These are developed in 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) packages containing multiple submodels 
such as combustion, turbulence, radiation, etc. CFD programs solve a system 
of partial differential equations. Additionally to the conservation of mass and 
78 Chapter III 
 
energy in zone models, the conservation of total momentum is taken into 
account. 
 Important aspects of smoke spread modelling 
The objective of the tool is to model the smoke spread in a building and provide 
a representative result with respect to the exposure of occupants to the effluents 
of the fire. In order to choose the most appropriate model, the main factors 
affecting the outcome in terms of fire effluent generation and transport need to 
be taken into account. From past research it has been concluded that both 
internal (e.g., safety systems, geometry, etc.) and external factors (e.g., wind, 
temperature, etc.) are important. The purpose of the remainder of this sub-
chapter is to review and analyse smoke spread models.    
 Review of smoke spread models 
For the purpose of the thesis, five smoke spread models have been analysed: 
two zone models, two field models, and one network model. The two zone 
models, CFAST [108] and BRANZFIRE [109,110] have been analysed for the 
simplified QRA-model. The two field models, FDS [50] and SMARTFIRE 
[111], have been studied for the comprehensive QRA model. The network 
model CONTAM [112] is investigated for analysing smoke spread in 
staircases.  
CFAST is a two-zone fire model that predicts the thermal environment caused 
by a fire within a compartmented structure. Apart from the traditional features 
of zone-models, CFAST can take spill plumes and corner fires into account.  
Because the governing equations are relatively simple, CFAST simulations 
typically require a few tens of seconds of CPU time on typical personal 
computers. 
BRANZFIRE is, similarly to C-FAST, a multizone fire model which integrates 
a flame spread and fire growth model for standard fire scenarios and scenarios 
with room lining materials [109]. Special features of BRANZFIRE is that it 
can take glass breakage and burning of wall linings into account. 
FDS is the most widely used CFD packages for transient fire and smoke spread 
simulations. FDS solves numerically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations 
appropriate for low-speed (Ma < 0.3), thermally-driven flow, with emphasis 
on smoke and heat transport from fires. The tool is composed of multiple 
submodels of which turbulence (LES), combustion, and radiation models are 
the most important. The advantage of FDS is the applicability, transparency, 
transient analysis, number of possible submodels and well-documented 
technical, user, verification and validation guides. The disadvantage is the high 
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computational power necessary to run simulations and that the underlying 
rectilinear mesh needs to be adjusted to the obstructions incorporated in the 
model. 
SMARTFIRE is just like FDS a Fire Field Modelling (FFM) environment 
which has an unstructured-mesh finite volume approach. The main difference 
between FDS and RANS is the turbulence model, LES for FDS and RANS for 
SMARTFIRE.  
CONTAM is a multizone indoor air quality and ventilation analysis computer 
program often used for ventilation and indoor air quality analysis. In the model, 
airflow and species transport are calculated between the rooms of a building 
and between the building and the outdoors. The so-called well-mixed 
assumption, in which each zone is characterized by a single contaminant 
concentration, is used to make the bulk analysis simpler and faster. The 
purpose of the model is to decouple the staircase geometries from the 3D field 
models so that the staircases can be analysed separately. Additionally, the 
model can determine the performance of the staircase pressurization systems 
by analysing the pressure differences across the staircase.	
 Evacuation model 
The main purpose of the evacuation sub-model is to analyse the life safety 
threat to occupants during evacuation in case of fire, this by analysing the 
evacuation of the occupants from the building with fire conditions. In order to 
define a suitable model, several important aspects about evacuation modelling 
need to be investigated. Firstly, the different types of evacuation modelling are 
discussed. Secondly, important aspects of evacuation modelling are analysed. 
Thirdly, a review of current evacuation models is conducted and specific 
features of research for development of such models are discussed.  
 Functional boundary conditions 
The choice of an evacuation (sub-)model for implementation in the QRA 
model depends not only on the criteria listed above, but also on the desired 
criteria set out by the FSE. Kuligowski suggested a series of important 
questions for the FSE to analyse before selecting a model [113]. Based on these 
research questions, the following boundary conditions are set. In this research 
the considered evacuation model should take into account: 
- Input: input provided in terms of occupancy (e.g., people type, etc.) 
and environment characteristics (e.g., smoke information). 
- Model: movement, main features and influence factors of human 
behaviour (affiliation, crowd, flow, group, etc.). 
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- Output: toxicity, temperature and radiation dose. 
- Validation and verification: the implemented evacuation model 
should be sufficiently validated and verified. [114–118]. 
Based on these boundary conditions, the focus of the remainder of this chapter 
is on numerical evacuation models. 
 Methods of modelling approaches 
To conduct an evacuation modelling, three approaches can be used: analytical 
calculations, numerical modelling, and multi-modelling [119].  
Analytical calculations represent the simplest approach. By means of simple 
travel and flow correlations, hand calculations can be performed to obtain a 
first approximation of the evacuation time [8]. The advantage of this approach 
is its speed and lack of transparency. The disadvantage is the lack of detail and 
quantification of certain aspects of occupant and building characteristics.  
Numerical models can be subdivided into network and spatial models. In 
network models each room or space is represented by a node and each node is 
connected with passageway or door connections. Spatial models represent the 
entire building layout by a grid or a continuous 3D-space. The advantage of 
these models is a higher accuracy level and the possibility to take into account 
more parameters compared to analytical models. The disadvantage is the 
higher computational cost.  
Multi-model approaches combine analytical and numerical models, in order to 
use the benefits of both. The approach utilizes different evacuation models at 
the same time for the analysis of the evacuation scenarios. This approach is 
mostly used to design evacuation models for specific configurations (e.g., 
evacuation in road tunnels [119]).  
 Important aspects of evacuation modelling 
The objective of the evacuation tool in this thesis is to model the evacuation of 
people from a building and provide a representative result with respect to the 
exposure of occupants to the effluents of the fire. In order to choose the most 
appropriate model, the main factors which affect the outcome in terms of 
exposure and evacuation time have to be considered. In the past, research has 
been conducted to define these critical factors for egress analysis [8,120–122]. 
From this research two main categories are defined: the occupant and the 
environment characteristics. The occupant characteristics are mainly 
represented by the physical and behavioural attributes. The environment 
characteristics are mainly represented by the architectural, procedural, 
organisational and environmental attributes [8].  
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 Review of evacuation models 
Comparison of different evacuation models has been conducted in past 
research [8,123–127]. Over 30 evacuation models have been investigated and 
compared for different characteristics and categories. Based on this research, 
the availability of the models and the boundary conditions discussed above, 
five evacuation models are considered appropriate for further analysis: STEPS 
[128], Pathfinder [129], BuildingEXODUS [126], FDS+EVAC [130] and 
JuPedSim [131]. The first four are the most commonly used evacuation models 
in countries with a performance based legislative framework [132]. The fifth 
model is a new and open source model. In the following sections, the main 
features and limitations of these models are analysed and discussed. 
III.9.4.1 Common features 
All five models have several common features. They can take into account 
complex geometry, e.g., turning stairs, complete stadia, stations, malls by 
means of different levels of simplification.  
The basic time-dependent algorithm in the models is developed in the 
assumption that it is people's priority to get out of the model as quickly as they 
can, without the need to predefine exit routes, by analysing the provided 
known exits in the model. The principle is that once people are added to the 
model, they look for the closest exit within the compartment that leads to a 
place of relative safety. Once that exit is passed, the next exit will be pursued 
until the final system exit, which is the exit out of the considered geometry, is 
reached. If multiple exits are available, people select the exit depending on the 
shortest time to leave the compartment. In all the models, the walking speed of 
agents can be reduced by increased occupant and smoke density or inclined 
effects of surfaces (e.g., stairs). The models provide toxicity and the results 
can be requested for each participating person. 
In the next sub-chapters, the evacuation models are further discussed 
individually. The focus is put on the implementation of human behaviour and 
fire scenarios.  
III.9.4.2 STEPS 
STEPS is a fine grid-based circulation and evacuation software that can model 
pedestrian movement in normal and emergency evacuations. The tool is an 
agent based model and takes into account aspects of human behaviour [128]. 
An example is the reduction of walking speeds (smoke and occupant density). 
Occupants also keep minimum distances between each other and can have 
different patience behaviour when queuing. Counter flows are allowed for and 
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elevators can be used. Other behavioural aspects are implicitly taken into 
account, for example by defining a pre-movement time or a familiar exit 
choice. The effect of group behaviour and smoke blocking exits needs to be 
implemented manually in the model. The model has been validated against 
codes, fire drills and literature on past experiments [126]. STEPS is still 
updated and developed. 
III.9.4.3 Pathfinder 
Pathfinder is a continuous based evacuation model specifically designed for 
evacuation modelling in case of fire. Evacuation of agents is modelled based 
on steering behaviour [129]. Pathfinder moves occupants in continuous 3D 
space using a triangulated movement mesh (Figure III.24).This movement 
mesh represents areas where occupants can walk, and the triangulated 
geometry allows to accommodate arbitrary obstructions and curved paths with 
great accuracy. At each time step, every agent examines the surrounding 
environment and takes action based on its own perceptions and goals. At the 
moment, Pathfinder can only model exit familiarity by establishing the 
sequence of waypoints that lead to the occupant's exit which can be either the 
nearest exit or a user-specified exit. The model simulates counter flows, exit 
blockage, group effects and elevator use. Pathfinder has been validated against 
codes, fire drills or other people movement experiments/trials, literature on 
past experiments and other models [126]. Pathfinder has a practical user 
interface and the model is still updated and developed. 
 
Figure III.24: Triangulated movement mesh [133]. 
III.9.4.4 BuildingEXODUS 
EXODUS was originally designed primarily for use in transport systems such 
as aircrafts [134,135]. However, because of its modular format, it became clear 
that the model was suited for adaptation to other types of environment, such as 
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buildings, and was therefore converted to building applications. 
BuildingExodus is a fine grid evacuation model for evacuation of multi-
purpose buildings [126]. The model is considered one of the most advanced 
evacuation tools with respect to human behaviour modelling. It can model 
counter flows, reduced walking speeds, elevator use, exit blockage by smoke, 
group effects, adapted decision making due to environmental changes (e.g., 
smoke), impact of exit signs, incapacitation, crawling, etc. [106,136–139].  The 
model has been validated against fire drills, literature on past experiments and 
other models. Additionally, third party validation has been performed [126]. 
The model is still updated and developed. 
III.9.4.5 FDS+EVAC 
FDS+Evac is a continuous evacuation simulation module for FDS, developed 
and maintained by the research institute VTT in Finland [130]. The model is 
developed to be applied in combination with FDS and is called a social force 
model because the emphasis is on distances between occupant and objects. In 
the model, agents are guided to exit doors by the preferred walking direction 
vector field. An example of a vector flow field is given in Figure III.25.  
 
Figure III.25: An example of the 2-dimensional flow fields that are used to 
guide the agents towards the exit doors. Taken from [130]. 
The model considers different parts of human behaviour into account, of which 
the most important are counter flows [140], incapacitation [141], exit choice 
(blockage by smoke)  [142], etc. The model has been validated against fire 
drills or other people movement experiments/trials, literature on past 
experiments, and other models [126]. FDS+EVAC has no user interface and is 
not further developed at the moment. 
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III.9.4.6 JuPedSim 
JuPedSim is a continuous pedestrian model for simulating and analysing 
agents motion at a microscopic level [131]. It consists at the moment of three 
modules which are loosely coupled and which can be used independently. The 
first module simulates the movement of pedestrians given a geometry and an 
initial configuration. The second module visualises the geometry and the 
trajectories. The third module analyses the results from the simulation or any 
other source, for instance experiments, and generates different types of plots 
such as densities, velocities, and flows. The model incorporates specific parts 
of human behaviour into account. The most important are the effect of smoke 
on walking speed and the exit selection. The model has been validated against 
fire drills or other people movement experiments/trials, literature on past 
experiments, and other models [126]. JuPedSim has its own user interface and 
is still developed. 
III.9.4.7 Discussion 
A comparative analysis has been conducted to investigate the different 
possibilities, model components and accuracy of the evacuation models. 
BuildingEXODUS is considered the most advanced with respect to aspects of 
human behaviour. However, the model uses, just like STEPS, a grid-based 
structure and is not flexible regarding the I/O analysis. Pathfinder has the best 
user-interface and is user friendly. However, the model is considered to be the 
least advanced in terms of human behaviour features. FDS+EVAC and 
JuPedSim model specific parts of human behaviour, are flexible to modify and 
provide open source features. A disadvantage of FDS+EVAC is that it does 
not have a user interface. Additionally, some features of human behaviour need 
to be manually implemented in the model.  
Based on this reasoning, two models are considered here for implementation 
in the deterministic framework: Pathfinder, for practicality, and JuPedSim, for 
flexibility. When fully developed, JuPedSim is expected to be a worthy 
competitor for more advanced models.  
 Consequence model 
 General 
In order to determine how a fire hazard may cause loss or harm to occupants, 
some form of consequence analysis is required. Consequence analysis, a key 
component of risk characterization, determines the potential impact of a hazard 
event without considering the likelihood that the consequences will occur. 
Consequence analysis is more complicated than hazard assessment, in that it 
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may not always be clear in what ways and to what extent something is valued 
and how the loss should be characterized. For life safety, the assessment may 
be binary (life or death), or may be continuous to cover quality of life, pain and 
suffering, and/or rehabilitation after a fire-induced injury. In this thesis, the 
model focuses on determining the consequences expressed in number of 
fatalities. The model obtains output from the evacuation model to assess the 
toxicity and heat doses of every occupant. 
 Life threatening factors 
In order to find the possible fatalities for the consequence model, the factors 
which pose a hazard to people should be determined.  The main toxic hazards 
associated with fire situations are [8,43,95]: 
- Asphyxiants and irritant gases: asphyxiant gases can, upon inhalation, 
reduce decision making capacities, incapacitate and cause death. The 
most common toxic products are CO and HCN, of which CO has been 
proven to be the most frequent cause of death. Also, high levels of 
CO2 and low levels of O2 will provide negative consequences because 
they will increase the respiration rate, causing faster intake of toxic 
particles. Irritant gases such as halogen acids and organic irritants can 
cause immediate incapacitation due to the effects on the eyes and 
upper respiratory tract. Asphyxiant gases are taken into account by 
the consequence model in the toxicity assessment (see next section). 
The effect of irritant gases is reflected in reduced walking speed in 
the evacuation model. 
- Smoke obscuration: low visibility due to smoke is not a direct threat 
but reduces people walking velocity and can disorientate them in case 
of emergency, which causes a longer exposure time to the products of 
the fire. This factor is discussed in the evacuation sub-model.  
- Heat: there are three ways in which exposure to heat can lead to life 
threat: hyperthermia; body surface burns; and respiratory tract burns. 
When the sum of fractional doses of heat and radiant energy exceeds 
the safety threshold, this defines the possibility of a fatality. Radiation 
is of particular importance close to the fire because radiation 
decreases quadratically with the distance from the source. The other 
factor is hot smoke, which mainly affects the respiratory tract and is 
mostly dangerous close to the fire, where it does not have the chance 
to cool down. The effect of heat is taken into account by heat 
assessment. 
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 The FID-concept 
In order to calculate the number of fatalities in the building, the Fractional 
Incapacitation Dose (FID) factor is defined [143]. The FID is the ratio of the 
dose of a gaseous toxicant or temperature produced in a given test to that dose 
of the toxicant or heat that has been statistically determined from independent 
experimental data to produce incapacitation in 50 percent of test animals within 
a specified exposure and post-exposure time. One can see that the FID uses the 
IC50 (i.e., 50 % incapacitation dose) approach for determining the probability 
of incapacitation. FID originates from the FED or Fractional Effective Dose. 
When the FED ratio becomes unity, the chance of dying becomes 50%. The 
dose necessary for obtaining the same FID and FED values will always be 
lower for the FID because it is considered that a person becomes first 
incapacitated and will then perish. The FID is chosen because it is assumed 
that, during evacuation, once a person becomes incapacitated, this person will 
fall on the ground, will remain there and keep breathing toxic air and receiving 
heat until the person passes away. This approach is confirmed in [43], where it 
is states that incapacitation often leads to death. In the consequence model, the 
FID is calculated for both toxicity and hot temperature. The calculation 
methods are elaborated in the subsequent sections. Both FID values are 
analysed separately. The FID that reaches unity first will determine the main 
cause of fatality.  
 Toxicity assessment 
Two methods have been studied to calculate the FID, namely the ISO 13571 
[143] and the Purser method [43]. The ISO 13571 method uses the principle of 
Haber’s rule (Blue line in Figure III.26) for CO, assuming that the deviations 
from linear uptake are small for exposure doses up to incapacitation for short 
periods [95]. The standard advises to use the Ct product correlation, where C 
is the concentration and t is the exposure time, for a maximum exposure dose 
of 35000 ppm min. The dose represents the critical value for humans engaged 
in moderate physical activity with a respiratory rate of 20 l/min. The standard 










         (III.8) 
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Where: 
7( The average concentration of an asphyxiant gas “i” over the 
chosen time increment [ppm]; 
7 The exposure concentration causing occupants 
incapacitation at time t [ppm] 
\ The chosen time increment, expressed in minutes [min] 
 
The advantage of the ISO 13571 model is that it is very easy to use. The 
disadvantage is that in reality the intake of CO is not completely linear. When 
similar doses are applied, uptakes with high concentrations in short time 
periods can have different effects than uptakes with low concentrations over a 
longer period (Figure III.26). This causes under- or overestimation of the real 
situation. 
 
Figure III.26: Correlation between exposure concentration and time to 
incapacitation for CO and HCN for macaques. Taken from [144]. 
The second method is more realistic, in that it uses a non-linear correlation 
between the FID and the toxic concentrations of each gas, particularly for CO. 
The applied general model is taken from [43]: 
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5ôö = (5únu + 5úD?) ∗ ùDzp + 5ôöúu        (III.9) 
 
Where: 
5únu Fractional effective dose for incapacitation by CO [-]. 
5úD?  Fractional effective dose for incapacitation by HCN [-]. 
ùDzp Multiplicity effect of inhaled CO2 [-]. 
5ôöúu Fractional effective dose for incapacitation by low oxygen 
hypoxia [-]. 
 
The FICO is calculated from the empirical Stewart-Peterson uptake model 
which takes into account %COHb rather than an exposure dose. The formula 
is taken from [43]: 
5únu = 3.317 ∗ 10]w ∗ [7ë]Ç.[qê ∗ ùx ∗
\
ö 
     (III.10) 
Where: 
 [7ë] CO concentration [ppm]. 
 ùx Volume of air breathed each minute [l/min]. 
 \ Exposure time [min]. 
 ö Exposure dose for incapacitation [%COHb]. 
 
The ùx depends on the body weight, smoke conditions and the occupant’s 
activity. The ö depends mainly on age, health and shape. The values of these 
parameters, for a person who is walking to escape, are typically taken as a fixed 
value (around 20-25 l/min for inhalation volume and of 30% COHb for 
susceptibility [43]). However, depending on the occupant type and physical 
challenges, these parameters may vary. Therefore, in the next subsection, a 
more in-depth study is performed to provide a better approximation for these 
parameters.  
The FICN is calculated from the empirical correlation suggested by Purser [95]. 
The effect of HCN is exponential, which means that doses can’t be added up 
and averaged because it would underestimate the effect of the gas. Important 
to mention is that HCN is 25 times more toxic than CO and that the FID for 
HCN and CO are additive. The formula reads [43]: 
5úD? = 		
[7¢]p.qê ∗ ùx
2.43 ∗ 10• 			\ 
     (III.11) 
Where: 
 [CN] HCN concentration [ppm]. 
 t Exposure time [min]. 
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In order to incorporate the effect of CO2 on the ùx rate, the following 




w       (III.12) 
Where: 
 [CO2] Carbon dioxide concentration [%]. 
 t Exposure time [min]. 
 





      (III.13) 
Where: 
 [%O2] Oxygen concentration [%]. 
 t Exposure time [min]. 
 
III.10.4.1 The respiratory Minute Volume Rate VE  
The RMV (Respiratory Minute Volume) or VE rate is the volume of air exhaled 
per minute. In smoke-free conditions, the VE-rate depends on the occupant’s 
activity and varies normally between 4.9 l/min (sleeping conditions) and 49 
l/min (running conditions) [8]. For heavier labour or other activities, such as 
firefighting intervention, VE rates up to 80 l/min can be achieved. In Table 
III.20 average VE rates for several activity types are presented. 
Table III.20: VE rate for different activities (body weight 70 kg) [8]. 
Activity © [km/h] VE [l/min] 
Sleeping 0 4.9 
Sitting 0 8.5 
Standing 0 11.2 
Walking 3 13.4 
Walking 4 17 
Walking 5 19.9 
Walking 6 23 
Walking 7 26 
Running 8.9 49 
Fire fighting 0-8 < 80 
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The data points discussed in Table III.20 are visualised in Figure III.27. A 
curve fit analysis is performed:  





        (III.14) 
Where 
 % The walking speed [m/s] 
 
The correlations are presented in Figure III.27 and implemented in the 
consequence model. This is done by linking the obtained dosages of every 
occupant to a walking speed.  Different data would be needed for children or 
adults with bodyweights significantly different from 70 kg because ùx depends 
primarily on the body size of the subject and the level of physical activity.  
 
 
Figure III.27: VE-rate in function of movement speed. 
III.10.4.2 Susceptibility D  
According to the definition of the FID and the IC50 approach, it is considered 
that a person who reaches an FID equal to unity or higher will perish unless 
they are rescued in time. However, the correlations used for the former 
formulas are obtained for healthy young men with a respiration rate of 20 l/min 
in normal conditions [145]. In reality a distribution of people with different 
ages and gender will be present, of which a considerable fraction is 
significantly more susceptible to the effects of the products of combustion, e.g., 
children, elderly, pregnant women. In order to consider these higher 
susceptibility range of occupants in fire safety designs, a safety margin is 
implemented by means of reducing the acceptable FID value to 0.3 [35]. 
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reality. Therefore, instead of lowering the FID value, the %COHb can be 
approached more realistically [146]. Based on the data depicted in Figure III.28 
and through personal communication with Purser, a normal and beta 
distribution are suggested in Table III.21. The distributions are presented in 
Figure III.29 
 
Figure III.28: Suggested population distribution of sensitivities to collapse 
from CO intoxication. Taken from [100]. 
Table III.21: Approximations of four normal and beta distribution [146]. 
Normal distribution [–] Beta distribution [–] 
Mean or μ 30 Alpha or α 7.5186  
STD or σ 8 Beta or β 4.1422 
\ \ Lower limit a -3.06E-16 
\ \ Upper limit b 50 
 
 
Figure III.29: Normal and Beta distribution suggested by Purser [147]. 
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 Heat assessment 
As with toxic gases, the body of a fire victim may be regarded as acquiring a 
“dose” of heat over a period of time during exposure, with short exposure to a 
high radiant flux or temperature being more incapacitating than a longer 
exposure to a lower temperature or flux. A similar fractional incapacitating 
dose model as for the toxic gases can be applied and, providing that the 
temperature in the fire is stable or increasing, the fractional dose of heat 
acquired during exposure can be calculated by summing the radiant and 











       (III.15) 
Where:   
\únud± The time to incapacitation due to convective heat transfer [min]  
\úf$≤ The time to incapacitation due to radiative heat transfer [min] 
 
 
The radiant component is calculated by [8]: 
\úf$≤ =
8
:Ç.qq      (III.16) 
Where: 
 8 The radiant heat exposure dose [(kW/m2)4/3 min] 
 : The radiant flux from the fire or smoke layer [kW/m2] 
 
The threshold for pain occurs at an 8 value between approximately 1.33 and 
1.67. Second-degree burns occur at 4.0–12.2 and third-degree (full-thickness) 
burns at approximately 16.7 (kW/m2)4/3 min (Table III.22). 
 
Table III.22: Radiant heat exposure dose from different injuries 
Radiant heat endpoint for exposed skin R [(kW/m2)4/3min] 
Severe skin pain 
Second degree burns 





The radiant heat flux can be calculated from the hot smoke layer temperature: 
 
: = 	≥	ò	(-(ß − -'c(dß )	       (III.17) 
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Where: 
 ≥ Emissivity for smoke [-] 
 ò Stefan Bolzmann constant 5.67*10-8 W/(m2K4) 
 -( Smoke layer temperature [K] 
 -'c(d Skin temperature of 306.6 K 
         
For ≥, typically a value of 0.5 is taken [8]. However, for dense black smoke it 
could be more conservative to take higher values closer to one into account. 
The expression for \únud± is related to exposure to heated air with less than 10% 
water content by volume [8]: 
\únud± = 5 ∗ 10• ∗ -fuu¥]q.ß       (III.18) 
Where: 
 -fuu¥ Room temperature [K]. 
 Conclusions 
In this part of the thesis, the deterministic framework has been described to 
quantify the consequences for life safety in case of fire. The objectives have 
been met: 
1. The framework can take into account the effectiveness of different 
safety systems. The efficiency and reliability of passive and active 
fire protection systems can be implemented.  
2. The procedure gives a step-by-step procedure to define representative 
design scenarios for fire and evacuation modelling in part 6 and 7. 
3. The framework can take into account building, system, procedural, 
occupant, and environmental characteristics by using complex 
models (part 8 and 9).  
4. The models are compatible with each other for efficient interaction 
and analysis.  
5. A choice can be made between lower or higher computational 
affording models. In this way, a high number of scenarios can be 
analysed. The further elaboration of the simplified method is 
discussed in Chapter V. 
Based on these conclusions, the methodology meets the predefined objectives. 
The framework will be validated in Part VI and tested by means of case studies 
in Part VII.  
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IV.1 Introduction of the developed framework 
In this chapter, the probabilistic framework for quantifying the life safety risk 
to people in complex buildings in case of fire is developed. Currently, no 
universal risk assessment framework with practical interpretation exists that 
can objectify the safety level of buildings with complex layouts. Therefore, 
research is done to develop a full-probabilistic risk assessment model to 
quantify life safety in fire related conditions. The focus is put on different 
probabilistic methods that enable the integration of the proposed deterministic 
models from Chapter III into the framework. The method can be applied for 
designing new and existing buildings against a pre-defined safety level, for 
comparison of performance or prescriptive-based designs and for performing 
cost-benefit analysis of new and existing buildings.  
In section 2, the problem objectives and challenges are formulated. In section 
3, the global framework is proposed and explained by means of a flow chart. 
In section 4, the probabilistic part of the framework is developed. The method 
for conducting the probabilistic and reliability analysis is described in a step 
by step procedure by means of examples. In section 5, the conclusions are 
formulated.  
IV.2 Objectives and challenges 
The main goal is to objectively quantify fire safety designs by taking the 
uncertainty of design parameters and the reliability of safety systems into 
account. The purpose is to develop a framework that guides the fire safety 
engineer through the probabilistic analysis to determine the safety level of 
various types of fire safety designs for different types of buildings. 
To design such a framework, several challenges are tackled. These challenges 
are considered fivefold. The first and main challenge is the need for a model 
that is able to objectively quantify the fire safety level of building designs. The 
framework should take the probability of the design scenarios and parameters 
into account. The final model should be a coherent application in combination 
with the deterministic evaluation of the sub-models developed Chapter III. The 
second objective is the applicability for engineering projects. The method 
should make it possible to design buildings with limited engineering cost and 
computational affordability. Computational demand increases with variability 
of the scenarios and input parameters, as well as with the complexity of the 
(sub)models (e.g. CFD, evacuation models, etc.) used for the risk analysis. The 
use of these computational affording models makes it not possible to analyse 
a large number of simulations. Therefore, efficient use of the sub-models and 
scenarios should be considered. The third challenge relates to the 
quantification of the safety level. The majority of risk methods give semi-
quantitative output values which do not represent a proper physical meaning. 
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The results of these methods give no clear understanding for stakeholders not 
familiar with the applied method. Therefore, results should be quantified into 
output values which give physical meaning to the problem at hand. The fourth 
challenge is related to data storage and handling. These are key aspects in terms 
of processing a significant amount of data in case of the implementation of 
sophisticated sub-models. The use of the different sub-models and the 
communication between these models has a significant effect on the efficiency 
of the model. 
The fifth challenge relates to the sensitivity of input parameters and the effect 
of specific safety system parameters. For simplified cases, only the most 
significant parameters and scenarios should be considered. Not every variable 
is equally sensitive and the sensitivity can vary for different configurations.  
IV.3 Global framework 
The proposed fire risk analysis model consists of a series of deterministic sub-
models [1,2] combined with probabilistic techniques to define the overall fire 
safety risk to occupants. The main framework, presented in Figure IV.1, is 
inspired by international guidelines on performance based risk analysis [3–8]. 
The framework consists of seven steps where each step is elaborated in the 
following and, when necessary, simple examples are used to explain the 
approach. 
 
Figure IV.1: Framework of the PRA-methodology. Adapted from [3]. 
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In the first step, the building configuration and scope details are described [3]. 
The specific boundary conditions with respect to occupancy, building and 
environmental characteristics are defined. Important aspects that will have an 
impact on the definition of the fire safety design are analysed. After the 
definition of the scope, the goals and objectives are defined in step 2. Normally, 
the goals are identified by the stakeholders such as the owner, the 
commissioner, the contractor, the design team, the government (legislation and 
standards), occupants, community, etc. [3,9,10]. The building should be 
designed within the acceptable regulatory requirements in which specific 
physical, functional or procedural boundary conditions are set by the different 
stakeholders. The main objective is to achieve the pre-defined life safety level. 
Additional objectives can focus on a specific sub-category of occupant groups 
(e.g. elderly, disability, etc.) or when specific risks are expected (underground, 
nuclear, etc.). 
In the third step, the performance criteria are developed based on the described 
goals, stakeholder and design objectives [3]. Depending on the problem 
description stated above, two types of performance evaluation can be defined. 
The first type of evaluation involves relative comparisons of different fire 
safety designs [11,12]. This is called the relative safety level for occupants 
(RSO). The safety levels of each of these fire safety designs are quantified 
through a safety factor. In traditional performance based designs, the 
quantification of these designs is conducted by calculating the safety factor by 
means of an ASET/RSET (available/required safe egress time) analysis. This 
method can be conducted to compare different fire safety systems and is 
typically used when applying performance based designs in a prescriptive 
based regulatory system when the building design deviates in certain aspects 
from the prescriptive legislation (e.g. maximum compartment surface, 
maximum walking distance to exit, etc.). By comparison, one can set a fully 
complying design as the reference level. This reference design will have a 
safety factor specific for its particular building configuration. The alternative 
design that deviates from prescriptive requirements will obtain a different 
safety factor which, in case of a lower safety factor, needs to be compensated 
by additional fire safety measures. The second type of evaluation can be 
defined as one in which the fire safety design is compared with absolute criteria 
derived from legislation, standards and guidelines [10,13]. The quantification 
of the absolute criteria is developed in Chapter VIII. In this thesis, the 
performance criteria are considered either reliability or risk based. For both 
relative and absolute evaluation, three types of criteria can be defined for the 
quantification of the acceptable risk level. The first criterion considers the 
probability of failure defined as the probability of a fatality over a period of 
time or given that a fire occurs [11]. In analogy to structural engineering, a 
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target annual failure rate can be defined. The second criterion is defined in 
terms of the individual risk (IR) [1,13]. The third criterion is expressed as the 
societal risk that represents the risk to a group of people and is typically 
visualised by means of an FN curve. In Figure IV.2 an example is depicted of 
a quantitively comparison of different tunnel fire safety designs [1]. The 
objective of the study was to determine the most cost-effective design (orange 
FN curve) against the pre-defined acceptable criteria (straight lines). 
 
Figure IV.2: FN curve case study with different alternative solutions [1]. 
In the fourth step, the fire safety design is developed. The fire safety concept 
should be designed based on the main principles of fire safety design rules of 
good practice [3,14]. In most cases, these are initially defined based on 
prescriptive requirements. Once the fire safety design is developed, the 
deterministic and probabilistic analysis is conducted in step 5. The full 
elaboration of the proposed methodology is discussed in the following section 
by means of a step-by-step approach.  
In the sixth step, the performance criteria are evaluated by means of 
comparison to the results with the individual and societal risk obtained in step 
5. If the obtained results meet the risk criteria, the outcome is positive and the 
final design can be selected in step 7. If not, the fire safety design should be 
modified, by means of changing the configuration and/or taking additional 
safety measures, and the procedure should be repeated. When multiple designs 
are selected, the most cost-effective design that meets the minimum acceptable 
limit or reference design can be selected. This is done by taking the whole life-
cycle into account so that commissioning, maintenance, control and inspection 
can be considered. 
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IV.4 Probabilistic framework 
In the fifth step of the global framework, the deterministic and probabilistic 
analysis is performed. In Figure IV.3 an overview of the proposed framework 
for the probabilistic risk analysis is given. The method is divided in 11 sub-
steps explained below and is implemented in the open source code Python [15] 
and Matlab [16].  
 
Figure IV.3: Probabilistic part of the framework (step 5 in Figure IV.1) [17]. 
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IV.4.1 Step 5.1: Definition of design scenarios 
In step 1 of the probabilistic framework, the main representative design fire 
scenarios are selected. These scenarios are chosen based on the building 
configuration (building type, height, adjacent buildings, structure type, etc.), 
environmental conditions (effect of wind, outside temperature, etc.), occupant 
characteristics (occupancy type, load, etc.) and fire safety design (safety 
systems, procedures, etc.). Design fires are chosen based on project specific 
parameters (atrium, open office plan, etc.) in combination with rules of good 
practice [18,19].  
IV.4.2 Step 5.2: Definition of the input variables  
In step 2, the most important input variables are determined based on a 
preceding sensitivity analysis [1]. For the considered variables, distributions 
are determined based on statistical data, fault tree analysis and engineering 
judgement [7]. In the Tables IV.1 and IV.2, a list of variables is given of the 
most sensitive parameters in the fire life safety analysis of a commercial 
building [20,21]. In theory, all these parameters should be implemented in the 
event tree analysis in step 3. However, in order to prevent an extensive event 
tree, the variables are divided into discrete and continuous parameters. The 
discrete variables are addressed in the bow-tie structure (Table IV.2). The 
continuous variables are addressed at the end of the event tree by means of the 
RSM (Table IV.1). The separation between the two types of variables is done 
for reasons of computational and operational efficiency (e.g. location of the 
fire). Secondly, some variables cannot be considered in continuous form due 
to their discrete nature (e.g. activation or failure of safety systems, the state of 
doors, etc).  
For every variable in Table IV.1, an indication is given of the order of 
importance with respect to the results. The first order variables are considered 
the most significant based on preceding sensitivity analysis [22]. The 
preceding sensitivity analysis is based on research performed in the master 
thesis [14] and other sensitivity analyses performed [60-63]. Examples of 
additional type of sensitivity analysis is provided in Appendix D. This means 
that only parts of the domain close to the limit state need to be analysed. The 
second order variables are still significant but less sensitive than the first order. 
For these variables, a large part of the domain needs to be analysed. Third order 
variables, e.g. ambient temperature, material properties, etc., are the least 
significant and are considered deterministic in this study. For these variables 
mean values are taken as nominal values. 
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Par 21  
(σ,b,b) 
Unit Reference 
1 Fire growth coefficient 1st  Lognormal 0.019 0.037 [kW/s²) Nilsson [23] 
2 Average HRRPUA 2nd   Lognormal 400 80 [KW/m²] Yoshikazu [24] 
3 Max area 1st  Lognormal 9.3 38.1 [m²) Holborn [25] 
4 Occupant density 1st  Lognormal 0.2 0.2 [p/m2] NZ VM2 [26] 
5 Affiliation 2nd Beta 2.0 5.1 [%] Case specific 
6 Pre-evac time: close 1st  Lognormal 60 10 [s] Modified VM2 [26]  
Pre-evac time: remote 1st  Lognormal 120 20 [s] Modified VM2 [26] 
7 Walking speed 2nd Normal 1.12 0.25 [m/s] SFPE [6] 
8 Shoulder width 2nd Normal 0.51 0.07 [m] Albrecht [12] 
9 Heat of Combustion 2nd Normal 25 4 [kJ/g] Yoshikazu [24] 
10 Soot Yield 2nd  Normal 0.12 0.04 [g/g] Albrecht [27] 
11 CO-yield 2nd Normal 0.09 0.03 [g/g] Albrecht [27] 
12 HCN-yield 2nd Normal 0.006 0.002 [g/g] Albrecht [27] 
13 Susceptibility 2nd Beta 7.5 4.1 [%COHb] SFPE [6] 
14 VE rate person 2nd Normal 25 5 [m] SFPE [6] 
1 The parameters μ and sigma σ are the mean and standard deviation of a normal or lognormal distribution, the 
parameters u and β are the location and scale parameters of the Gumbel distribution and a and b are the shape parameters 
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In Table IV.2, several variables are given which will be implemented in the 
event tree. The focus is put on reliability of the safety systems. For every safety 
system, the reliability is presented by a PERT distribution with their 
corresponding parameters. In the table, the most critical component is 
presented for each system that is the main cause of system failure. The 
presented reliability data is valid under the consideration of proper design, 
installation, testing and maintenance. In case of low testing and maintenance 
quality the reliability levels drop significantly. For sprinkler systems, the most 
frequent reason for system failure, ranging from 33% to 100% of the reported 
failures, is that the system was shut off after reparation or maintenance. One 
possibility to increase the reliability of sprinkler systems is to provide an 
electrical monitoring system that monitors the state of the main sprinkler valve. 
This way the reliability can be increased towards 95-99.9% [28]. Similarly, the 
reliability of SHC systems can be increased when the critical components are 
monitored. 
Table IV.2: Safety system reliability data for event and fault tree analysis. 
Safety system Critical component Low Exp. High Ref.         
Smoke detection Poor maintenance 0.86 0.96 0.99 [28] 
Alarm Shut off after maintenance 0.85 0.95 0.99 [29] 
Sprinkler Main valve shut off 0.80 0.95 0.98 [28] 
SHC Damper failure 0.30 0.50 0.70 [30] 
Smoke barrier  Door shutter failure 0.50 0.80 0.95 [29] 
IV.4.3 Step 5.3: Construction of the Bow-Tie structure based 
on scenario analysis 
In step 3, the bow-tie model is constructed. The bow-tie technique requires 
formation of fault trees at the left side and branch scenarios (event trees) at the 
right side of a particular event (start fire, detection, sprinkler activation, etc.). 
The ignition frequency data depends on the size of the building [31]. The 
probabilities in the fault tree are based on component analysis, historical data 
and engineering judgement. The event tree is structured based on pathway 
factors [7].  
The factors are determined by dividing the variables in discrete and continuous 
parameters as illustrated in Table IV.3. The discrete variables are addressed in 
the bow-tie structure. The continuous variables are addressed in a later stadium 
by means of response surface modelling (RSM). The separation between the 
two types of variables is done for reasons of efficiency and because of the 
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reason that some variables have to be treated as discrete variables (door 
open/closed, system activates/fails, etc.). On the other hand, depending on the 
properties of the considered variable, some variables are necessary to be 
analysed in continuous form (fire growth, max HRR, number of people, etc.). 
Therefore, not all variables will be included in the event tree. They are 
considered variable in the scenario itself. In Figure IV.4, the conceptual 
representation of the bow-tie structure is presented by means of a fault tree 
analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA). 
Table IV.3: Describing discrete and continuous variables. 
Discrete variables Continuous variables 
Location of the fire 
Sprinkler activation 
SHC scenarios 
Fire doors state 
 
 
Fire growth coefficient 
Heat Release Rate per Unit Area 
Max fire Area 
Sprinkler location w.r.t. the fire 
Occupant density 
Pre-evacuation time 




!"# or CO-yield 
!$"% or HCN-Yield 
HoC or Heat of Combustion 
D or Susceptibility to fire 
V-rate or respiratory minute volume 
 
 
Figure IV.4: Concept of the bow-tie model. Adapted from [16]. 
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In Figure IV.5, the conceptual representation of part of an event tree structure 
is presented. 
 
Figure IV.5: Conceptual representation of the dynamic bow-tie structure. 
In the next steps, the failure probability of every branch scenarios is calculated.  
IV.4.4 Step 5.4: Construction of the response surface model 
IV.4.4.1 General concept 
The basic concept of a response surface model is to approximate the response 
in the global domain for a specific model without relying upon the physics of 
the system. This can be the case when the modelling of the response becomes 
physically too complex. It is often used when the limit state function [32] is 
implicitly formulated [27] (e.g. structural engineering) which is the case for 
the numerical models considered in this framework [33]. In RSM, the results 
of a finite set of detailed model simulations are translated in a meta-model, 
which does not model the physics in any way. The formulation can be 
described as [22]: 
y = f(X)         (IV.3) 
in which y is the response and X being the vector of input variables. A 
conceptual example is given in Figure IV.6.  
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Figure IV.6: Example of a response surface model. 
It is the goal of an RSM to replace the output information of the complex model 
&(() by an equivalent function &(̅()  by which the computational procedures 
can be simplified. An example of an RSM of a linear combination of second 
order polynomials can be depicted: 







         (IV.2) 
in which X	= (25,27,…,23)  are the variables and the parameters  a,  bi, 
ci, (i =  1,…,  n) are to be determined.  
It should be mentioned that in some cases the response surface may not be 
sufficiently accurate if it does not take interactions between variables properly 
into account, e.g. when interactions are expected between fire variables such 
as fire growth and fire area size. In the latter case, mixed terms may be included 













         (IV.3) 
This response surface with interaction terms is more accurate. However, more 
evaluation simulations are needed to determine the coefficients. 
IV.4.4.2 Multi-submodel response surface framework 
The framework consists of multiple sub-models for determining the risk to 
failure. Depending on the scope, these sub-models will model fire ignition, fire 
spread, smoke spread, evacuation, toxicity effects, fire brigade intervention, 
Variable X2 
Variable X1 
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etc. in which they have to interact with each other. Therefore, a link between 
these sub-models should be established. For example, output from the smoke 
spread model can be used for determining the visibility in evacuation models.  
In Figure IV.7, a sequential method of three sub-models is shown: the smoke 
spread, the evacuation and the consequence model. The input for smoke 
spreads model is divided into primary and secondary parameters. The primary 
type are parameters that have a significant impact on the fluid dynamics in the 
smoke spread sub-model, e.g. fire growth, fire area, ventilation conditions, etc. 
The secondary type of variables are parameter inputs which are considered to 
have significantly less impact on the movement of smoke, e.g. toxicity yields, 
heat of combustion, etc. The variability of these parameters is considered 
outside the computational expensive model by an analytical model, this to 
reduce the dimensionality and the number of simulations. The output from the 
smoke spread sub-model is generated based on a limited learning set. The 
response model is then used to generate input data in terms of visibility, 
toxicity and temperature components for the evacuation model. In a similar 
way, the evacuation model is analysed. The output from the evacuation model 
is then used to perform the consequence analysis. This model will determine 
the consequences for each occupant in terms of injury or fatality. In the last 
step, the reliability analysis is performed by limit state design. The limit state 
design is coupled to the Fractional Effective Dose (FED) model in which the 
individual risk in terms of the probability of fatality is calculated. Next, the 
societal risk is visualised by means of an FN curve. 
 
Figure IV.7: Simplified representation of the response surface model for 
multiple sub-models. 
IV.4.4.3 RSM for bow-tie scenarios 
Principally, the outcome of every event tree scenario in the bow-tie structure 
has multiple continuous variables. These variables need to be further analysed 
by means of the response surface model which is elaborated in the following 
steps. For bow-tie structures with limit sizes, the extent of the number of 
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simulations is reasonable. However, in case of larger bow-tie models, an 
extensive number of simulations needs to be performed for the different sub-
models. This will not be feasible when computational affording submodules 
are used. Therefore, the implementation of a comparative method for similar 
scenarios is suggested. The method is applied when similar sensitivities and 
behaviours are expected for branch scenarios. Multiple scenarios are grouped 
together in order to reduce the number of necessary model evaluations.  
For one of the grouped scenarios, the reference scenario, the standard 
procedure is followed as discussed in step 5, 6, 10 and 11. Multiple support 
points are generated (steps 5 and 10) and deterministic evaluations are 
performed (steps 6 and 11). For the other scenarios, only one support point (the 
most conservative) ?3@A	BC@3 is chosen and evaluated with similar boundary 
conditions as one of the simulations ?D@E	BC@3	in the scenario with multiple 
support points. The ratio between the results of these two identical scenarios 
is determined. Based on the ratio, additional support points for the other 











Component value (CO, CO2, O2, HCN, T) of support 
point for other scenarios. 
Component value of other scenario i. 
Component value of other scenario	?. 
Component value of reference scenario ?. 
IV.4.5 Step 5.5: Generation of the support points for smoke 
spread to be used in the response surface modelling 
In the first phase, the variables for deterministic analyses are chosen. The total 
computational time is reduced by only implementing the fundamental input 
variables that affect the main physics of smoke movement (Figure IV.7). The 
chosen variables, based on a preceding sensitivity analysis, are the fire growth 
coefficient S, the heat release rate per unit area (HRRPUA) and the maximum 
fire area (Amax). Other primary variables can be the sprinkler activation time, 
the wind effect, etc. In Table IV.1, the distributions for these variables have 
been listed. 
Next, the support samples are defined for the deterministic analysis. Sample 
combinations need to be chosen that give sufficient information to generate an 
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accurate response surface model. In [2] it is discussed that fractional factorial 
design is a suitable Design of Experiment (DoE). Other suitable designs are 
Central Composite and Box-Behnken designs [34]. The samples should be 
chosen to cover the domain of the expected limit state that covers the highest 
failure domain, i.e. the closest part of the limit state design from the origin in 
standard normal space (Figure IV.8).  
 
Figure IV.8: Selection of supports considering a limit state. 
In order to determine the optimal support points to generate the RSM, several 
aspects have to be considered. The first step is to choose a representative 
domain for every variable. Not the entire domain should always be chosen 
because it is expected that only a specific part of the domain will significantly 
contribute to the value of TE, as e.g. the fire grows too slowly, the fire area is 
too small, the sprinkler extinguishes the fire, etc. In Table IV.4, the suggested 
ranges are shown for the analysed variables. The choice of the ranges for every 
variable is based on a preliminary iteration in which first a broad parameter 
range is chosen, which is subsequently narrowed down. For example, the 
support points for the fire growth coefficient in a specific scenario can initially 
vary from slow to ultra-fast. After narrowing down, the risk analysis can be 
conducted for values from fast to ultrafast. 
Table IV.4: Input values for the support points for the RSM of the smoke 
spread sub-model (LL = Lower Limit, MV = Mean Value, UL = Upper 
Limit, CDF(LL) = Cumulative Density Function Lower Limit, CDF(UL) = 
Cumulative Density Function Upper Limit). 
Variable input LL MV UL Units CDF(LL)1 CDF(UL)1 
Fire growth 0.012 0.12 0.188 kW/s2 0.88 0.992 
HRRPUA 300 450 600 kW/m2 0.0816 0.99 
Max fire area 4 10 100 m2 0.6 0.98 
1CDF evaluated in the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL). 
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In the second part of step 5, the DoE is chosen based on full fractional factorial 
design [35,36]. For every variable, a minimum of three values are chosen [35]. 
This gives a total of 3n or 27 simulations. The lower limit (LL) values are 
adopted based on the method described above. The upper limit (UL) is taken 
based on physical boundaries (max fire area and maximum fire growth). The 
mean values (MV) are based on the linear or logarithmic average between the 
lower and higher limit. In order to test the convergence of the model, additional 
samples are evaluated to analyse the convergence rate of the developed RSM 
(see step 7). 
 
Figure IV.9: DoE fractional factorial design. 
In case correlation between variables is expected, correlation effects need to 
be implemented in the methodology. An extension of LHS or Sobol technique 
can be performed with correlated variables [37–39]. The method is extended 
by implementing a correlation matrix (see Table IV.5). The correlation matrix 
is a U	2	U	matrix, with n the number of variables, which defines the correlation 
between variables. Correlation between variables is possible because of the 
physical boundary effects (e.g. a slowly growing fire is less likely to reach a 
significant fire surface area). The values in the table are arbitrary values. 
Secondly, some combinations are not relevant for the analysis as they are not 
located in the vicinity of the limit state and hence are of minor importance 
when looking for the most likely failure point and the associated exceedance 
probability. The values in the table have been chosen as possible values here, 
in order to illustrate the proof of concept of the technique. 
Table IV.5: Correlation coefficients for a problem formulation with 3 
variables [2]. 
Variables S VWWTXY YZ[\ 
S 1 0.85 0.35 
VWWTXY - 1 0.2 
YZ[\ - - 1 
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IV.4.6 Step 5.6: Evaluation of the training set with 
deterministic analysis 
In step 6, the training set is evaluated by means of the deterministic smoke 
spread sub-model [2]. The corresponding input parameters are implemented 
and the scenarios are evaluated. Two models are considered: a zone model 
(e.g. Branzfire or CFAST) for simple compartment configurations and a field 
model FDS [40] for complex layouts. The output of the smoke spread sub-
model is obtained in 3D values for every time step and translated into 
compatible input for subsequent sub-models.  
IV.4.7 Step 5.7: Generation of the response surface smoke 
spread model 
The RSM is generated in step 7. Two methods are analysed for response 
surface modelling in the framework of life safety analysis [2,22]. These are the 
Interpolating Moving Least Squares (IMLS) method and the Polynomial 
Chaos Expansion (PCE) method. Both methods have a different approach for 
estimating the response surfaces and will prove to be sufficiently accurate for 
the intended purpose (see Chapter 6) [2]. 
The PCE estimates one response surface for the entire domain independent of 
the chosen support points. The model provides a more accurate method when 
fewer irregular patterns are observed (e.g. field far from the fire, low 
turbulence, etc.). In this thesis, the PCE methods is chosen for the analysis 
because of its higher accuracy for this type of configurations [2]. In general, 
the PCE method consists of two steps. First, it estimates a response surface 
based on the support samples for the chosen domain. In the second step, for 
every new combination of input variables, the RSM estimates the outcome by 
addressing the response surface. PCE is based on the homogeneous chaos 
theory proposed by Wiener [41]. PCE is a powerful surrogate modelling 
technique that aims at providing a functional approximation of a computational 
model through its spectral representation on a suitably built basis of orthogonal 
polynomial functions. The proposed methodology is explained in more detail 
in [42]. 
The IMLS method has only one step. For every new sample combination of 
input variables the method estimates a response surface which fits the best for 
that specific sample point. This means that the response surface and output 
value is generated at once for every new combination of input parameters. In 
Figure IV.10, the conceptual representation of the IMLS is depicted for two 
new samples (blue samples). Each new sample gives a different response 
surface because a weight function is used to give more importance to the 
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support samples (red samples) close to the new samples (red arrows). All 
support points have an influence on new samples. However, only the closest 
ones will have a significant impact based on the weighting function. The 
method is a more accurate method when strongly irregular patterns are 
observed (e.g. close to the fire, high turbulence or irregular sampling 
techniques). The advantage is that the method fits the best surface for the 
chosen support point. The mathematical explanation is discussed in 4.7.2. 
 
Figure IV.10: Conceptual representation IMLS method. 
IV.4.7.1  Response surface modelling with polynomial chaos 
expansion 
PCE in mathematical terms is based on the homogeneous chaos theory 
proposed by Wiener [41]. PCE is a powerful surrogate modelling technique 
that aims at providing a functional approximation of a computational model 
through its spectral representation on a suitably built basis of orthogonal 
polynomial functions.  
Consider a random vector with independent components X = (25		27		2]) =
(α, HRRPUA	and	AZ[\) ∈ R
M described by the joint probability density 
function (PDF) f(X) . Consider also a complex model as a map Y	=k(X). The 
PCE of k(X) is defined as: 
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Y	= k(X)	= / lαΨα(X)
αΝΜ
        (IV.5) 
where Ψα(n)	are multivariate polynomials, orthonormal with respect to &(+). 
α	 ∈ 	NM is a multi-index that identifies the components of the multivariate 
polynomials Ψα and lα	 ∈ 	R are the corresponding coefficients. In realistic 
applications, the sum given in Eq. (IV.5) needs to be truncated to a finite sum, 
by introducing the truncated polynomial chaos expansion: 
k(X)≈kPC(X)= / βαΨα(X)
αq
        (IV.6) 
In Eq. (IV.6)	q	 ⊂ 	NM is the set of selected multi-indices of multivariate 
polynomials.  
IV.4.7.1.1 Define the basis of the multivariate polynomials Ψα 
Conventionally, for normally distributed input variables, PCE constructs an 
RSM for the output using Hermite polynomials, which are orthogonal with 
respect to the standard normal distribution. The weight function and Hilbertian 
basis of the Hermite polynomials are presented in Table IV.6. 
Table IV.6: Implemented orthogonal polynomial for Gaussian variable 













For input variables following some specific non-normal distributions, Wiener-
Askey polynomials can be chosen as the orthogonal basis. However, if these 
non-normal distributions can be transformed to normal distributions, the 
Hermite polynomials can be used.  
The subset q in equation IV.6 is determined in such a manner that the number 
of polynomials used in the analysis do not exceed the number of samples, in 
order to avoid over-fitting (which is a common problem in response surface 
methods). A standard truncation scheme is used, corresponding to all 
polynomials in the M input variables of total degree less than or equal to p: 
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q{,| = {S~ℕ{ ∶ |S| ≤ É}         (IV.7) 
 
Figure IV.11: Truncation set for p = 2. 
A second truncation scheme used is the hyperbolic truncation scheme (or q-
norm). The scheme makes use of the parametric q-norm to define the 
truncation [42]: 








        (IV.9) 





         (IV.10) 
where èêë
(1)(21) is the univariate polynomial of degree α from the orthonormal 
family associated to variable 21 . 
Classical orthogonal polynomials are defined for reduced variables (e.g. 
standard normal variables). In practical problems the physical variables are 
modelled by random variables that are not necessarily reduced and not 
necessarily from a classical family, e.g. lognormal variable. Therefore, an 
isoprobabilistic transformation is necessary: 
(1 = 	î1 + ï1	ñ1        (IV.11) 
This gives for response model: 
kPC(X)= / βαΨα(ó)
αq
      (IV.12) 
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Next, the Hermite polynomials are defined by means of recurrence generation: 
ò	
Vy5(2) = Vô(2) = 1
V3ö5(2) = 2 ∗ 	V3(2) − U ∗ V3y5(2)
→	û	
Vô(2) = 1
V5(2) = 2(1) − 1 ∗ 0 = 2	
V7(2) = 2(2) − 1 ∗ 1 = 2
7 − 1
        (IV.13) 
The polynomials are normalized by dividing through †‖V3‖7: 
‖Vô‖
7 = 1, ‖V5‖
7 = 1, ‖V7‖
7 = 2	         (IV.14) 





     (IV.15) 
All the polynomials of (ñ5ñ7ñ]) that are products of univariate Hermite 
polynomials and whose total degree is less than 2 are considered as provided 
in Table IV.7:  
Table IV.7: Polynomials considered in the PCE model. 





























7 − 1)/√2 
(ñ7
7 − 1)/√2 
(ñ]
7 − 1)/√2 
 
Based on Table IV.7, the following formula can be written: 
Y = M£§(ñ5, ñ7, ñ]) = 	-ô + -5ñ5 + -7ñ7 + -]ñ] + -•	ñ5ñ7
+ -¶	ñ5ñ] + -ßñ7ñ] + -®(ñ5
7 − 1)/√2	 
																																+	-©(ñ7
7 − 1)/√2 + -™(ñ]
7 − 1)/√2 
     (IV.16) 
Were -ô, -5,…	-™ are the coefficients. 
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IV.4.7.1.2 Calculate the coefficients by means of Least Squares 
Minimization ¨ 
Next, the coefficients have to be calculated. These are determined by means of 
a least squares minimization. The exact (infinite) series expansion is 
considered as the sum of a truncated series and a residual: 
Y	=	M(X)= / βαΨα(X)
αq
+ εÆ ≡ β∞Ψ(X) + εÆ(n)      (IV.17) 
The unknown coefficients are estimated by minimizing the mean square 
residual error: 
β±=arg	min	Ε[εÆ7(n)] = arg	 	min	 Ε[(¨∞Ψ(X) −ℳ(X))∫]      (IV.18) 
The coefficients can be calculated as: 
β±=ªHT Hº-1 HT	y       (IV.19) 
The vectors Ω and F are discussed and explained below. 
IV.4.7.1.3 Construction of the matrix Ω 
Ω is a 2D-matrix with size m x n containing m support points and n-nonlinear 









































































     (IV.20) 
IV.4.7.1.4 Construction of the vector F 
The F matrix is a 1-dimensional vector containing the responses for the support 
samples at a considered location, timestep and component. 
F = [Œ5		Œ7 ….		Œ7®]       (IV.21) 
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IV.4.7.2 Response surface modelling with interpolating moving 
least squares 
For every combination of input samples output data is generated by means of 
the IMLS method. For every sample data is generated by means of the 
following formula: 
Œœ(–) = —(–)	“”(å)       (IV.22) 
“”(å) = (Ω∞‘(–)		Ω)yì	Ω∞‘(–)	F       (IV.23) 
In which, 
Œœ(–) The output response value.    
—(–) 
 
1D vector with containing the polynomials for the input 
variables x 
H 2D matrix with size m x n containing n linear functions hi(xi) 
W(x) 2D diagonal weighting matrix with size m x m 
y 1D vector with size m containing response data 
   
The construction of the different vectors and matrices is explained below. 
IV.4.7.2.1 Construct the matrix Ω 
Ω is a 2D-matrix with size m x n containing m support points and functions 



























      (IV.24) 
 






























       (IV.25) 
The values for S, HRRPUA and Amax are obtained from the input given in 
Table IV.4.  
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IV.4.7.2.2 Construction of the matrix ‘(–) 
For every combination of input variables and thus every smoke spread 
simulation, the weighting matrix ‘(–) needs to be determined. ‘(–) is a 2D 










ä›       (IV.26) 
Every ⁄1	is calculated by means of the following formula. 




¢45 ªfifl − fl‡ífiº
      (IV.27) 
 	 (4) 
with 




, ‰D@Â ≪ 1       (IV.28) 
 
where flZë and fl are the values chosen in Table IV.4 and transformed to the 
standard normal space. This is done in order to work with relative distances 
and not absolute ones so that the scale of the variables does not have an impact 
on the weighting factor. A regularization parameter ‰D@Â	is implemented in the 
method so that sample points at the support point location can be evaluated. In 
general a regularization parameter of ‰D@Â = 10y¶ is recommended [27]. 
IV.4.7.2.3 Construction of the vector —(–) 
For every combination of input variables and thus every smoke spread 
simulation —(–) needs to be determined. A quadratic scheme is chosen for 
—(–) in which the variables are fitted with respect to a second order degree and 
a first order interaction. The values for 25, 27	&	2]	are generated from data 




7]      (IV.29) 
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IV.4.7.2.4 Construction of the vector F 
The Œ matrix is a 1-dimensional vector containing the responses for the support 
samples at a considered location, timestep and component. 
Œ = [Œ5		Œ7 ….		Œ7®]      (IV.30) 
IV.4.7.3 Regularization of the model 
The purpose of the implementation of a regularization factor is to 
prevent overfitting of the response surface model. In regression analysis, the 
larger the number of parameters in the surrogate model, the better the fit to the 
original model. However, the higher the number of parameters, the higher the 
complexity and the higher the possibility of overfitting. In general, overfitting 
occurs when the number of unknown parameters in the regression model are 
equal or more as the size of the training set. A visual example of overfitting 
for a one-dimensional model is given in Figure IV.12.  
 
Figure IV.12: Example of overfitting in linear regression. 
In order to overcome this problem of overfitting, the L2 regularization or ridge 
regression [43]  is applied. For every chosen set of combinations of parameters 
in the surrogate model, the method determines a cost function Î(¨) in which 
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an additional term is added to penalize higher degree fitting surrogates. The 











ä       (IV.31) 
with m the size of the training set, n the number of parameters and Ì the 
regularization or shrinkage parameter. The latter parameter causes the 
coefficients to shrink as much as possible and is calculated in practice by using 
nested cross validation. From several case studies is found that a Ì between 
0.01 and 0.3 is appropriate.  
The purpose of the cost function is to find a balance  between the size of the 
error and the complexity of the model. In other words, a trade-off is found 
between bias and variance in the model prediction. The concept is illustrated 
in Figure IV.13. The method is applied for both IMLS and PCE methods. 
 
Figure IV.13: Bias and variance contributing to total error. 
IV.4.7.3.1 Implementation of regularization in IMLS 
In order to implement the method of regularization in the IMLS method the 
expression for eq. 23 is extended as follows: 
“”(å) = (Ω∞‘(–)	Ω + 	Ì	Ó	)yì	Ω∞‘(–)	F      (IV.32) 
Important to mention is that the variables should be rescaled to the standard 
normal space in order to prevent bias for larger scale variables. Otherwise Ì is 
not a fair predictor for smaller scale variables. 
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IV.4.7.3.1.1 Implementation of regularization in PCE 
In order to implement the method of regularization in the PCE method the 
expression for eq. 19 is extended is as follows: 
β±=ªHT H+ 	Ì	Óº-1 HT	y       (IV.33) 
IV.4.7.4 Convergence analysis 
The aim of the convergence analysis is to obtain an independent result with 
respect to the number of samples considered. Therefore, in step 5 and 10, n 
additional samples are generated and a response surface is determined for each 
additional sample. Next, for each additional sample, the convergence rate of 
the response surfaces is determined by calculating the absolute value of the 




Ò ≤ 5	%		          (IV.34) 
with F3 the result when including the additional sample and F3y5 is the result 
without the additional convergence sample. The result is considered converged 
when the error of the last sample is smaller than 5 % [45], [44]. If the results 
are not converged, additional samples are generated until the criteria are met. 
Both LHS and Sobol sampling can be applied to increase the sampling pool 
while maintaining the original samples. An example is given in Figure IV.14 
where additional samples are evaluated and added, with Sobol sampling, until 
the performance criteria are met for n = 3 runs in a row. 
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Figure IV.14: Example of a convergence analysis for the PCE and IMLS 
method. 
IV.4.8 Step 5.8: Generation of the DoE for probabilistic 
analysis of smoke spread RSM 
In step 8, the DoE is generated for the probabilistic analysis of the smoke 
spread RSM. In order to give a proper representation of the entire domain, a 
probabilistic sampling method is defined which covers the chosen domain. 
Therefore, two aspects have to be clarified: the preferred sampling technique 
and the domain to be analysed. 
IV.4.8.1 Sampling techniques 
Two sampling methods are discussed. The Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) 
and the Sobol Sampling technique. 
IV.4.8.1.1 Latin Hypercube Sampling 
The LHS method [46], [47], [48] is a statistical method for generating a near-
random sample of parameter values from a multidimensional distribution. A 
Latin square is a U2U	ıquare filled with n different samples in such a way that 
each sample appears once in each row and column. The LHS method for two 
variables and 10 samples method is illustrated in Figure IV.15. LHS is based 
on the Latin square design, which has a single sample in each row and column. 
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Figure IV.15: Multidimensional Latin Hypercube Sampling [47]. 
Additional techniques are implemented to optimize the sampling pattern of 
LHS. By means of maximizing the minimum distance between sample points, 
an improved representative sampling distributions can be obtained [49]. 
Secondly, in [38] and [50], research is conducted to enrich existing LHS sets 
with new samples while maintaining an overall LHS sampling set. The 
advantage of the method is that the original sampling pool can be reused and 
no support samples are lost. 
IV.4.8.1.2 Sobol Sampling 
The Sobol Sampling technique is based on the Sobol sequences which are 
quasi-random low-discrepancy sequences. The main difference between 
random sampling techniques (e.g. random sampling, LHS, etc.) is that the 
sample values are chosen under consideration of the previously sampled points 
thus avoiding the occurrence of clusters and gaps. In Figure IV.16, the 
difference is shown between classical random sampling, LHS and a Sobol 
sampling technique. The figure demonstrates that the Sobol sampling method 
represents a better distribution pattern [48], [51]. Further, the method shows 
the advantage of generating additional samples within the existing sample 
pool. In case of convergence analysis, it is of importance to perform a larger 
sampling sequence without the need to execute a new sampling scheme. 
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Figure IV.16: Sampling patters with n = 80 for a) random sampling, b) Latin 
Hypercube sampling and c) Sobol sampling. 
IV.4.8.2 Investigated domain 
The purpose of this section is to determine the domain to be investigated. In 
previous case studies [52] it is observed that, for an important part of building 
types, analysis of a large part of the input domain does not have a significant 
impact on the results. This can be due to the physical restrictions of the 
variables such as small fire size or a low fire growth. These parameters result 
in negligible consequences and have no added value to the output. 
Consequently, the analysis of such parts is not efficient and considered 
irrelevant. Therefore, it is suggested to reduce the domain to the part of the 
domain which has a significant impact on the final results.  
For more complex cases a conservative approach can be followed that stepwise 
narrows the domain. Initially, broad ranges should be applied in order to 
prevent underestimation of the failure domain. Next, the domain can 
systematically be narrowed until a significant impact is observed on the output. 
For common buildings types and their boundary conditions, a reduction of the 
domain can be done based on past experience. The boundaries are set and the 
domain is narrowed (red part Figure IV.17). In order to represent reality, the 
occurrence probability of samples in the neglected domain should be 
considered. This is accomplished by incorporating a weight factor to the 
probability of occurrence. The following weight factor for smoke spread or 
ˆ˜̄ ¯ is applied: 
ˆ˜̄ ¯ = (1 − ˜̆ (2)ê) ∗ (1 − ˜̆ (2)$˙˙˚¸˝) ∗ (1 − ˜̆ (2)˝)       (IV.35) 
ˆ˜̄ ¯ = (1 − 0.88) ∗ (1 − 0.0816) ∗ (1 − 0.6) = 	0.044       (IV.36) 
where	˜̆ (2)ê,			˜̆ (2)$˙˙˚¸˝ and ˜̆ (2)˝	are the cumulative distribution 
values for the fire growth coefficient, HRRPUA and the maximum fire area. 
The values are taken from Table IV.4. The weight factor will be multiplied by 
the final failure probabilities to take the entire domain of the distributions into 
account.  
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The LHS (Figure IV.17) or Sobol method is applied between the suggested 
limits in Table IV.4. An output	U	2	Ï matrix is generated for n samples and m 
variables. An example is given in the figure below for U	 = 	10	-U˛	Ï = 1 
between the given limits. It is suggested to sample a sufficient number of 
samples to reach convergence of the failure probability. 
 
Figure IV.17: LHS between upper and lower limit. 
IV.4.9 Step 5.9: Calculation of the fire and smoke spread 
responses based on RSM 
In step 9, the output results are obtained by addressing the RSM for the chosen 
input combinations. For every sample defined in step 8, the outcome is 
predicted by the RSM generated in step 7. Extrapolation is suggested not to be 
applied to avoid large errors in the model.  
Once the smoke spread results are obtained, the procedure continues to the 
analysis of the evacuation part of the method. In order to do this, the procedure 
loops back to step 5 and the output from the smoke spread is provided as input 
for the evacuation analysis. 
IV.4.10 Step 5.5: Generation of the support points for EVAC 
RSM 
The main input parameter from the smoke spread model that has a significant 
impact on the evacuation modelling is visibility. For every fire scenario, each 
evacuation model will have a different outcome. However, the combination of 
the sampled smoke spread scenarios in step 8 and the chosen evacuation 
scenarios gives a large number of evacuation scenarios to be analysed. 
Therefore, the smoke spread and evacuation modelling is partially decoupled. 
The effect of visibility is considered by analysing three representative smoke 
spread scenarios for each evacuation scenarios instead. The first scenario is 
considered the best-case scenario when only one person is affected by a low 
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smoke density and has a reduced walking speed. All the other occupants are 
not affected and therefore the impact of smoke on walking speed is negligible. 
This scenario is considered an evacuation scenario in smoke free conditions. 
All the evacuation scenario providing less severe smoke conditions give the 
same results in terms of movement dynamics. The second scenario is the 
worst-case scenario when the visibility conditions are the most negative. This 
is considered for the smoke spread scenarios with the highest smoke 
generation. The third scenario is chosen between the two former scenarios 
based on the average between the input values.   
Next, the support points for deterministic evacuation analysis are chosen. In 
order to reduce the total computational time, only the primary input variables 
that affect the main physics in terms of evacuation dynamics are implemented 
(Figure IV.7). The variables occupant density (OD), affiliation (exit 
familiarity), pre-evacuation time, shoulder width and movement speed are 
considered significant parameters affecting the output. An additional 
important parameter can be detection sensitivity or the activation of the alarm 
in case manual intervention is necessary. In Table IV.1, the distributions for 
these variables are listed. The secondary parameters considered are the 
respiratory minute volume (VE-rate) and susceptibility of people to smoke. 
These parameters are analysed in the consequence model. 
The support samples are generated for evaluating the deterministic analysis. 
To determine these support points, several aspects have to be considered. The 
first aspect is to choose a representative domain for every variable. In analogy 
to step 5 in the smoke spread sub-model, only a specific part of the domain is 
chosen in which fatalities are expected. No fatalities are expected to occur in 
particular domains because the population density is too small or the response 
is too fast. In the table below, the suggested ranges are shown. The choice of 
the ranges for every variable is based on a preliminary iteration in which first 
a broad parameter range was chosen and subsequently narrowed down. The 
ranges are chosen for higher occupant densities and are broader for the variable 
affiliation because fatalities can be expected even for optimal exit choice.  
Table IV.8: Upper and lower variable limit. (LL = Lower Limit, IV1/2 = 
Intermediate Value 1/2, UL = Upper Limit, CDF(LL) = Cumulative Density 
Function Lower Limit, CDF(UL) = CDF Upper Limit). 
Variable  LL IV1 IV2 UL unit CDF(LL)1 CDF(UL)1 
Occupant density 380 550 750 945 [pp] 0.02 0.97 
Affiliation 0.2 0.5 0.65 0.8 [-] 0.09 0.8 
1CDF evaluated in the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL). 
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Secondly, the DoE is chosen based on full factorial design. For every variable, 
four values are chosen. This gives a total of 4n or 32 simulations. The chosen 
data for 4n input combinations are presented in the table above. The lower 
values are taken based on the limits discussed in Table IV.8 because 
interpolation will be performed. The upper limit is adopted based on physical 
boundaries (maximum fire area and maximum fire growth). The middle values 
are based on the linear or logarithmic average between the lower and higher 
limit. 
IV.4.11 Step 5.6: Evaluation of the support samples with 
deterministic analysis 
In step 6, the training set is evaluated by means of the deterministic evacuation 
sub-model in analogy with the theory explained in [2]. Several evacuation 
models are investigated of which Pathfinder [53] and JuPedSim [54] are 
implemented in the framework. Pathfinder is suggested for practical 
applications because of the high efficiency in practical use. JuPedSim is 
implemented for flexibility and research purpose. This model can be adapted 
because it is open source. However, it needs more engineering time for the set-
up of the building geometry. The two evacuation sub-models consist of a 
combination of different models in which occupant movement, human 
behaviour and interaction with the environment is considered. The output 
provides time-depend 3D locations data for every occupant.  
In the next steps the RSM should be applied. However, when a similar 
procedure would be applied for the response surface modelling like in the 
smoke spread analysis, the model will be interpolated between occupant 
locations. This would not give the desired result because, depending on the 
scenario, the occupant will evacuate to different exits. This means that the 
interpolated result will give a location in between the exits which is not 
realistic and will couple toxic concentrations data with occupant locations 
which do not match with the real location of the occupant for either scenario. 
Therefore, the focus of the interpolation is shifted from occupant locations to 
the dosage obtained for each occupant at a specific exit. Each exit will give 
way for evacuation of a group of occupants. When analysing the toxic and 
temperature dosages for all the occupants at a specific exit it can be observed 
that the dosages and corresponding calculated FID values increase in a 
continuous form. An example is given in Figure IV.18 where 235 occupants 
evacuate to a specific exit where the FID increases from almost 0 to 1.5. 
Therefore, it is decided to first analyse the dosages and corresponding FID 
values and then continue to the response surface modelling of the evacuation 
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parameters. In order to perform this strategy, once the results from the 
evacuation RSM are obtained, the procedure loops to step 8 (Figure IV.3). The 
output obtained from step 5 is used as input for the consequence analysis sub-
model after linking the locations of the occupants to their corresponding 
dosages. 
 
Figure IV.18: Example of continuous increase in FID values for a group of 
people at an exit door. 
IV.4.12 Intermediate step: linking location-based 
concentration data with agents tracking 
After the analysis of the responses, the geometrical concentration data is 
coupled with the location data of the occupants. For every occupant the doses 
are calculated for every time step of 60 s. In case insufficient data is obtained 
from the smoke spread model (evacuation time longer than smoke spread 
simulation), the data is linearly extrapolated over time. 
IV.4.13 Step 5.8: Generation of the DoE for probabilistic 
consequence analysis 
A DoE is generated for the probabilistic consequence analysis. The secondary 
variables not considered in the previous sub-models are implemented in the 
consequence sub-model. This is done to reduce the variability of the more 
computational affording models by only taking parameters into account that 
have an important impact on the smoke spread (smoke spread model) and 
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evacuation dynamics (evacuation model). The secondary parameters are 
implemented in the consequence model because the model is an analytical 
model that efficiently evaluates the deterministic scenarios. The effect of the 
variables CO-yield (!"#), HCN-Yield (	!$"%), Heat of Combustion (HoC), 
Susceptibility (D), Respiratory minute volume (V-rate) is simulated. The same 
sampling technique is chosen for this part as discussed in step 8 of the smoke 
spread model. 
IV.4.14 Step 5.9: Calculation of the consequences for life 
safety 
Next, the consequences for life safety are determined in step 9. The input from 
the previous two steps is combined into analytical formulations. The effect is 
quantified through combining toxicity and heat (convective and radiation) 
effects into the Fraction Incapacitation Dose (FID) [1,55]. This value 
determines whether a person will manage to escape or get incapacitated. 
According to the definition of the FID, it is considered that a person who 
reaches an FID equal to unity or higher will not be able to survive the fire. The 
FID is calculated by means of the consequence model in analogy with [1] and 
as discussed in Chapter III. 
For every sample combination obtained from step 8, a set of FID values is 
obtained equal to the number of occupants in the building for the 
corresponding scenario. Each set is subdivided into a number of subsets equal 
to the number of exits in the analysed building. The FID values of every person 
is then appointed to the corresponding used exit door for the corresponding 
occupant. An example of an ascending order of FID values is given in Figure 
IV.19 (black line). 
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Figure IV.19: FID values for a set of occupants evacuating through an exit. 
Next, a polynomial curve with max degree of 10 is fitted to the FID values for 
each exit and sample scenario. In this way, all the values do not have to be kept 
in storage and interpolation can be done between multiple scenarios. The 
purpose of the polynomial curve fit is to facilitate a proper interpolation 
between different scenarios.  
IV.4.15 Step 5.7: Generation of the response surface 
evacuation model 
Once the curve fitting is performed, the procedure loops back to step 5.7 and 
the RSM for evacuation is developed. The RSM is applied in two phases for 
the evacuation data. Firstly, the RSM is conducted for determining the number 
of people evacuating towards each exit. Secondly, the RSM is applied for 
implementation of the other variables. The reason for the distinction is that 
first the number of people need to be fixed in order to interpolated between the 
FID curves. 
For the first RSM evacuation application, a different approach is applied than 
the method applied for the smoke spread interpolation. This is due to the fact 
that the variables occupant density and affiliation are translated to the variables 
occupant density and occupant exit load. In order to determine the latter, 
several steps are taken. First the two variables occupant density and affiliation 
are translated to normal distributed values. Then, the estimated mean and 
variance are determined for the joint density function [56]: 
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ˇ = î\î!       (IV.37) 
"- = î\7ï!7 + î!7ï\7       (IV.38) 
This is done for both type of exits (main and back) so that for every original 
sample set two new sample sets exist. Depending on the chosen exit, the main 
or back exit density should be applied. More practically, one sample set with 
a fixed value for occupant density and affiliation will be translated into two 
sets. Sample set one will be the combination of the parameter occupant density 
together with exit load for the front exit. Sample set two will be the 
combination of the parameter occupant density together with exit load for the 
back exit. 
Next, for every exit in every support sample scenario, the FID curves are 
rescaled to the number of occupants estimated before. An example for a set of 
six support points is given in Figure IV.20. Originally, these curves were fitted 
for different occupant sizes. However, interpolation between them would not 
be possible. Therefore, a scaling algorithm is implemented to rescale every 
curve to the desired number of occupants.  
 
Figure IV.20: Rescaled FID curves for a support sample of a particular exit 
and scenario. 
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After rescaling the FID curves, the second RSM evacuation application 
interpolates between the rescaled FID curves for variables such as pre-
movement time, detection time, etc. 
IV.4.16 Step 5.8: Generation of the DoE for probabilistic 
evacuation analysis 
In step 8, the DoE is generated for probabilistic evacuation analysis. Only a 
part of the domain is analysed for the same reason as discussed earlier. Samples 
with low occupant densities will not give a significant added valued to the 
results. Therefore, it is chosen to narrow the domain and give a weight to the 
results.  
In order to take into account the probability of occurrence, the following 
weight factor for evacuation or ˆ #̃[C is applied from Table IV.8: 
ˆ #̃[C = ª1 − ˇ"Y$%%_#'	º ∗ ª1 − ˇ"Y$%%_˝EEº       (IV.39) 
ˆ #̃[C = (1 − 0.02) ∗ (1 − 0.09) = 	0.941192      (IV.40) 
where ˜̆ (2)#'	and ˜̆ (2)˝EE	are the cumulative distribution values for the 
occupant density and affiliation towards the main exit.  The weight factor will 
be multiplied with the final failure probabilities to take the entire domain of 
the distributions into account. The weight factor is multiplied with the failure 
probability after applying the reliability analysis.  
IV.4.17 Step 5.9: Calculation of the evacuation data based on 
RSM 
Once the input combinations are chosen, the samples are evaluated by means 
of the response surface model for evacuation discussed in section 4.15. In 
Figure IV.21 an example is given of the estimation of an FID curve by RSM. 
The red line is the estimated curve and the blue line is the real value. Two 
support samples are presented in green to illustrated that the new samples are 
interpolated between the support samples.   
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Figure IV.21: Estimated FID curves for a new sample for a particular exit 
and scenario. 
IV.4.18 Step 5.10: The reliability analysis 
In step 10, the failure probability in relation to the specific scenario is 
calculated. The combined result of the analysis will be expressed in an FID 
value. Therefore, the following limit state is applied: 
g(n) = ()*− ì = 0     (IV.41) 
In case a sufficient number of occupants obtain an FID ≥ 1, a direct failure 
can be calculated in which the number of subscenarios (determined by Sobol 
Sampling) containing one or more occupants with an FID ≥ 1 or 
,-0ı6xU-./012'35	is divided by the total number of subscenarios or 




		ˆ˜̄ ¯	ˆ #̃[C       (IV.42) 
In case an insufficient number of occupants obtain an FID ≥ 1, an indirect 
failure probability needs to be calculated because the failure probability or risk 
level cannot be zero. An approximate calculation is performed in which the 
most suitable distribution is fitted to the FID results. Next, the probability of 
FID ≥ 1 for the fitted distribution is calculated. In Figure IV.22, a conceptual 
Validation curve 
Estimated Curve 
Support curves 1-2 
1 
2 
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fitted normal distribution is presented with red marked the zone in which FID 
> 1. 
 
Figure IV.22: Failure probability of the FID distribution. 
The model fits multiple possible  distribution types with the corresponding data 
by means of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation [57]. For each of the 
considered distributions the residual sum of squared errors (SSE) is 
calculated.  The SSE is a measure of the discrepancy between the obtained data 
and the fitted distribution. The following formula is suggested: 
,,ˇ =	/(Œ1 − &(21))7
3
145
      (IV.43) 
The fitted distribution with the lowest SSE value is considered the best fit. The 
SSE method is considered a good method for estimating the goodness of fit for 
the entire distribution. However, the focus of the curve fitting should be put on 
the tail of the distribution. Because the failure probability will be determined 
based on the area in that tail with FED > 1. Therefore, the Anderson-Darling 
(AD) test is suggested. The AD test [58] is used to test if a sample of data came 
from a population with a specific distribution. It is a modification of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test [59] with more focus on the tails of the 
distribution.  
Y7 = 	−U −
1
U
/(2/ − 1)[ln	(˜((1) + lnª1 − ˜((3y1ö5)º]
3
145
      (IV.44) 
where n is the number of samples and ̃ ((1) is the considered distribution type. 
The lowest value for Y7 gives an indication of the applicability the 
Pf 
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corresponding fit. When the most optimal distribution is fitted,  the probability 
for obtaining an FID > 1 for the specific scenario is determined as: 
TE,BC@3[D1Ô = ˆ˜̄ ¯	ˆ #̃[C 	 6 &(˜78)˛(˜78)
12'4	9
12'45
      (IV.45) 
In analogy to previous steps, a convergence analysis is performed to determine 
the accuracy of the results. The calculation procedure from step 4-10 is 
repeated for every event tree scenario. 
IV.4.19 Step 5.11: Calculation of the general, individual and 
societal risk 
Finally, in step 11, the general risk, individual risk and societal is calculated. 
The risk  is calculated by taking the sum of the conditional frequencies 
obtained from the event tree analysis combined with the failure probabilities 
for every event tree scenario: 
W =/	TBC@3,1 ∗ #&-:-;/:/xıBC@3,1
3
145
       (IV.46)  
where UBC@3 are the number of scenarios. The branch probabilities are 
determined by multiplying the corresponding frequencies of the pathway 
factors (e.g. ventilation conditions, safety system state, etc.) which are 
determined by the fault tree analysis. The societal risk is calculated for all the 
different scenarios and represented by means of a FN curve. The resulting 
values of fatalities (N) obtained for every scenario are plotted against the 
cumulative frequency (F) the log/log diagram. In order to give a clearer 
explanation regarding the PRA model. A worked out example for one event 
tree scenario is provided in Appendix E. 
 
  




In this part of the thesis, the probabilistic framework is developed for 
quantifying the life safety risk in case of fire. The proposed method can 
objectively quantify fire safety designs by taking the uncertainty of design 
parameters and the effectiveness of safety systems into account. The 
parameters and representative design fire scenarios can be analysed by the 
proposed deterministic framework. The model can take the effect of efficacy 
and reliability of different safety systems into account.  
The implementation of the response surface model in combination with design 
of experiments techniques allows for a significant reduction of the 
computational time. The challenge of data allocation and communication when 
dealing with large data files is tackled. Several techniques such as compression 
and averaging are used to reduce the data files for storage and communication 
for input/output handling.  
The results can be quantified reliability-based in terms of a failure probability 
or risk-based in terms of an individual and a societal risk. 
Overall, the framework provides a guideline for the fire safety engineer to 
perform a probabilistic analysis to determine the safety level of various types 
of fire safety designs for different types of buildings. 
Based on these conclusions, the methodology meets the predefined objectives. 
The framework will be validated in Chapter V and illustrated and discussed by 
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 Introduction to the simplified method 
In this chapter, a simplified version of the probabilistic methodology is 
developed. The objective of the simplified method is to provide a first 
indication of the fire safety level by implementing less accurate but relative 
fast models. The simplified model will provide a rough estimate of the safety 
level to highlight the main strengths and weaknesses of the building and 
occupant configuration. The simplified method is presented in this chapter, it 
is validated in chapter VI and tested on case studies in chapter VII. 
 Problem description and objectives 
One of the main challenges of the developed probabilistic model in chapter IV 
is to find a trade-off between the number of representative scenarios and the 
available time for the analysis. In this way, the necessary computational power 
to perform the simulations is reduced. However, even in optimized form, the 
computational affordance required to analyse complex building designs is still 
significant. Additionally, it might not always be necessary to perform an in-
depth analysis. Therefore, a simplified method that performs a pre-analysis of 
fire safety building designs needs be developed to give a rough estimation of 
the safety level and distinguish whether a design is sufficiently safe or needs 
further analysis. 
The objective is to develop a simplified method that gives a first estimate of 
the fire safety level of the considered building in a relatively short time span, 
in the order of one day of work. The goal is to reduce the computational time 
of the framework by implementing simplified smoke spread and evacuation 
submodels. The general framework is identical to the one discussed in chapter 
IV; only the smoke spread and evacuation model are substituted by simplified 
models. This is done because these models require the most engineering and 
computational time. Both models are discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
 Smoke spread zone model 
There are two options to simplify the implemented field model for smoke 
spread, namely analytical mass loss models or numerical zone models. 
Typically, the analytical models are faster and used to give a first estimation 
of the smoke generation. The numerical models take more time to apply and 
are typically used for time dependent analysis or to obtain more accurate 
results. For this application, numerical zone modelling is chosen because it 
takes the basic principles of thermodynamics into account, and it requires 
computational time in the order of minutes. The compartment is subdivided 
into only two volumes, the upper hot gas layer and the lower ambient air layer. 
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Both layers are assumed to have homogeneous temperatures and mass 
concentrations, which limits the model applicability to simple compartment 
geometries [1]. 
Based on the assumption of two volumes, the change in the zone temperatures 
and the layer height (ℎ<) can be computed numerically by time-stepwise 
solutions of the equations for conservation of mass (Ï) and conservation of 
energy (ˇ) for each zone, as schematically depicted in Figure V.1. State-of-the 
art zone models, such as CFast, B-RISK, or MRFC, are capable of computing 
multiple compartments and contain simple combustion models. 
 
Figure V.1: Schematic representation of the assumptions used in zone 
models. Taken from [2]. 
For the simplified model, the zone model B-RISK is chosen. The model 
incorporates the same basic correlations as C-FAST, but has additional 
submodels for glass failure and fire growth over linings. The model is under 
continuous development and has a probabilistic feature. In Figure V.2, an 
application to B-RISK for an atrium building is provided.  
 
Figure V.2: Application of B-RISK for atriums.  
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Similarly to the main framework, the input parameters are provided to the 
model and the results are obtained in the form of concentrations. Contrary to 
the CFD output, the location dependent toxicity and temperature data are 
limited to one data value per room for every output type. These output data 
values are then linked to the other models (evacuation and consequence 
model). For further technical elaboration, reference is made to the technical 
manual [3]. 
 Evacuation network model 
There are two possibilities to simplifying the continuous evacuation model, 
namely analytical and numerical network models. Although both are hydraulic 
models, the latter provides more accurate results for complicated building 
configurations. Therefore, the focus is put on numerical modelling.  More in 
particular, the focus is put on coarse network models. When using a coarse 
network, the network does not explicitly represent all the occupiable space. A 
coarse network divides the floor plan into rooms, corridors, stair sections, and 
so on, and the occupants move from one structural component to another (e.g., 
room to corridor). The best way to segregate and hence to represent the 
structure within a coarse network model is not always clear. The segmentations 
will have a direct impact on the obtained results, since they directly influence 
the movement of the occupants and the routes that may be adopted.  In a coarse 
network, the occupants will move from one segmented area to another through 
links. It is up to the user to provide segmented areas that are representative of 
how occupants might move throughout the space. 
 
Figure V.3: Example of a segmented office floor plan. Taken from [4]. 
Several network models have been analysed, of which EvacuatioNZ, 
WAYOUT, EVACNET4 and EXIT89 are the most known and available for 
analysis. From these tools, EvacuatioNZ is considered the most sophisticated 
one [5,6]. The model allows for incorporation of probabilistic Monte Carlo 
approaches and can take reduced walking speed into account. However, this 
method (and others) has several disadvantages with respect to implementation 
in the framework. First, the I/O treatment is very rigid for serial analysis. 
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Second, the effect of smoke on walking speed cannot be directly taken into 
account. Third, it is not possible to obtain agent-based locations. This is a 
major disadvantage of EvacuatioNZ and other network models. Therefore, an 
in-house model is developed, inspired on EvacuatioNZ, that is able to easily 
track occupants and take the effect of smoke on walking speed into account 
[7,8,9]. The occupants in the model can be appointed to familiar exits. The 
model is developed in python and described in the subsequent sections. 
 Input parameters 
The model can take several variables into account. The mean input parameters 
are occupant density, unimpeded walking speed, response time, familiarity, 
smoke density, occupant size, exit behaviour, boundary layer, etc. These 
parameters can be identified by the user through GUI. The default values are 
presented in the table below. 
Table V.1: Default values and calculation procedure for the network model. 
Parameter Default Units Ref.         
Maximum walking speed 1.20 m/s [10] 
Pre-evacuation time  30 s [11] 
Specific flow rate 1.33  pers/s/m [10] 
Exit behaviour Min distance - [6] 
Starting distance Random distance - [6] 
Body size 0.45/5 [m] [10] 
 
Furthermore, building properties and calculation parameters such as stair 
dimensions, door width, path width and length, time step can be determined 
by the user. 
 Submodel framework 
The network model contains several submodels that assist in the global 
dynamics of the evacuation process. The main submodels are the building 
network, the travel, the door and stair flow, the routing, random start, pre-
evacuation and agent submodel.   
V.4.2.1 Building geometry 
V.4.2.1.1 Nodes  
The model consists of five different types of nodes: the source, travel, door, 
stair and safe node. The source node provides the start point for occupants 
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throughout the building. The node can only exist in a room type. A specific 
occupant density can be assigned to each of these node types. The node is red 
in the model. The second node is the travel node. The node can only be used 
to travel from one node to the other and can exist in a room type. This node is 
black in the model. The door node provides passage through doors and 
simulates door flows. They can only exist at door locations. The stair node 
provides passage through stairs and forms the link between levels. The safe 
node is a node in which the occupants are considered safe from the effects of 
fire. One or more safe nodes can exist in and outside the building. The goal of 
the occupant is to reach a safe node before untenable conditions occur. In a 
scenario with more than one safe node, the occupants can choose the safe nodes 
that they will travel to, according to the exit behaviour specified by the user. 
An example of a network structure of a floor level is given in Figure V.4. 
 
Figure V.4: Example of network structure with nodes and links. 
V.4.2.1.2 Links 
The links provide travel opportunities between different nodes (Figure V.4). 
The links are physical tubes that can hold people. The links represent paths 
between nodes in rooms and evacuation routes in hallways between doors.  
V.4.2.2 Agent 
The objective of the occupant pre-evacuation sub-model is to determine the 
occupant behaviour during evacuation. The main purpose is to translate this 
occupant behaviour into (in)actions taken during egress which have influence 
on the evacuation dynamics and the consequence for the occupants.  
The general model structure is based on the Evacuation Decision Model 
developed bij Reneke [12]. The model considers the fact that occupants can 
have three different states: the Normal State (NS), the Investigating State (IS) 
and the Evacuating State (ES). The agent can shift between states depending 
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on the perceived risk. The allowed passages are those from NS to IS, from NS 
to ES and from IS to ES (Figure V.5). The occupant can perform actions 
depending on its corresponding state.  
 
Figure V.5: Proposed behavioural states [12]. 
For the purpose of the simplified model, human behaviour is implicitly 
modelled through implementing pre-movement response times by means of a 
pre-defined distribution.  
V.4.2.3 Movement 
The walking speed of occupants has been extensively studied in the past. 
Gwynne et al. provided a review of walking speeds in different models [10]. 
For the development of the submodel, a literature study has been performed in 
the Appendix F. Apart from the nominal walking speed, three factors that 
impact traveling speed are implemented. The first factor takes into account the 
characteristics of the person. The second factor is the effect of occupant 
density. This factor takes into account the type of path (evacuation route, 
connection, stair, ramp, etc.) and its conditions (rough, obstacles, etc.). The 
third factor incorporates the effect of smoke on occupant movement. 
V.4.2.3.1 Effect of occupant characteristics 
The effect of occupant age and body weight is implemented in the submodel. 
The first factor (age) is directly related to a deterioration in physical, mental 
and neurological functions, which has a negative impact on individual 
movement, e.g., speed and stride length [13]. Recent studies [14] have 
quantified the impact of population age on crowd speed (Figure V.6). Three 
population types were included in the study: adults, children and elderly. The 
figure shows reduced speeds for elderly and children. 
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Figure V.6: Walking speed vs density for different age demographics. Taken 
from [14]. 
The effect of body weight on walking speed has been proven to have 
significant impact on walking speed dynamics [14]. The actual impact of the 
increasing proportion of obese people has yet to be properly considered with 
respect to crowd movement. However, from initial research [10,15], it is 
estimated that increased body size can reduce the movement speed and flow 
rate up to 25%.  
V.4.2.3.2 Effect of occupant density on horizontal and vertical walking 
speed  
Extensive research has been conducted regarding the effect of occupant 
density on walking speed [10]. Experiments show an inverse relationship 
between the two parameters. The waking speed decreases as the occupant 
density increases (Figure V.7). An important limitation of this relationship is 
the exclusion of body size. The real density might vary depending on the body 
size (small children vs. obese adults). A possible adaption could be to represent 
the correlation in terms of occupant coverage per square meter. 
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Figure V.7: Relation between walking speed and density through doors, on 
stairs and slopes. Taken from [10]. 
Movement on slopes, stairs and escalators presents a different challenge than 
horizontal movement, given the extra degree of freedom available in the 
movement, the constraints imposed by the stair design, and the additional 
effort required to traverse the stair component. Extensive research was done  
[16,17], giving a wide range of results depending on density and floor levels. 
A mean movement speed of 0.48 m/s ± 0.16 m/s was obtained [17]. In Figure 
V.7, several correlations for walking speeds on stairs are suggested. 
V.4.2.3.3 Effect of smoke on walking speed 
It is considered to have occupants which walk through low-irritant smoke 
conditions. These occupants are either sufficiently familiar with the 
environment, or they are guided towards the exits. Based on multiple research 
studies [7,8,9], it is suggested to implement a correlation interpretation of the 
data set in which the variable unobstructed and minimum walking speed are 
applied (Figure V.8). The general formulation of the calculation of the walking 
speed =1B reads: 
=1
B = 	Ï-2	Ü=1,Z13(/), =1
ô6(>̄ )à (V.1) 
The walking speed in smoke =1B  of occupant	/ is a fraction =1ô(?B)	(/. x. 0 <
6	 ≤ 1)	of the walking speed in clear condition is =1ô	and depends on the 
extinction coefficient >ı. In dense smoke there is a considerable scattering of 
speeds, i.e., =1,Z13 depends on the characteristics of the occupant, 
i.e.,	=1,Z13 = =1,Z13(/). U smoke/speed curves are produced in accordance with 
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the characteristics of n individuals. The minimum speed depends on the 
characteristics of the individuals. Occupants, even in dense smoke, keep 
walking with U different minimum speeds, depending on their individual 
skills. A minimum threshold is applied for each individual. A fictive example 
is given below. 
 
Figure V.8: Schematic representation of the fractional/variable minimum 
speed interpretation. 
In order to take the above discussed probabilistic method into account, the 
method is divided into three different states for non-irritant smoke conditions 
[18]. 
Visibility ≥ 3 m: The walking speed in a smoke free environment =¯E	is 
represented by a randomized value from a normal distribution curve with an 
average value of 1.35 m/s and a standard deviation of 0.25 m/s [19], with 
minimum and maximum limits of 0.85 and 1.85 m/s respectively. 
0.5 m < visibility < 3 m: In case of lower visibilities, the walking speed is 




(" − 0.5) + =¯))	 (V.2) 
were " is the visibility in meter. A minimum for =Z13	of 0.2 m/s is applied. 
The above equation also represents the randomness of the individual occupant 
characteristics. 
Visibility ≤ 0.5 m: In case of very dense smoke, the walking speed in smoke 
=¯ is represented by a randomized value from a uniform distribution with 
minimum and maximum limits based on the 95% confidence level of the 
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forecast range [9]. The minimum value is at least 0.2 m/s and, at most, it is the 
individual's velocity in smoke free environment. In Figure V.9, a visual 
representation of the probabilistic approach for multiple occupants is depicted.  
 
Figure V.9: Probabilistic approach of the relation between walking speed and 
visibility. 
V.4.2.4 Flow 
The flow of occupants through geometrical constraints has been extensively 
studied in the past [10]. The main influence factors affecting flow performance 
can be distinguished into internal and external factors. Internal factors are due 
to the occupant’s individual characteristics (age, fitness, focus, etc.). External 
factors are mainly due to occupant density, merging and building configuration 
(Slope, stair, etc.). The effect of these parameters show a wide range of 
possible average flows (between 0.0 and 2.0 pp/m/s) applied in evacuation 
models [10].  
V.4.2.4.1 Effect of occupant characteristics 
The effect of occupant age and body size is implemented in the submodel. The 
first factor age has been experimentally studied [14]. Three population types 
were included in the study: adults, children, and elderly. Figure V.10 shows 
reduced flow rates for elderly. For children, an increased flow rate is observed  
for high densities due to the smaller body sizes. 
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Figure V.10: Crowd flow rate vs. density for different age demographics. 
Taken from [14]. 
The second factor is body size. From research it is observed that a change in 
body size has a significant impact on modelling evacuation time. Purser and 
Gwynne performed a sensitivity analysis with a mean body size of 0.46 m 
diameter and a variation between 0.3 - 0.7 m [20]. For smaller body sizes, the 
effect was small. For larger body sizes, a variation up to 50% is observed 
because the flow rate is heavily reduced.  
The impact of significantly higher proportions of obese people has yet to be 
properly considered with respect to crowd movement. However, from initial 
research [10,15], it is estimated that increased body size can reduce the 
movement speed and flow rate by up to 25%. 
V.4.2.4.2 Effect of occupant density on horizontal and vertical flow 
Experiments show a parabolic relationship between occupant density and flow. 
The flow first increases from low to medium densities up to 2 p/m2.  
Subsequently, the flow decreases from a maximum value to almost zero for 
higher densities around 4 p/m2.  
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Figure V.11: Specific flow as a function of population density. Taken from 
[10]. 
V.4.2.4.3 Effect of merging in staircases on flow 
The effect of different merging dynamics in staircases can have a significant 
impact on the exposure time of occupants in the incident compartment to the 
effluents of a fire. Purser described that most experiments show merging flows 
in the order of a 50:50 ratio [21]. In these circumstances the top floor empties 
first and then from bottom up. Ronchi et al. found that in the case of low 
occupant load and low densities, stair mergers seem too often have priority 
over floor mergers (in the order of 60-70:40-30) [22]. It was also discussed 
that the majority of the evacuation models approximate a 50:50 percentage 
ratio for most stair configurations [23].  
V.4.2.5 Pre-evacuation model 
In Appendix C, a literature study is performed to study the different pre-
evacuation modelling techniques. The chosen approach for the simplified 
model specifies pre-movement response times as a distribution or a random 
number. This approach is used in models such as EvacuatioNZ  [24]. A Sobol 
sampling scheme is used for assigning pre-evacuation times. The approach is 
an improvement with respect to methods with a fixed value. However, it is still 
not a general model, since the effects of fire severity and fire detection and 
alarm systems on occupant response are not reflected. 
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V.4.2.6 Exit choice 
The purpose of the occupant exit choice model is to determine the exit choice 
for every occupant in the building during emergency evacuation. In the past, 
exit choice was mainly an optimization problem. Models were designed to 
assign agents to a certain exit depending on the shortest travel time. These 
algorithms give the shortest evacuation times. However, research has shown 
that people do not always know all exit possibilities, or do not always have a 
clear overview of the fastest route [25,26]. In Appendix C, a literature study is 
performed to study the different exit choice modelling techniques. 
Three submodels are implemented in the model: the ‘shortest path’, the ‘fastest 
path’, and the ‘affiliation’. The shortest path calculates the fastest exit route 
and appoints this exit to the occupant. Shortest path is determined using the 
“Dijkstra” algorithm [27]. The fastest path chooses the fastest route to the 
outside taking into account queuing. The affiliation model takes into account 
a distribution of occupants assigned to each exit. A fourth submodel is 
considered, in which a combination of the former two is implemented. In this 
submodel, the occupants travel to the fastest known exit based on the affiliation 
parameter. During the evacuation simulation, for every timestep, the occupant 
re-evaluates their exit choice based on the influence of dynamic factors such 
as population size and environmental factors (smoke, signage, etc). The 
occupant may redirect due to higher expected queuing times or unavailability 
due to smoke.  
V.4.2.7 Random start 
The random start possibility randomises the start positions of the occupants. 
The occupants are randomly spread in the room in which represented by the 
corresponding node. This feature helps to make the model more realistic 
because in real situations, occupants are distributed within the space, and they 
do not usually have the same travel distance to the room exit. The result of this 
is that the occupants arrive at the door at different times. Therefore, by using 
the random start feature, we allow the occupants closer to the door to leave the 
room before the majority of the other occupants arrive to queue. 
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Figure V.12: Randomised vs standard occupant distribution. 
 User framework 
The user framework contains different steps to perform the evacuation 
analysis. In Figure V.13, the interaction between the different parts of the 
software is presented.  
  
Figure V.13: User framework. 
Step 1 – Defining building layout: The building layout provides a user 
interface to draw a network. Therefore, a map or building plan is required and 
imported into the building layout model. Different type of files can be imported 
(e.g.,  PGM, PPM, GIF or PNG format).  
Step 2 – Drawing evacuation network: To create a network, the ‘network 
creator’ module is used. This module provides a platform for the user to draw 
the network and add network properties utilizing key and click handlers. In 
this part, doors, travel links, start points, stair cases, floor connections are 
designed. The network is then saved.  
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Step 3 – Scaling the model: Next, the design is scaled. The problem with 
utilizing an image as building plan is the scale of the image. Different images 
could have different scales, which will change the result of simulations. The 
‘PhotoImage’ widget used in Python translates pixel to meter by a conversion 
factor equal to one. Therefore, ‘pixel_to_meter’ module was developed to 
facilitate the conversion with a real scale specified by the user. The module 
receives two nodes identified by the user and the distance in between; dividing 
the distance by the distance already measured in pixel, the meter to a pixel ratio 
is obtained, which will be used for converting pixel to meter during evacuation 
calculations. Moreover, for modelling a multi-storey building, different floors 
may have different map scales. This will also be taken into account by the 
software. To do so, the software will implement the corresponding meter to 
pixel ratio of each floor during evacuation calculations of that floor. 
Step 4 – Integration of multiple floors: Since the software environment for 
creating a network is two dimensional, for simulations of a multi-storey 
building, evacuation networks of all the floors must be connected at connection 
points such as stairs. Therefore, ‘multi_floor’ and ‘multi_floor_support’ 
modules have been developed to facilitate the task. These modules combine 
separate networks of all the floors into one network, by automatically creating 
links between connection nodes, and save it to a ‘graph.data’ file. In order for 
the code to connect two floors, their connection points must be identified by 
the user on both floors by selecting connection type nodes. Each connection 
type node will then be linked to the connection node with the same group 
number on the adjacent floor. 
Step 5 – Evacuation modelling: The ‘evacuation_plan’ is the module for 
identifying the next path during evacuation. The evacuation submodel decides 
what link the agent will turn to from a given intersection. Currently, this 
module provides multiple ways to define the exit strategy. This can be based 
on the exit choice, the random path or the shortest path model.  The evacuation 
simulator, included in the ‘evacuation’ module, is the main algorithm for the 
simulation of the evacuation network. Several functions are defined in order to 
calculate the location of agents per time, their arrival at different node types, 
and calculate cumulative waiting times for people during their evacuations. 
The calculations take into account the number of people queuing at specific 
locations such as door inlets, narrow hall ways, and stairways. 
The GUI provides an interface for the user to access different features of the 
software. GUI is prompted by ‘GUI’, ‘GUI_support’, ‘GUI_Options’ and 
‘GUI_Options_Support’ modules. To develop the interface, tkinter widget has 
been employed [28]. 
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Figure V.14: Graphical user interface. 
 Limitations and future optimizations 
In this part, limitations and possible future optimizations are discussed. The 
main limitations are: 
- In terms of geometry, the software provides a convenient platform for 
modelling complicated multi-storey buildings, where the user does 
not need a complicated three-dimensional model of the building and 
the modelling can be performed with only two-dimensional plans of 
floors; however, the model is sensitive to network drawing. For 
example, when the obstructions are unknown, it is not convenient to 
draw the proper network structure. 
- The modelling accuracy is less than with fine networks or continuous 
models, due to a coarser representation of the building; but, similar to 
those models, agents can have attributes and their exact locations 
during evacuation can be modelled by the software. 
- Specific geometry configurations (lifts, turnstiles, etc.) cannot be 
taken into account.  
Several possible suggestions are made for future developments: 
- The user interface can be made more user-friendly. The option 
‘delete’ for omitting ‘link’ objects should be incorporated. 
- Additional correlations can be implemented into the model, for 
example the effect of fatigue on walking speed. 
- Several programming functions can be added to the model to make 
simulations even faster in densely populated case studies. (e.g., 
parallel computing, NumPy arrays and error handling). 
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- A new module for importing FDS results and modelling interactions 
between fire and people during evacuation can be added to the 
software. 
 Conclusions 
In this part of the thesis, the simplified version of the probabilistic framework 
has been developed for quantifying the life safety risk in case of fire. In order 
to accomplish this challenge, the objective was to develop a simplified method 
that gives a first estimate of the fire safety level of the considered building in 
a relatively short time span, in the order of one day of work. Two submodels 
are replaced to reduce the engineering and computational time. The simplified 
method is validated in chapter VI and tested on two case studies in chapter VII. 
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One of the most important parts in simulation modelling is to ensure that the 
model represents the developer’s conceptual description and that the model is 
correctly translated to software applications. Therefore, several validation and 
verification cases are analysed in order to determine the accuracy of the 
different submodels. Initially, the verification and validation objectives are 
defined. Next, the case configurations and boundary conditions used for the 
analysis are defined. After the definition of the case configurations, three 
verification procedures are defined and results are discussed. The first case 
analyses the performance of the Pyhton code during the modelling. The second 
case describes several algorithm tests. The focus is put on convergence 
analysis. The third study verifies the simplified model with respect to the full 
probabilistic model. Next, three validation studies are performed. The first 
validation study analyses the accuracy of the smoke spread RSM, the second 
analyses the evacuation RSM, and the third analyses the probabilistic 
representation of fire locations. After the analysis of the validation cases, the 
results are discussed and conclusions are drawn. 
 Validation and verification objectives 
For the model to be implemented in future projects, the most sensitive and 
critical parts have to be subjected to validation and verification.  
 Verification 
By its definition, verification is a process of determining that a model 
implementation accurately represents the developer’s conceptual description 
of the model and the solution to the model [1]. Furthermore, verification means 
checking that the source code contains no errors in terms of the calculation 
process.  
Verification mainly deals with the mathematical and numerical solution of the 
underlying physical problems. The “verification suite” is a collection of simple 
calculations that typically test some specific feature of the model [2]. Hence, 
in practice, executing the verification process is to determine whether the 
source code used for the modelling t contains errors or not.  
The objective of verifying a calculation method or procedure by error 
estimation is determining the accuracy of a calculation. The strategy is to 
identify and quantify the errors in the model implementation and the solution.  
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There are two aspects of verification (Figure VI.1): software quality testing 
and algorithm testing. The former deals with code errors and performance, the 
latter puts focus on algorithm performance and accuracy.  
For software quality testing, two basic approaches are used for verifying the 
simulation software; these are static and dynamic testing. In static testing the 
computer program is analysed, without executing the code, to determine if it is 
correct by using such techniques as structured walkthroughs, correctness 
proofs, and examining the structure properties of the program. The objective 
of static testing in this research is to find preliminary errors and optimize the 
code structure. This is done for the different scripts. Since the focus of the 
research is not on programming, this part is not further elaborated in the thesis. 
The second approach for verifying the code is dynamic testing, in which the 
software is compiled, executed, and compared for the expected output. 
Additionally, parameters such as memory usage, CPU usage, response time, 
and overall performance of the software are analysed. In the research study, 
both functional (unit, integration and system testing) and non-functional 
(performance testing) testing is performed. Functional testing is not further 
elaborated in this thesis. Performance testing is discussed in the next chapter. 
In the algorithm testing, the focus is put on error estimation by means of 
convergence analysis of the implemented probabilistic DoE. The objective is 
to define an algorithm that dynamically defines the optimum DoE for every 
case study. 
 
Figure VI.1: Verification process for the developed methodology. Adapted 
from [1]. 
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In analogy to the full-probabilistic model, the simplified model is verified by 
doing both software quality and algorithm testing. The focus in this thesis is 
on the verification by means of dynamic testing. 
 Validation 
In order to prove that the model represents real conditions as accurately as 
possible, validation is needed. Validation is defined as “substantiation that a 
computerized model within its domain of applicability possesses a satisfactory 
range of accuracy consistent with the intended application of the model” [3,4]. 
Therefore, the validation process is defined as a process of decisive level for a 
model simulation in order to represent its intended use in the real-world case. 
By that definition, it can be determined that the purpose of the validation 
process is to know the accuracy level of the simulation model in describing the 
actual condition. 
The results of the validation process are used for two purposes. First, they are 
applied to direct the future improvement of the model by revealing the parts of 
the model having highest errors and uncertainties. The second and more 
important use of the validation simulations is the estimation of model 
uncertainty, explained in the next part, in a way that is useful for the end users 
[5].  
The fundamental approach of validation is to identify and quantify the main 
error and uncertainties in the conceptual and computational models. In 
validation the numerical errors are quantified and the experimental uncertainty 
is estimated by comparison between the computational results and the 
experimental data [6]. 
The objective of validation in this research is twofold. First, the RSM for 
smoke spread and evacuation modelling is validated. The validation is 
performed for simple and more challenging case studies and the results are 
presented in terms of relative error estimations. Second, the probabilistic 
representation of fire location is analysed. The necessary number of fire 
locations to obtain a global representation of fire in a building is defined for 
specific cases. The methodology for validation of the two objectives is 
presented in Figure VI.2. 
 




Figure VI.2: Validation process for the developed methodology. Adapted 
from [6]. 
 Model uncertainty 
Because the analysis of model uncertainty is an important part in the validation 
of models, it is briefly discussed in this section and applied in parts of the 
validation case studies.  
Models having different complexity are designed to describe, for a certain 
degree of approximation, systems and processes in different aspects of the real 
world (e.g. industrial, social, or economic). The use of these models involves 
the presence and treatment of uncertainties [7]. The input for a model is subject 
to many sources of uncertainty including errors of measurement, the absence 
of information, scaling errors, design of experiments, out of-date information, 
and poor or partial understanding of the main driving forces and mechanisms 
[7].  
This imposes a limitation on the certainty in the response of the model. 
Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis are able to increase this confidence in the 
model and its predictions. This by providing an global understanding of how 
the model response variables respond to changes of the input variables [7]. 
Therefore, the difference between the response result and the simulation result 
generates an error. However, this error rate should be examined further in order 
to conclude whether it is acceptable or not. 
Moreover, errors can be determined as an unavoidable element in the 
measurement process. Error in measurement is usually defined as the 
difference between the true value and the measured value. When used in the 
context of measurement, uncertainty has a variable associated with it. More 
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specifically, the measurement uncertainty has the same units as the 
measurement results. A careful uncertainty calculation does not only provide 
an accurate estimate of the research data obtained, but also can be used to 
determine the measurement that requires higher precision in order to obtain 
accurate results. Uncertainty analysis is a very useful tool for determining the 
reliability level of a measurement and for the validation of theoretical and 
simulation models.  





         (VI.1) 
In this research, model uncertainty analysis is performed considering two 
approaches. The first one calculates the mean and standard deviation (STD) of 
the error considering a normal distribution. The second one is based on the 
European standard document EN 1990 Annex D [8]. This method calculates 
the mean and STD of the relative error considering a lognormal distribution. 
The formulas for the second approach are discussed below. 
The approach from the European standard EN 1990 Annex D is applied by first 
calculating the error term C1. For each experimental value rei and theoretical 





where b is the “Least Squares” best fit to the slope and should be determined 




7 	 (VI.3) 
From the value of C1 an estimated value of error variance "E is determined by 
the following equation: 
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From Equation 4, 5 and 6 a value of error variance "E is calculated by the 
following equation: 
"E = Hexp(ı∆
7) − 1	 (VI.6) 
Based on the model uncertainty analysis it can be determined whether the error 
is acceptable or not. This application is applied in several of the following 
sections. 
 Verification and validation test cases 
For the verification and validation of several parts of the methodology, two test 
configurations are investigated. A simple and a more challenging case are 
chosen for the validation of the methodology. 
 Configuration of the simple case  
The building configuration used for the several verification and validation tests 
embodies the configuration of a multi-purpose community assembly 
compartment [9]. The building can be used for festivities, receptions, etc. The 
compartment consists of a large main room with a dancing floor and bar, and 
smaller rooms which consist of a storage, a dressing room, a cloak room and a 
VIP room (Figure VI.3). The compartment has dimensions of 25.0 m x 18.0 m 
x 3.0 m. Three emergency exits are shown in three different outer walls. The 
main emergency exit is 1.8 m x 2.2 m, the back and staff exits are 1.2 m x 2.2 
m. The exit next to the bar is only used by staff. The exits are considered as 
open boundaries. No additional fire safety systems are considered. 
 
Figure VI.3: Case study multiple purpose assembly building. 
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 Configuration of the challenging case  
The case study embodies the configuration of a multi-purpose commercial 
building (step 1 in Chapter IV). The shopping mall offers different types of 
merchandise (e.g. clothes, multimedia, healthcare, beauty, etc.) over a total 
surface area of 25000 m2 (Figure VI.4). The building consists of one main 
compartment of 5 floors from level -1 to level 3, with a surface area of about 
5000 m2 per floor and ceiling heights between 3 and 4 m. Figure VI.5 shows a 
schematic floor plan of the ground floor. The floors are interconnected by four 
escalators (orange marking) distributed over two central openings. Emergency 
exits are positioned on each floor by means of four compartmentalized 
staircases (blue marking). Four exits are foreseen for evacuation of people on 
the ground floor. Level -1, 0, 1 and 2 are only used for commercial purposes. 
On level 3, a restaurant of 2000 m2 is located in the same compartment. In this 
case study no external influences (e.g. wind, seasons, fire brigade, etc.) or 
bottlenecks (e.g. merging flows, direct access to street, etc.) are taken into 
account.  
 
Figure VI.4: Model of the shopping mall. 
 
Figure VI.5: Ground plan of floor level 0. 
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 Verification of the methodology  
Several verification studies are performed in order to present the correctness 
of the implemented models. Three verification tests are presented. The first test 
analyses the code performance during the development of the model. The 
second test analyses the convergence rates of the critical submodels. The third 
study deals with the verification of the essential submodels of the simplified 
version of the methodology. 
 Dynamic testing: algorithm performance 
The purpose of the dynamic testing process during the development of the code 
is to increase the performance of each module/script individually as well as for 
the entire model. From the first version of the algorithm to the final version, 
optimizations have been performed to decrease the calculation time. In Figure 
VI.6, the code performance increase is depicted for the challenging case with 
a sample DoE set of 100 samples. 
 
Figure VI.6: Performance evaluation over time. 
The major optimization performed in the coding process is the shift from 
functional to object-oriented programming in version 3. The second major 
performance increase is due to the shift from serial to parallel calculation 
procedures in version 6. The performance optimizations in other versions are 
mainly due to improved memory allocation, cleaning the code, the 
implementation of vectorized functions, etc. In order to obtain an efficient 
algorithm, the performance criteria for the considered number of DoE is set to 
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in Figure VI.7 can be concluded that the objective was achieved from version 
7 onwards. 
 Algorithm testing: convergence analysis 
The convergence analysis has already been discussed in Chapter IV. The 
purpose is to analyse the accuracy of the DoE and RSM modelling and update 
the sampling scheme with additional samples until the desired accuracy is 
achieved. In Figure VI.7, the most negative scenario in the challenging case 
study is presented. Here seven additional samples needed to be added to obtain 
the desired accuracy defined in Chapter IV [10]. For 95-99% of the scenarios 
no additional samples were necessary due to immediate convergence.  
 
Figure VI.7: Convergence analysis method by means of analysing additional 
samples. 
 Verification of the simplified model 
For the verification of the simplified model, only the part consisting of the 
evacuation submodel is verified because the implemented smoke spread model 
has already been verified and validated in past research [11]. The other models 
are similar to the comprehensive QRA model.  
According to [12], five main elements should be verified for an evacuation 
model, i.e. pre-evacuation time, movement, exit choice, route availability and 
selection, and flow condition/constraints. To assess the model capabilities, the 
behaviour in these five aspects of the model should be compared with ideal 
cases, which are understood as “scenario tests”. For this thesis, the model 
components pre-evacuation time, (smoke) movement, door and stair queuing, 
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exit choice and route selection will be tested to ensure that they are working 
and producing representative results.  
The verification is performed by means of component testing because this is a 
fundamental approach to validating and verifying a model. The global 
comparison between the results of the case studies is made in Chapter VII. 
VI.4.3.1 Pre-evacuation time 
The verification test is performed to verify the model’s ability to assign 
distributions of pre-evacuation times to agents. The proposed test is a modified 
version of IMO Test 5 [13]. The test is performed in the simple case study 
including 100 occupants. The pre-evacuation time is normal distributed with 
parameters  î = 180	ı and ï = 20	ı. The simulation is performed five times 
to verify the repeatability of the model. For every simulation a Kolmogorov-
Sminorf test was performed comparing the test data with the pre-defined 
normal distribution.  For every simulation the test showed that the theoretical 
data and the experimental data were not significantly different (p > 0.05). 
For each occupant, an initial pre-evacuation time	:1 is assigned by sampling 
from the distribution. Both the initial pre-evacuation time :1  and the observed 
pre-evacuation time :Ô are recorded when the evacuee began moving towards 
the exit. The results are presented in Figure VI.8 by means of a smoothed 
histogram and compared with the PDF of the distribution. The comparison 
predicts relative errors of less than 5%. The variability in the different test runs 
was negligible. 
 
Figure VI.8: Comparison of implemented :1 and observed :Ô evacuation time.  
186 Chapter VI 
 
 
VI.4.3.2 Movement and navigation 
This test is basically related to the speed in a corridor as proposed in [14]. It is 
good practice to verify the travel time of an evacuee maintaining an assigned 
walking speed over time. The test is based on IMO Test 1 from the IMO 
Guidelines [13]. The test is performed in the simple case between a source 
node and an exit node. The link between the nodes is 12 m long and 1 m wide. 
The scenario considers one evacuee with an assigned walking speed of 1.2 m/s. 
Two different scenarios are studied: one without smoke and one with smoke. 
The test is performed 10 times, the average travel time in clear conditions is 
observed to be 10 s, which corresponds to the theoretical walking speed. The 
same test is performed in smoke with a velocity reduction factor of 2. The 
average travel time obtained is 20.1 s which is very close to the theoretical 
walking speed. The main difference is related to conversion errors from soot 
extinction to walking speed. 
VI.4.3.3 Door and stair queuing  
The applied door queuing and stair flow rate algorithm was verified by 
considering a simple two-node map with a door linking the two nodes (Figure 
VI.9). The door width was varied and the flow rate for the evacuation of 100 
people was calculated. For the verification procedure, it was assumed that the 
maximum occupant density was 2 persons/m2 [15] and the maximum potential 
travel speed was 1.2 m/s when the occupant density was below 0.5 persons/m2. 
To set the occupant density in the starting node, the area of the starting node 
was modified for the two scenarios. 
 
Figure VI.9: (Left) Layout of the building for the testing of the door queuing 
component. (Right) Nodal representation of the building in the door queuing 
example. 
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The results of the simulated versus theoretical evacuation time is presented by 
means of the model uncertainty in Figure VI.10. The calculated mean relative 
error is less than 0.01 and a standard normal deviation of 0.012 is obtained. 
 
Figure VI.10: Model uncertainty for the verification of the door flow model. 
A similar validation procedure is applied for a stair with inclination of 30°. The 
obtained results are in the same order of magnitude as for the door verification 
test.  
VI.4.3.4 Exit choice and route selection 
The purpose of this section is to verify the ability of the model to choose the 
proper exit given certain parameters. The exit choice in evacuation may rely 
on simple criteria (shortest distance, user-defined), allowing for a deterministic 
rather than predictive result. An exit route allocation test based on IMO Test 
10 [13] is suggested. Additionally, the possibility of simulating 
affiliation/familiarity with the exit is tested. The case is presented in Figure 
VI.11. The building is populated with 2 people per room having a fixed 
walking speed of 1.2 m/s. The corridor towards the main exit is filled with 
smoke causing a speed reduction of a factor 3. The exit doors are 0.8 m wide. 
Three scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, the shortest path is 
applied. In the second scenario, the fastest path is evaluated. In the third 
scenario, a 60/40 affiliation is applied to the main/secondary exit.  




Figure VI.11: Case geometry for exit choice validation. 
The simulation of the scenario including the shortest path shows that 12 
occupants evacuate towards the main exit and 12 occupants towards the 
secondary exit. This is in line with the expectation that the shortest path is 
determined for each occupant individually. The simulation with the fastest path 
shows that 3 occupants evacuate to the main exit and 21 occupants evacuate 
towards the secondary exit. When the queuing time is not taken into account, 
all occupants should evacuate towards the secondary exit. This is because of 
the significant walking speed reduction of the smoke. However, due to limited 
flow capacity the flow of occupants is restricted causing three occupants to 
evacuate towards the main exit. This is also observed analysing the model with 
Pathfinder [16].  
VI.4.3.5 Discussion 
Four important aspects of the network model have been verified. The model 
verification tests show good agreement with the theoretical calculations. This 
means that the verification tests can be considered successful. 
Although there are still more component tests to be done [13], the testing of 
basic components such as the door queuing model and stair movement model 
is essential as a first step in validating the program. 
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 Validation of the methodology 
In this part, several validation studies are performed to present the validity of 
the implemented models. Three verification tests are presented. The first two 
tests analyse the accuracy and model uncertainty of the RSM for the smoke 
spread and evacuation modelling. The third test analyses the probabilistic 
representation of fire locations throughout the building. 
 Validation of the smoke spread RSM  
As discussed in section 2, validation in the context of this research is performed 
with respect to prediction of the simulations of the field models. Validation 
with respect to real experiments is not considered in this thesis. In the first 
validation case, the performance of the IMLS and PCE RSM are analysed for 
the simple case study. The objective is to determine the most optimal method 
with respect to its estimated error for the smoke spread submodel in terms of 
toxicity yields and radiation. The analysis is performed by applying the 
proposed framework in Chapter IV.  
VI.5.1.1 Method and analysis 
In this case study, the influence of the variability of the fire parameters is 
analysed considering only one sub-model, namely smoke spread. A 20 cm 
mesh is used in combination with a 10 cm mesh in the vicinity of the fire. A 
sensitivity study has been performed to obtain these mesh sizes. The detailed 
results are not included in the thesis. Note that no special emphasis is put on 
obtaining high-resolution CFD results. Rather, the aim is to illustrate/validate 
the proof-of-concept of the RSM approach: starting from a set of CFD 
simulations (taken as reference here), a response surface is defined and 
subsequently other CFD results are predicted through the RSM approach. From 
preceding sensitivity analyses, it is decided to take three important input 
parameters into account: the fire growth rate, the Heat Release Rate per Unit 
Area (HRRPUA) and the maximal area of the fire. In Table VI.1, the 
distributions for these parameters are described. A constant CO-yield of 0.15 
g/g is considered. A radiative fraction of 0.35 is applied. 
Table VI.1: Input variables. 
Type Distr type μln σln Analysed range Ref. 
Fire growth [kW/s2] LN -6.6 2.2 0.01-0.07 [17] 
HRRPUA [KW/m²] LN 5.97 0.191 320-500 [18] 
Max area [m²] LN 0.78 1.7 2.0-28.0 [17] 
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The support samples are chosen based on LHS and the input range is chosen 
based on the expected failure domain [9]. Failure in this case relates to fatalities 
obtained by intoxication. 64 simulations (blue points in Figure VI.12) have 
been performed over a wide spectrum of the input range (see Table IV.1)  
In step 2, the most important input variables are determined based on a 
preceding sensitivity analysis [1]. For the considered variables, distributions 
are determined based on statistical data, fault tree analysis and engineering 
judgement [7]. In the Tables IV.1 and IV.2, a list of variables is given of the 
most sensitive parameters in the fire life safety analysis of a commercial 
building [20,21]. In theory, all these parameters should be implemented in the 
event tree analysis in step 3. However, in order to prevent an extensive event 
tree, the variables are divided into discrete and continuous parameters. The 
discrete variables are addressed in the bow-tie structure (Table IV.2). The 
continuous variables are addressed at the end of the event tree by means of the 
RSM (Table IV.1). The separation between the two types of variables is done 
for reasons of computational and operational efficiency (e.g. location of the 
fire). Secondly, some variables cannot be considered in continuous form due 
to their discrete nature (e.g. activation or failure of safety systems, the state of 
doors, etc).  
For every variable in Table IV.1, an indication is given of the order of 
importance with respect to the results. The first order variables are considered 
the most significant based on preceding sensitivity analysis [22]. This means 
that only parts of the domain close to the limit state need to be analysed. The 
second order variables are still significant but less sensitive than the first order. 
For these variables, a large part of the domain needs to be analysed. Third order 
variables, e.g. ambient temperature, material properties, etc., are the least 
significant and are considered deterministic in this study. For these variables 
mean values are taken as nominal values. 
Apart from the 64 support points, an additional 20 validation samples are 
simulated (orange points in Figure VI.12), also spread over a wide range. These 
samples are not used for estimating the response surface. The purpose is to 
evaluate the quality of the RSM by comparing the response of the validation 
set with a full CFD simulation, which is computationally expensive. The 
validation samples are chosen between the ranges shown in Figure VI.12. 
The sampling technique LHS is combined with a correlation matrix (see Table 
VI.2) [19]. The correlation matrix is a n x n matrix, with n the number of 
variables, which defines the correlation between variables. Correlation 
between variables is possible because of the physical boundary effects (e.g. a 
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slowly growing fire is less likely to reach a significant fire surface area). Some 
combinations are not relevant for the analysis as they are not located in the 
vicinity of the limit state and hence are of minor importance when looking for 
the most likely failure point and the associated exceedance probability. The 
values in the table have been chosen purely on the basis of expert judgement, 
in order to illustrate the proof of concept of the technique.  
 
Figure VI.12: DoE input samples for the considered variables. 
Table VI.2: Correlation coefficients. 
Parameters S HRRPUA Area 
S 1 0.85 0.35 
HRRPUA - 1 0.2 
Area - - 1 
 
The support samples are evaluated by means of the smoke spread sub-model 
FDS version 6.1.1 [20]. After evaluation of the support samples, the smoke 
spread RSM is generated using the PCE and IMLS method. In order to make a 
fair comparison with respect to the two response surface techniques, the same 
number of coefficients should be chosen for both models. For the PCE model 
a degree p of 2 and q-norm of 0.5 is chosen, leading to 7 coefficients. For the 
IMLS model, the 3 parameters, the interaction components, and the constant 
coefficient are considered, also giving a total of 7 coefficients to be estimated. 
Next, the support samples are calculated.  
VI.5.1.2 Performance criteria 
To consider the RSM model as sufficiently accurate, performance criteria are 
defined for the mean and standard deviation of the relative error for the 
192 Chapter VI 
 
 
concentration and FID-values. The RSM model is considered acceptable if the 
absolute value of the mean and spread (ï) of the error is lower than 5% [21]. 
VI.5.1.3 Results 
In this part, the results of the validation study are presented. The focus is put 
mainly on the comparison of the toxicity yields. Since the results for the 
radiation comparison are similar, the output is shown in summarized form.  
The validation of the toxicity estimation is performed by means of CO-
concentrations. In Figure VI.13, the predictive capability of the model is 
visualised for one of the 20 validation cases as slice file results from FDS 6. 
Comparison is made between the validation set and the two RSM models for 
two-time steps during the progress of the smoke development. The CO-
concentrations are presented for the validation case with the following 
parameters: S = 0.0142, HRRPUA = 356 kW/m2 and Amax=3.68 m2. No colour 
bars are shown. Instead, for every time step, one CO-equipotential line (same 
concentrations) is shown to illustrate the comparison between the validation 
set and the results of the two methods. Figure VI.13 shows good qualitative 
agreement between the estimated values based on the developed response 
surface and the validation set. For both methods, the results show good 
agreement with the validation set at every position of the compartment.  
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CO-concentration at t = 240 s CO-concentration at t = 480 s 






Estimated based on PCE 
 
Estimated based on PCE 
 
Estimated based on IMLS 
 
Estimated based on IMLS 
Figure VI.13: Case study results for CO-concentrations at 2.0 m. 
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In the second step, the mean error in % is calculated between the estimated set 
and the validation set for the 20 validation cases, for every cell in the horizontal 









         (VI.8) 
Where n is the number of validation cases. In Figure VI.14 and Figure VI.15, 
the mean error, expressed in %, is shown for the 20 validation cases with the 
IMLS and PCE models at time 480 s (which is time step 96). After 480 s, 
steady-state conditions were obtained. The last time step is chosen because the 
heat release rate is at its maximum and the strongest turbulent flows are 
expected. The results show that for both methods the mean error is very low, 
with the error between −2.5% and 1% at most locations. The results for the 
PCE method show slightly smaller mean errors (in absolute value) compared 
to the IMLS method (which shows more negative mean errors). This means 
that the IMLS model underestimates the CO-concentrations more than the PCE 
model. 
 
Figure VI.14: IMLS - mean error [%] of the 20 validation cases for all 
locations at t = 480 s. 
 




Figure VI.15: PCE - mean error [%] of the validation cases at t = 480 s. 
In Figure VI.16 and Figure VI.17 the corresponding standard normal deviation 
(STD) of the error is presented, expressed in %. The results show that for both 
methods the STD is very low, with values below 10% at  most locations. 
The results for the PCE method show significantly lower STD values (close to 
zero) compared to the IMLS method. This means that the IMLS model has a 
higher spread of errors. For both the mean and the STD, the results show larger 
errors in the region close to the fire. This is expected, as the largest turbulent 
fluctuations occur there. This also means that the model is particularly reliable 
for analyses remote from the fire. 
 
Figure VI.16: IMLS – standard deviation of the error [%] of the validation 
cases at t = 480 s. 




Figure VI.17: PCE - standard deviation of the error [%] of the 20 validation 
cases for all locations at t = 480 s. 
 
In the third step, the mean error (expressed in %) is calculated between the 
















Figure VI.18 presents the results for the 96 time steps. The mean error for the 
PCE model varies between -0.6 % and 0.7 %, while with the IMLS method a 
value between -1.5 % and 0.5 % is observed. Hence, both approaches yield 
very good agreement, considering the turbulent conditions in the compartment. 
The PCE model shows better agreement than the IMLS model. Considering 
the 20 validation cases, only 76 local points out of 21600000 points 
(combination of the number of validation cases and cells in the x and y 
direction times the number of time steps: 20 x 125 x 90 x 96) in the PCE model 
reached an error larger than 20%, while with the IMLS model 5151 local points 
had an error exceeding 20%.  
The zero values for the initial time are due to two reasons: zero concentrations 
are measured at the beginning (absence of smoke), and errors on 
concentrations below 100 ppm are not taken into account because of 
insignificance for life safety (short exposure periods). 
 




Figure VI.18: Mean error of the CO-results for the validation simulation set. 
Left: PCE; right: IMLS. 
For the comparison of the radiation calculations, an analogous approach is 
conducted. The only difference is that no slice file data are compared but 10 
individual device locations chosen at strategic locations Figure VI.19. The 
radiative heat flux is measured. 
 
Figure VI.19: Location of radiation devices. 
The results are depicted in Figure VI.20. Similar results are obtained as for the 
toxicity yields. This means that the behaviour is similar for both patterns. 
 
 




Figure VI.20: Mean error of the radiation results for the validation simulation 
set. Left: PCE; right: IMLS. 
VI.5.1.4 Discussion 
The analysis in this validation case was restricted to the possibility of using 
PCE and IMLS for response surface modelling for smoke spread and 
evacuation in the context of probabilistic fire safety analyses.  
For the RSM in the smoke spread sub-model, the mean and standard deviation 
for the relative error of the IMLS and PCE models are below the pre-defined 
performance criteria. Therefore, both models are considered suitable for the 
analysis. The results are in favour of the PCE model. However, for more 
irregular patterns (close to the fire), the IMLS shows better results. Therefore, 
for evacuation analysis it is suggested to implement the IMLS. 
From this analysis was observed that care should be taken in the choice of the 
output. If the output is discrete, rather than continuous, in nature, the 
development of the RSM is difficult to achieve. One example is the number of 
fatalities, which would yield a value of zero in most training sets, and then 
jump to non-zero integer numbers in other sets. Therefore, for the evacuation 
RSM, the output in terms of Fractional Incapacitation Dose (FID) values is 
calculated. This output presents a gradual (continuous) increase over time and 
population density [22]. 
 Validation of the evacuation RSM  
In the second validation case, the performance of the RSM method is validated 
for the evacuation submodel. The objective is to determine the accuracy of the 
evacuation RSM for the simple and challenging building configurations. The 
challenging case is split up into two analysis in which one case examines the 
evacuation of one floor and in the second case, the entire building is evacuated. 
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The results are compared in terms of FID values. This chapter is supported by 
the work performed by one of the master theses during the phd program [23]. 
VI.5.2.1 Method and analysis 
Similar to the first validation case, the influence of the variability of the 
evacuation parameters is analysed, considering the variability of only one sub-
model, namely evacuation. No variability of the smoke spread model is 
considered. 
Therefore, only one sample set of fire parameters is applied: S = 0.046 kW/s2, 
HRRPUA = 400 kW/m2 and Amax = 16 m2 and evaluated by means of FDS 
6.1.1. For the evacuation variables, it is decided to take three important input 
parameters into account: the mean pre-movement time, affiliation and 
occupant density. The affiliation represents the percentage of people 
evacuating towards the main exit. The variables are chosen based on a 
preceding sensitivity analysis [24]. In Table VI.3 and Table VI.4,  the 
distributions for these parameters are described for the simple and challenging 
case. A constant CO-yield of 0.15 g/g is considered. 
Table VI.3: Input variables simple case. 
Type Distr 
type 
μ σ Analysed range 
Pre-evacuation time [s] Normal 160 13.3 120-200 
Affiliation [-] Normal 0.6 0.033 0.5-0.7 
Occupant density [m²/pp] LN 0.7 0.5 0.2-2 
Table VI.4: Input variables challenging case. 
Type Distr 
type 
μ σ Analysed range 
Pre-evacuation time [s] Normal 220 15 180-260 
Affiliation [-] Normal 0.6 0.015 0.55-0.65 
Occupant density [m²/pp] LN 4 1 2-6 
 
The support samples are chosen based on fractional factorial design. The 
chosen input domain ranges are depicted in the tables above and chosen based 
on three times the standard deviation. A total of n3 or 27 support samples are 
analysed. Apart from the 27 support points, an additional 20 validation samples 
are simulated. These samples are not used for estimating the response surface. 
The support and validation points for the simple configuration are presented in 
Figure VI.21. A similar pattern is used for the challenging case and therefore 
not repeated in the thesis.  




Figure VI.21: DoE input samples for the considered variables. 
The support samples are evaluated by means of the evacuation tool Pathfinder 
[16]. After evaluation of the support samples, the RSM is generated and the set 
of validation samples are estimated. In Figure VI.22, an example of an 
evacuation simulation is presented. 
 
Figure VI.22: Pathfinder simulation example. 
For the simple case, only two exits are chosen: the main (M) and back (B) exit. 
For the challenging case, four exits are chosen: A, B, C and D (Figure VI.23).  
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VI.5.2.2 Performance criteria 
Similar to the RSM for smoke spread, a response surface evacuation model is 
considered acceptable if the absolute value of the mean error and the spread of 
the error is lower than 5% [21]. 
VI.5.2.3 Results 
The results are presented in terms of FID values. In Figure VI.24, an example 
of the simple configuration is given. The predictive capability of the model is 
visualised for one of the 20 validation cases by means of the FID values for 
every person. The FID approximations are analysed and presented in ascending 
order for every exit separately. This means two curves for the simple case and 
four for the challenging case are considered. The presented sample in the figure 
is for the combination: pre-movement time 140 s, affiliation = 0.59 and an 
occupant density of 0.87 m2/pp. The blue line is the real value obtained from 
the validation set and the red line is the estimated value obtained by the RSM. 
The figures show good agreement between the estimated values based on the 
developed response surface and the validation set. 
 
Figure VI.24: FID estimation for the main exit and back exit. 
To analyse the performance of the prediction, the model uncertainty is 
calculated. Both the simplified and the Eurocode approach are applied, as 
discussed in part 2.3, for the mean error calculation between the estimated set 
and the validation set for all the 40 validation cases and every occupant.  
Considering the errors as normally distributed variables, the mean and standard 
deviation of the relative error are calculated as  0.59 % for the mean and 3.64 
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The uncertainty model error is also calculated according to the Eurocode. For 
b, the best fit of the slope of the regression of ˜78@ in function of ˜78D, the 




7 = 1.00217 (VI10) 








= 1.74 ∗ 10yß	 (VI.11) 
The coefficient of variation is calculated by the following equation: 
"E = Hexp(ı∆
7) − 1 = 0.00132 (VI.12) 







= 1.0039	 (VI.13) 
Moreover, the mean and STD lognormal of error are calculated by the 
following equation: 
ïO;˘ = 	Hln	("\
7 + 1) = 0.00132	  (VI.14) 




7 = 	0.0039   (VI.15) 
From the obtained error value, a lognormal mean error of 0.0039 and 
lognormal STD of 0.00132 for all validation cases are observed. The mean 
error is 1.0039 and the STD is 0.0364. The results for all occupants and 
validation scenarios are presented in Figure VI.25. The black line presented 
the average error slope. The red line represents the 99.7% confidence interval 
of the average error. The closer the value is to unity, the better the agreement 
between the RSM model estimation and the simulation result.   
 




Figure VI.25: Representation of the model uncertainty by the .1 − .@	diagram 
for the simple case validation set. 
The results for the challenging case with one floor (upper floor) are in the same 
trend with respect to the simple case. An example case is presented in  Figure 
VI.26.  
 
Figure VI.26: Evacuation simulation for the challenging case of one floor. 
The results for one validation case is presented in Figure VI.27. Four curves 
are depicted because four exits are implemented. Two exits show higher values 
due to the difference in affiliation and therefore more occupants are appointed 
to the main exits. For this case 65% of the occupants are assigned towards the 
main staircases A and B. 
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Figure VI.27: FID values of one validation set for the challenging 
configuration with one floor. 
Considering the errors as normally distributed variables, the mean and standard 
deviation of the relative error are calculated: 1.57 % for the mean and 4.98 % 
for the standard deviation are obtained for FID values larger than 0.3. Values 
lower than 0.3 are not considered relevant for the analysis. 
From the obtained error calculation according to the European standard, a 
lognormal mean error of 0.00972 and lognormal STD of 0.00246 is calculated. 
Based on these results, the mean is 1.011 and the STD is 0.052. The results for 
the support and validation scenarios are presented in Figure VI.28.  
 
Figure VI.28: Representation of the model uncertainty by the .1 − .@	diagram 
for the challenging case validation set (one floor). 
Lower occupant densities 
Higher occupant densities 
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The results for the challenging case with multiple floors are in the same trend 
with respect to the other cases. Considering the errors as normally distributed 
variables, the mean and standard deviation of the relative error are calculated 
as 0.82 % for the mean and 2.50 % for the standard deviation are obtained for 
FID values larger than 0.3. 
From the obtained error value calculation according to the European standard, 
a lognormal mean error of 0.004 and lognormal STD of 0.0249 is determined. 
Based on these results, the normal mean is 1.0043 and the normal STD is 0.024. 
The result for all occupants and validation scenarios are presented in Figure 
VI.29.  
 
Figure VI.29: Representation of the model uncertainty by the .1 − .@	diagram 
for the challenging case validation set (multiple floors). 
VI.5.2.4 Limitations of the model 
An additional analysis is performed to study possible limitations of the RSM. 
Three specific circumstances are analysed: scenarios with low occupant 
densities, exits close to each other and a reduced number of support samples.  
In the scenario with low occupant densities, the same conditions are applied as 
in Table VI.3. Only the occupant density is reduced with occupancies between 
5 and 20 pp /m2. 40 validation cases are performed of which the best and worst 
results are selected and presented in Figure VI.30. The validation case 11 
shows better agreement than case 16. It gives a good confirmation of the model 
limitations, since the validation case 16 has a lower occupant density than case 
11.  
 v 




Figure VI.30: The FID results of validation cases 11 and 16. 
 
Similar to the other validation cases, the model uncertainty is calculated. 
Considering the errors as normally distributed variables, the mean and standard 
deviation of the relative error are calculated as -2.66 %  % for the mean and 
8.27 % for the standard deviation are obtained for FID values larger than 0.3. 
From the obtained error value calculation according to the European standard, 
a lognormal mean error of -0.0045 and lognormal STD of 0.0889 is 
determined. Based on these results, the normal mean is 0.999 and the normal 
STD is 0.089. The result for all occupants and validation scenarios are 
presented in Figure VI.31. the results show a higher spread than for the original 
cases. This means that the RSM is less suitable for low densities. 
 
Figure VI.31: Representation of the model uncertainty by the .1 − .@	diagram 
for the simple case validation set (first limitation analysis). 
 v 
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In the scenario with adjacent exits, the same conditions are applied as in Table 
VI.3. Only in this case, two exits are placed next to each other (Figure VI.32).  
 
Figure VI.32: (Left) The simulation geometry of adjacent case study and 
(Right) an example of a simulation. 
An example of one of the simulations is shown in Figure VI.32. 40 validation 
cases are performed of which the best and worst results are selected and 
presented in Figure VI.33. Both results show good agreement with the 
validation cases.   
 
Figure VI.33: FID results validation case 5 and 14 for the adjacent door case. 
 
Similar to the other validation cases, the model uncertainty is calculated. 
Considering the errors as normally distributed variables, the mean and standard 
deviation of the relative error are calculated as 1.3% for the mean and 7.93 % 
for the standard deviation are obtained for FID values larger than 0.3. 
From the obtained error value calculation according to the European standard, 
a lognormal mean error of -0.0024 and lognormal STD of 0.189 is determined. 
The result for all occupants and validation scenarios are presented in Figure 
VI.34. The results show a higher spread than for the original cases.  
B 
M 




Figure VI.34: Representation of the model uncertainty by the .1 − .@	diagram 
for the simple case validation set (second limitation analysis). 
In the scenario with less support points, the same conditions are applied as in 
Table VI.3. The only difference is that less support points are assigned to the 
case. Instead of 53 only 33 support samples applied (Figure VI.35).   
 
Figure VI.35: DoE for the combination of pre-evacuation time and OD for 
the sample case with less support points. 
 




Figure VI.36: DoE for the combination of pre-evacuation time and OD for 
the sample case with less support points. 
40 validation cases are performed of which the best and worst results are 
selected and presented in Figure VI.37. Both results show good agreement with 
the validation cases.   
 
Figure VI.37: FID-results for case 12 and 30 for the sample case with less 
support points. 
Similar to the other validation cases, the model uncertainty is calculated. The 
normal parameters are calculated: a mean relative model error of 0.74 % and a 
STD of 4.95 % are obtained for FID values > 0.3. Next, the lognormal 
parameters are calculated, a mean error of 0.0104 and an STD of 0.0588 is 
obtained. The result for all occupants and validation scenarios are presented in 
Figure VI.38. The results show a higher spread than for the original cases.  




Figure VI.38: Representation of the model uncertainty by the .1 − .@	diagram 
for the simple case validation set (third limitation analysis). 
VI.5.2.5 Discussion 
The analysis of this part was limited to the possibility of using RSM algorithm 
for evacuation parameters to predict the FID value of the simulation results in 
the context of life safety analysis. The validation analysis is done to find out 
the accuracy of RSM algorithm model in predicting the simulation result. 
Therefore, relative errors are analysed and represent the level of accuracy of 
the RSM model. The mean and STD of error for all cases are presented in Table 
VI.5. 
Table VI.5: The mean and STD of the relative error of simple and 
challenging cases. 
Simple case Challenging case one floor 
 
Challenging case multiple 
floors 
î ï î ï î ï 
0.59% 3.64 % 1.57% 4.98% 0.82% 2.5% 
 
The results obtained in the three cases gives similar errors with respect to their 
complexity. The simple case gives lower relative errors than the challenging 
cases. From these results it can be concluded that more complex designs give 
higher errors. However, the same trend is not observed between the 
challenging cases of one and multiple floors. The error for one floor is higher 
than that for multiple floors. It is expected that this outcome can be allocated 
to the difference in occupant load. The higher occupant load gives better results 
because the results are smoothened by a larger number of occupants for each 
exit.  
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With respect to the performance criteria, all three validation cases pass the 5% 
criterion. This means that the proposed approach is suited for the analysed 
cases. 
Further analyses were performed to explore the possible limitations of the 
model. Three limitation cases are analysed for the simple geometry. The results 
are summarized in Table VI.6. 
Table VI.6: The mean and STD of the relative error for the sample case with 
less support points. 
Low Density of 
Occupant 
Adjacent Exit Less Support Point 
î ï î ï î ï 
-2.66% 8.27% 1.30% 7.93% 0.74% 4.95% 
The results show that the methodology is less suitable from lower occupancy 
loads and when exits are close to each other. The results when less support 
points are applied are within the pre-defined error criterion. This means that 
for the simple case, even less support points could be used.   
 Validation of probabilistic representation of fire 
location in a building 
Further, a validation of the probabilistic modelling for smoke spread is 
performed for the challenging case. More in particular, the focus is put on the 
necessary number of fire locations for obtaining a probabilistic representation 
of possible fire locations in the building. The objective is to find the minimum 
number of fire locations to obtain a sufficient accurate representation of the 
possible fire locations. The results are compared in terms of FID values. 
VI.5.3.1 Method and analysis 
The influence of the variability of the fire location is analysed by choosing 
different fire locations on multiple floors. Nine fire locations for each floor are 
analysed (Figure VI.39). No variability of other parameters in the smoke 
spread and evacuation model is considered. Therefore, only one sample set of 
fire parameters is applied: S = 0.046, HRRPUA = 400 kW/m2 and Amax = 16 
m2 and evaluated by means of FDS 6.1.1. For the evacuation variables, also 
one sample set is applied: pre-movement time = 220 s, affiliation = 0.5, and 
0.3 m²/pp and evaluated by Pathfinder 2018. A constant CO-yield of 0.09 g/g 
is considered. 




Figure VI.39: Schematic representation of fire locations in the challenging 
case study. 
The analysis consists of nine scenarios in which the first scenario is considered 
as the reference scenario. In the following scenarios multiple fire locations are 
omitted from the analysis until only one location is left. The configurations are 
described in Table VI.7. The choice of omitting particular scenarios is because 
it is expected that interpolation will be more accurate forward than 
extrapolation [25]. 
Table VI.7: Fire location configurations. 





































VI.5.3.2 Performance criteria 
Similar to the other validation cases, The representation is considered 
acceptable if the absolute value of the mean error and the spread of the error is 















The simulations are analysed in terms of FID values. In Figure VI.40, the 
obtained results present the number of occupants with the corresponding FID 
value or higher.  
 
Figure VI.40: FID results for the nine scenario configurations. 
The results of the scenario cases are compared with the reference case of 45 
simulations. The relative error with respect to the number of occupants with 
FID values equal or higher than the corresponding value is determined and 
presented in Figure VI.41. 
 
Figure VI.41: FID estimation error relative to the reference scenario. 
VI.5.3.4 Discussion 
The results of the analysis show the applicability of reducing the necessary 
number of fire locations for the probabilistic fire representation in shopping 
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mall building. The results show that the reduction from 45 to minimum 10 
simulations provides accuracy errors of less than 5%. What can be established 
from these results is the necessity of the analysis of fire simulations on each 
floor for proper representation of fire through the building. 
 Conclusions 
In this chapter, extensive verification and validation of the full-probabilistic 
and simplified model has been performed. Through a set of verification tests, 
the model proves able to give a good representation of the modelling accuracy 
of the RSM and evacuation submodel of the simplified risk model. Overall, the 
verification and validation tests show good agreement between the theoretical 
and the simulation cases.  
There are still more components that should be tested before this model can be 
used for design purposes. More specifically, additional validation should be 
performed for the evacuation network model.   
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 Introduction  
In this chapter, the probabilistic risk assessment methodology is tested against 
the two case studies discussed in chapter V. The purpose is to test the validity 
and feasibility of the full and the simplified QRA method for practical projects. 
The first case study is the simple case that embodies the configuration of an 
assembly hall and serves as a night club. This case is used as a first step to 
analyse the shortcomings of the method before continuing towards larger and 
more complicated projects. The second case study, the more challenging case 
study of a multi-storey shopping mall, is used to analyse how the method deals 
with more complicated configurations. For both case studies, the extensive and 
simplified QRA method are applied, the results are compared and discussed. 
Since the QRA method is developed for these types of projects, it is important 
to analyse shortcomings and make suggestions for further improvements.  
A remarque should be made with respect to the comparison of the 
comprehensive and simplified method. The models used in the comprehensive 
method are seen as most advanced models in FSE. Although that these models 
have their uncertainty and error, the results obtained from these models are 
typically considered as true values (at least in Belgium) for fire safety design. 
Therefore, when comparing these advanced models with other models, the 
term error is used rather than uncertainty. 
 Case study 1: Assembly hall 
In this section, the extensive and simplified QRA-method is applied to a simple 
building configuration. Since both methods apply the same procedure with 
different sub-models, the case study details are explained once, for the full 
QRA method. Only the results and modifications are discussed for the 
simplified method. 
 Comprehensive QRA analysis 
The probabilistic QRA method is applied to the assembly hall validation case 
discussed in Chapter VI (step 1). The main purpose is to investigate the 
feasibility and efficiency of the framework for a simple case study. The goal 
(step 2) of the QRA analysis is to determine the life safety level of the building 
in case of fire. The defined risk criteria (step 3) are threefold and will be 
explained in Chapter VIII. The first objective is defined in terms of a failure 
probability of 10-4 fatalities per year for the entire building [1]. The second 
objective is expressed as an acceptable individual risk of 10-6 fatalities per 
individual per year [1]. The third objective is defined in terms of the societal 
risk. The acceptable societal risk level is presented by an FN-curve and 
obtained from Chapter VIII with starting point 10-5 for N = 1, with a slope of -
1. No ALARP criterion is defined.  
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In step 4, the fire safety design is developed. The building is considered as one 
compartment and the main passive fire safety components have a fire rating of 
R60 and two exits doors of 80 cm width (left and right). The upper door is only 
used by staff. The main active fire components are smoke detection, fire alarm 
and sprinkler system. The safety systems are designed according to the Belgian 
and European standards [2,3]. The procedure with respect to detection provides 
a 60 s delay before activation of the alarm. One fire safety design is analysed 
with three reliability levels for the implemented sprinkler system. For the first 
design, a high maintenance and inspection level is considered. For the second, 
a low maintenance level is implemented. The third fire safety design does not 
have a sprinkler system. 
In step 5, the probabilistic and deterministic analysis are performed. In step 5.1 
of the probabilistic analysis, the main design fire scenarios are defined. Four 
fire scenarios are considered (Figure VII.1 ): in the main room (1), the VIP 
room (2), a hidden fire in the storage room (3) and the cloakroom (4).  
 
Figure VII.1: Plan view of the assembly hall. 
In step 5.2, the most important input variables are defined. The variables 
reported in Table IV.1 are adopted for the case study. In step 5.3, the event tree 
is constructed based on the location of the fire and on the  performance of the 
active fire protection systems. A simplified version of the location, alarm, 
detection and sprinkler performance is presented in Figure VII.2. 
 
Figure VII.2: Part of the event tree of the simple case study. 
A1 
1 
 2  3  
4  
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An initial ignition frequency of 0.00194 fires per year is assumed [4]. The 
reliability data used for the sprinkler system with high maintenance is 0.95 and 
for low maintenance quality 0.6 [5]. The probability of fire occurrence in the 
four rooms is assigned according to the surface of each room in comparison to 
the total building area.  
In step 5.4, the RSM is defined and in step 5.5, the support points are generated. 
The sample set suggested in Table IV.4 is analysed by means of the smoke 
spread model FDS version 6 [6] in step 5.6. In case of the simplified method, 
the analysis is performed by means of a zone model [7]. After evaluation of 
the support samples, the smoke spread RSM is generated (step 5.7). In Figure 
VII.3, an example of the RSM for the smoke spread is presented. The results 
are depicted for CO concentrations in front of exit 1 (point A1 in Figure VII.1) 
at 450 s after ignition (t0). At this point, the fire and evacuation are at full 
development. For visualisation, the variables fire growth area and maximum 
fire area, which are considered the most sensitive [8], are shown, while the 
HRRPUA is kept constant at 450 kW/m2 (average value) because the former 
two variables are considered the most sensitive [9]. A convergence analysis is 
performed and showed that no additional sample points were necessary 
because the calculated convergence error was below the pre-defined criterion 
of 10%. 
 
Figure VII.3: Smoke spread RSM of CO concentrations at 450 s at location 
A1 at 2.0 m height. 
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Next, the Design of Experiments (DoE) is conducted to obtain a uniform 
representation of the analysed input domain (step 5.8). For each scenario 100 
samples are generated and simulated in step 5.9 (blue points in Figure VII.3). 
The results are provided as input for the evacuation analysis (loop to step 5). 
The support points for the evacuation RSM are generated based on Table IV.4 
(step 5.5). The samples are analysed by means of the evacuation model 
Pathfinder (step 5.6). Next, the concentrations are linked to the occupant 
locations and doses are calculated for every occupant and scenario sample. At 
the same moment, the DoE is generated for the consequence analysis in step 
5.8 and together with the toxicity dosages, evaluated in step 5.9. Hereafter, the 
system loops back to step 5.7, in which the RSM, generated for the evacuation 
input parameters, is implemented. In Figure VII.4, the application of the RSM 
for the evacuation sub-model is visualised. The results are depicted for CO 
concentrations in front of the main exit at 450 s. The variables ‘affiliation to 
the main exit’ and ‘occupant density’ are analysed, while the fire parameters 
are kept constant for each fire scenario. 
 
Figure VII.4: Representation of the evacuation RSM of CO concentrations at 
450 s in front of the main door. 
In step 5.8 the DoE of 100 samples is generated for the evacuation analysis and 
the responses are obtained in step 5.9. In Figure VII.5, the range of results of 
the support points is given for a particular scenario with a fixed number of 
occupants. 
Affiliation [%] 




Figure VII.5: Range of results of the support points. 
In step 5.10, the probability of fatality is calculated for every scenario and in 
step 5.11 the final probability of fatality and risk are calculated. The results 
obtained for the probability of fatality and the individual risk are presented in 
Table VII.1. The results show that the three safety levels are within the pre-
defined acceptable safety limits. The probability of fatality is in increasing 
order due to the decreasing reliability of the sprinkler system. The individual 
risk is lower than the probability of fatality because the probability of having 
a fatality in a group is higher than having a fatality as an individual.  
Table VII.1: Results simplified method for the probability of fatality (TE) and 
the individual risk (IR). 
Option Fire safety design PP [1/yr] IR [1/yr] 
1 High maintenance level 5.3	 ∗ 	10y© 2.5 ∗ 10y© 
2 Low maintenance level 3.9 ∗ 	10y® 2.3 ∗ 10y®   
3 No sprinkler 8.8 ∗ 	10y® 4.8 ∗ 	10y® 
- Acceptable limit 10-4 10-6 
 
In Figure VII.6, the societal risk is presented in terms of an FN curve. The 
results show the difference between the two safety levels, which indicate the 
importance of reliability assessment with respect to maintenance and 
inspection in the overall risk assessment. The FN curves shift vertically 
because only the frequencies change for this case. Further, an additional 
Lower sample limit 
Upper sample limit 
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reduction of the safety level can be observed when no sprinkler system is 
implemented.  
 
Figure VII.6: FN curves for the different fire safety designs. 
 Simplified QRA method 
The simplified QRA method is applied on the assembly hall building through 
the same framework. Only different sub-models for smoke spread and 
evacuation are implemented (see Chapter V). In Figure VII.7, the smoke 
spread and evacuation models are depicted.  
 
Figure VII.7: Representation of the simplified geometry in B-RISK. 




Figure VII.8: Representation of the simplified geometry in the evacuation 
network model. 
The results for the individual risk and probability of fatality are presented in 
Table VII.2. The results illustrate that, similarly to the comprehensive method, 
the obtained safety levels are within the pre-defined acceptable safety limits.    
Table VII.2: Case study results for the probability of fatality (TE) and the 
individual risk (IR). 
Option Fire safety design PP [1/yr] IR [1/yr] 
1 High maintenance level 5.6	 ∗ 	10y® 3.0 ∗ 10y5ô 
2 Low maintenance level 4.1 ∗ 	10yß 1.4 * 10y™ 
3 No sprinkler 9.0 ∗ 	10yß 1.0 ∗ 	10y© 
- Acceptable limit 10-4 10-6 
 
In Figure VII.9, the societal risk is presented in terms of an FN curve. Similarly 
to the comprehensive analysis, the results depict expected differences and are 
below the acceptable criterium.  




Figure VII.9: FN curves for the different designs. 
 Comparison and discussion 
The analysis of both methods on the simple case show results that are very 
similar. Additionally, a systematic difference can be observed between the 
results of the simple and the comprehensive method. The fatality rates of the 
simplified method show higher values than the partially more accurate 
solution. It is observed that the differences are mainly due to the two-zone 
model overestimating the toxicity concentrations at the occupant inhalation 
height. A second reason is the more conservative approach if the evacuation 
network model is used. The evacuation times are slightly higher. In Figure 
VII.10, the six FN-curves are presented.  
 
Figure VII.10: Results of the comprehensive and simplified method. 
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The probability of fatality for the two methods are repeated in Table VII.3 and 
the relative error for the two methods are calculated by means of eq. VI.1. The 
error varies between 7% and 15% and is higher for lower probabilities of 
fatality because these scenarios are more sensitive to variation. The differences 
between the values obtained with the two methods are small, so it can be 
concluded that the simplified method can be applied to simple cases. 
Moreover, the results provided by the simplified method are more 
conservative. This is consistently observed in other simple case studies. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the simple method provides a good first 
estimate of the safety level. 
Table VII.3: Probability of fatality for the simplified (TE1QMM) and 
comprehensive method (TE¯1Z|M) for case study 1. 
Option Fire safety design TE1QMM [1/yr] TE¯1Z|M [1/yr] Error 
1 High maintenance level 5.3	 ∗ 	10y© 5.6	 ∗ 	10y® 5% 
2 Low maintenance level 3.9 ∗ 	10y® 4.1 ∗ 	10yß 4.5% 
3 No sprinkler 8.8 ∗ 	10y® 9.0 ∗ 	10yß 2.9% 
 
The results reveal that the fire risks of all the scenarios are below the acceptable 
limit, so that no sprinkler system would be necessary for the case at hand. This 
aligns with the Belgian regulatory framework, which requires no sprinkler 
system for the considered building configuration.    
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 Case study 2: Shopping mall 
In this section, the QRA methods are applied to a more challenging building 
configuration. Similarly to the first case study, this case is explained 
completely for the detailed method and only the results are shown for the 
simplified analysis. 
 Comprehensive QRA method 
The QRA method is applied to the multi-purpose commercial building case 
study discussed in Chapter VI (step 1). The objective of this case study is to 
analyse the applicability of the model for this type of projects. No external 
influences (e.g., wind, fire brigade, etc.) or bottlenecks (e.g., merging flows, 
direct access to street, etc.) are taken into account. The building is considered 
to be occupied by customers (90%), who are not familiar with the building, 
and staff (10%), who are familiar with the building. The occupant density is 
presented in Table IV.1 and based on an average of 1 occupant per 5 m2 [10]. 
The occupants are considered to have mean pre-evacuation times between  
60 s and 120 s [10].   
 
Figure VII.11: Model of the shopping mall. 
 
Figure VII.12: Ground plan of floor level 0 for option 1 (with sprinkler and 
SHC system). For more information see Chapter VI. 




Figure VII.13: Ground plan of floor level 1 for option 2 with additional 
compartmentation. 
The goal (step 2) of the QRA analysis is to determine life safety in case of fire. 
The same risk criteria for the probability of fatality, individual and societal risk 
are defined as in case study 1 (step 3). 
In this case study, three developed fire safety designs (step 4) are analysed 
(step 5) and eventually evaluated against the pre-defined risk criteria (step 6). 
The first and the second option both follow the main considerations of the 
Belgian prescriptive requirements regarding passive and active fire safety 
systems for safe evacuation, fire rated elements and fire brigade assistance. 
The requirements are in analogy to other countries with a prescriptive 
framework (e.g., France, Netherlands, etc.). The three options have several 
common and different features. The common features are structural stability 
(R 60), compartmentation of staircases (EI 60), number and width of 
emergency exits, automatic smoke detection and standard alarm system. The 
alarm system is delayed by 120 s after initial detection. This method is 
typically applied in larger commercial buildings in Belgium and allows the 
security to confirm the fire and reduce the risk of false alarm.  
The distinctive features of the different options relate to vertical 
compartmentation and active safety systems. More in detail, in the first option, 
all the floors are considered as a single compartment. The fire safety design 
consists of a smoke and heat control system (SHC) and a sprinkler system. The 
fire safety concept is designed according to the rules of good practice. The 
SHC system is designed in accordance with the EN12101-5 (Figure VII.12) 
and is composed of natural (1/3) and mechanical (2/3) air supply (mechanical 
front doors) and mechanical extraction of 60000 m3/h of smoke, divided over 
multiple extraction points on the incident floor. Every floor is divided into two 
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SHC zones, separated by a fixed smokescreen. The sprinkler system is an 
ordinary hazard (OH) 3 installation in accordance with the NBN EN 12845 [3]. 
The reliability of the sprinkler system is considered 0.95. An ASET/RSET 
analysis is performed to evaluate the performance. In the second option, a 
complete prescriptive solution is designed: a sprinkler system is implemented, 
the floor levels are compartmented and every floor is divided in two 
compartments smaller than 2500 m2 (Figure VII.13). The compartments are 
connected by three self-closing doors in case of fire. In the third option, the 
same fire safety design is applied as in option 1. However, no SHC system is 
implemented in this case. The purpose of this option is to determine the effect 
of the SHC-system on the safety level.  
Next, the probabilistic and deterministic analysis are performed. In step 5.1 of 
the probabilistic analysis, the main design fire scenarios are defined. Three 
representative design scenarios are considered: a fire in the open commercial 
area (1); a fire in a small storage room (2); and a fire in the restaurant (3). In 
step 5.2, the most important input variables are defined. The variables 
discussed in Table IV.1 are adopted for the case study. For every first order 
parameter, the CDFs are presented for smoke spread in Figure 14-15, and for 
evacuation in Figure VII.16-17. On these figures, the adopted parameter values 
for traditional performance-based analysis tools (e.g. BS PD7974, C/VM2, 
CIBSE, etc.) are depicted to show the conservatism of these parameter values. 
The range of the arrow is the analysed domain in the probabilistic analysis. 
The figures show that most standards and guidelines use fixed parameters. 
These parameters are mostly situated towards the conservative side (right part 
of the figures) of the distribution with respect to the available literature. In this 
way, some kind of safety factor is taken into account in the parameters. 
 
Figure VII.14: CDF of the fire growth rate. 




Figure VII.15: CDF of the maximum fire size. 
 
Figure VII.16: CDF of the occupant density. 
 
Figure VII.17: CDF of the pre-evacuation time. 
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The bow-tie model is generated for every design scenario (step 5.3). To 
construct the event tree, multiple pathway factors are considered: the location 
of the fire (5 floors, 3 zone and 2 room types room); sprinkler activation 
(activation and failure); SHC performance (activation, 50% activation, and 
total failure); detection (normal, sprinkler, and delayed); alarm performance 
(normal and delayed), and failure of passive systems (e.g., door shutter failure 
of self-closing door). The event tree is constructed similar to Figure VII.2. In 
total, 64 event tree scenarios are considered important to be analysed for the 
smoke spread RSM analysis. The other scenarios are only analysed for one 
combination of parameters. They are not analysed by means of RSM 
sensitivity because they are considered similar to one of the 64 scenarios (e.g., 
symmetrical configuration), not significant because of negligible 
consequences (e.g., sprinkler extinguishment, ect.) or can be interpolated 
(intermediate floors, etc.). An important boundary condition of the case study 
is that the staircases are considered smoke free during the evacuation for all 
scenarios. This is a limitation of the model because failure of a fire door causes 
smoke leakage into the staircase, which will have a major impact on the safety 
level.  
An initial ignition frequency of 0.062 fires per year is taken into account [4]. 
The probability frequencies of the branch scenarios are determined by the 
combination of the probabilities of the pathway factors. These probabilities are 
obtained through fault tree analysis and analysis of historic data [5,11,12]. The 
probability data used in the case study is presented in Table IV.2. For the 
considered case study, the analysis is done with the provided PERT 
distributions. 
In step 5.4, the PCE RSM is chosen for the case study because of its efficiency 
and high accuracy for the region of interest, namely the far field of fire. In step 
5.5, the support points are generated. The sample set suggested in Table IV.4 
is analysed by means of the smoke spread sub-model FDS version 6 [6] in step 
5.6. In Figure VII.18, a cross-section of the smoke spread for a conservative 
fire scenario (S = 0.012 kw/s2, HRRPUA = 450 kw/m2, Amax = 100 m2) is 
shown on the ground floor in the left part of the compartment at 250 s after 
ignition. At this moment, the smoke has already spread to all floors. In this 
scenario, an SHC-system is implemented and considered to have a reliability 
of 0.6 based on statistical data [5]. The smoke has spread to the other floors 
through the central openings relatively quickly.  




Figure VII.18: Smoke spread for a fire scenario on the ground floor. 
After evaluation of the support samples, the smoke spread RSM is generated 
(step 5.7). The toxicity, temperature and radiation concentrations are 
calculated at multiple locations. In Figure VII.19, the resulting temperatures at 
450 s (evacuation at full development) are depicted on the ground floor for the 
sample combination S1: α = 0.101 kW/s2, HRRPUA = 575 kW/m2, and Amax = 
88 m2. The results show a clear separation of the floor into two SHC zones due 
to the fixed smoke curtain in the middle.  
 
Figure VII.19: Estimated temperatures at 2.0 m above the ground floor for 
the sample combination S1 at 450 s. 
A convergence analysis is performed to determine the accuracy of the RSM. 
In 90% of the cases when the RSM is applied, convergence  (less than 10% 
error) was immediately achieved. In 9.5% of the cases only 1 or 2 additional 
samples were necessary and in other cases multiple extra samples were 
necessary. For one case close to the fire, 8 additional support points were 
necessary in order to achieve convergence. The analysis is shown in Figure 
VII.20 (blue line). The main reasons for the deferred convergence is due to the 
difficult flow patterns occurring in the scenario with a fire on the top floor in 
combination with the implementation of an SHC system. Additionally, a 
sensitivity analysis is performed to analyse the convergence rates of the PCE 
and the IMLS method. For the more turbulent regimes, the IMLS method has 
a significantly better convergence rate.  




Figure VII.20: Convergence analysis of the PCE and IMLS smoke spread 
RSM for case design scenario 1. 
Next, the DoE experiments are determined to obtain a uniform representation 
of the analysed domain (step 5.8). For each scenario 100 samples are generated 
and simulated in step 5.9. The results are provided as input for the evacuation 
analysis (loop to step 5.5). The support points for the evacuation RSM are 
generated (step 5.5). The sample is analysed by means of the evacuation model 
Pathfinder (step 5.6). In Figure VII.21, an evacuation simulation is depicted 
for a scenario with normal affiliation and high occupant density at 450 s after 
ignition. The scenario takes into account a fire on the ground floor.  
 
Figure VII.21: Location of the occupants for a fire on the ground floor at    
450 s after ignition. 
In order to increase the efficiency of the method, data is retained only at 
locations where occupants move. In Figure VII.22, an example is depicted of 
the agent occupation (yellow) on the ground floor for all evacuation scenarios 
and all time steps. The four stairs and four exits are visible. The figure reveals 
that many locations are not relevant for further analysis. This is an important 
aspect in terms of data allocation to reduce memory usage and to increase 
computational efficiency. During the probabilistic simulations it is observed 
that the computational time is reduced by a factor 2-5. 




Figure VII.22: Indication of used locations (yellow) for evacuation on the 
ground floor. 
After evaluation of the support samples of the evacuation analysis, the dosages 
are linked to the locations and the consequence output is calculated. The five 
remaining variables provided in Table IV.1 are implemented and the DOE 
experiments are generated to obtain a uniform representation of the analysed 
domain (step 5.8). It is only now that the DoE for probabilistic representation 
of the evacuation variables is generated and the evacuation RSM is applied to 
determine the output for the generated DoE. For each event tree scenario, a 
total of 1003 (smoke spread, evacuation and consequence sub-model) samples 
are generated and analysed in step 5.9 by means of the analytical sub-model 
[13,14]. Similarly to the smoke spread sub-model, a convergence analysis is 
performed to determine the accuracy of the RSM.  
In Figure VII.23, the results for two event tree scenarios are presented in terms 
of FID values. The results show that, within the analysed domain, most of the 
occupants are able to escape in smoke-free circumstances, which means that 
sample points are chosen at the safe side of the limit state. Secondly, some of 
the occupants obtain a FID value higher than 1, which means that multiple 
sample points are at the unsafe side of the limit state. The two event tree 
scenarios shown below depict different results because the limit state shifts, 
from left to right, due to the implementation of different safety systems, 
causing safer conditions. In the left figure more people are affected by smoke 
conditions. In the right figure, an SHC system is implemented increasing 
tenability conditions. A curve fitting analysis is performed (orange line Figure 
VII.23), for each event tree scenario, based on the Sum of Square Error (SSE) 
to determine the probability density function and the probability of fatality. For 
the left and right figure, a lognormal distribution is derived. The results are 
calculated for each event tree scenario and for the three fire safety designs. 




Figure VII.23: FID data and fitted PDF for two event tree scenarios. 
In step 5.10, the probability of fatality is calculated for every scenario and in 
step 5.11 the final probability of fatality and risk are calculated. The results 
obtained for the probability of fatality and the individual risk are presented in 
Table VII.4. The results show that the three options are well within the pre-
defined acceptable safety limits. The second option obtains the highest safety 
margin. The third option results in the lowest safety margin.  
Table VII.4: Case study results for the probability of fatality (Pf) and the 
individual risk (IR). 
Option Fire safety design Pf [1/yr] IR [1/yr] 
1 Sprinkler + SHC 3.8 ∗ 	10yß 2,1 ∗ 10y® 
2 Sprinkler + comp. 9.9	 ∗ 	10y® 8.5 ∗ 10y© 
3 Sprinkler 9.8 ∗ 	10yß 7.8 ∗ 10y® 
- Acceptable limit 10-4 10-6 
 
In Figure VII.24, the societal risk is presented in terms of an FN curve. The 
three fire safety designs and acceptable limit are depicted. The three options 
are below the acceptable limit, which means that any of these designs can be 
selected. Option 2, with sprinklers and compartmentation, obtains the highest 
safety level, signifying that, for this case study, compartmentation with 
sprinklers provides a higher safety margin than a sprinkler system in 
combination with a SHC system. Two reasons can be formulated. The first 
reason for the higher impact of compartmentation is because fewer people are 
exposed to the smoke due to the physical separation of smoke from other sub-
compartments and from the staircases in the model. This is also the reason why 
more fatalities can occur without compartmentation. Smoke spread in 
staircases due to door barrier failure is not taken into account. It is expected 
that the risk level will increase when failure of the smoke barriers that protect 
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the staircase, is taken into account. Most likely, the effect of taking this 
additional fire scenario into account will not be equivalent for the three fire 
safety designs because the SHC will have an important role in avoiding of 
smoke spread in the staircases due to the creation of under pressure in the 
incident compartment. The second reason for the higher impact of the 
compartmentation is the low reliability of the SHC with respect to other safety 
systems. Increasing the reliability by reducing complexity or improving 
redundancy will increase the safety margin.  
The final selection of the fire safety design can be further determined using a 
cost benefit analysis (life cycle cost) or in terms of functionality (open plan) 
and flexibility (changing walls). Other systems can be implemented to increase 
the safety level or omitted to increase functionality (alarm delay). 
 
Figure VII.24: FN curves of the three fire safety designs for the 
comprehensive method. 
An additional analysis is performed to analyse the equivalence of options 1 and 
2. Both designs comply with the Belgian legislative framework. However, the 
designs show different safety levels. In order to obtain an equal safety level for 
both designs, option 1 can be reverse engineered to determine which reliability 
the SHC system leads to equivalence. In order to determine this safety level, 
the reliability of the SHC system is increased until the risk is equal for both 
fire safety designs. Basically, the probability of the event tree branch 
“Successful SHC” is increased and “SHC failure” is lowered until the risk level 
became equal. The visualisation of the equal safety level is shown in Figure 
VII.25. The orange FN curve shifted downwards. The red areas represent lower 
risk for option 1 and the green areas represent lower risk for option 2. A 
reliability of 0.88 was calculated, which is significantly higher than the 
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originally assumed average reliability of 0.6. The higher reliability level can 
be achieved when important failure characteristics of the system are reduced 
(Table IV.2). Another possibility is to improve and optimize the SHC design 
with respect to the proposed standard to reduce the presence of toxic species 
and heat in the incident compartment. In this way, the consequences, instead 
of the frequencies, are reduced. 
 
Figure VII.25: FN curves of the three fire safety designs with increased 
reliability of the SHC-system. 
 Simplified QRA method 
The simplified QRA method is applied through the same procedure with 
different sub-models for smoke spread and evacuation (see above). The 
representation of smoke spread in the zone model is presented in Figure VII.26. 
 
Figure VII.26: Representation of smoke spread by temperature distribution in 
the zone-model at 250 s. 
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The results for the individual risk and probability of fatality are presented in 
Table VII.5. These results illustrate that, for individual risk,  the safety levels 
are within the pre-defined acceptable safety limits.   
Table VII.5: Case study results for the probability of fatality (Pf) and the 
individual risk (IR). 
Option Fire safety design Pf [-] IR [-] 
1 Sprinkler + SHC 4.8 ∗ 	10yß 5.1 ∗ 10y® 
2 Sprinkler + comp. 1.5	 ∗ 	10yß 1.8 ∗ 10y® 
3 Sprinkler 1.2 ∗ 	10y¶ 2.8 ∗ 10yß 
- Acceptable limit 10-4 10-6 
 
In Figure VII.27, the societal risk is presented in terms of a FN curve. Similarly 
to the detailed analysis, the results depict important differences between the 
three safety levels. The option with only the sprinkler system is not within the 
acceptable limits. This is mainly due to the errors obtained by the simplified 
method with respect to the comprehensive model.  
 
Figure VII.27: FN curves of the three fire safety designs for the simplified 
method. 
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 Comparison and discussion 
The comparison of the results between the simple and comprehensive method 
show systematic differences. The fatality rates of the simplified method show 
higher rates compared to the more accurate solution. In Figure VII.28, the six 
FN curves are presented.  
 
Figure VII.28: Results of the comprehensive and simplified method. The 
results for the comprehensive method are each time the lower FN curve. 
The probabilities of fatality for the two methods are repeated in Table VII.6 
the relative error for the two methods is calculated based on eq VI.1. The error 
varies between 21% and 53%. The error is higher for lower probabilities 
because these scenarios are more sensitive to variation. Based on the size of 
the error, it could be concluded that the simplified method is less applicable to 
more complex cases. However, because results of the simplified method are 
consistently more conservative, it can give a good estimate of the safety level.  
Table VII.6: Probability of fatality for the simplified and comprehensive 
method for case study 2. 
Option Fire safety design PfFull [-] PfSimpl [-] Error 
1 Sprinkler + SHC 3.8 ∗ 	10yß 4.8 ∗ 	10yß 26% 
2 Sprinkler + comp. 9.9	 ∗ 	10y® 1.5	 ∗ 	10yß 51% 
3 Sprinkler 9.8 ∗ 	10yß 1.2 ∗ 	10y¶ 22% 




From the results of the comprehensive analysis it can be observed that all the 
scenarios are below the acceptable limit. This implies that only a sprinkler 
system would be necessary for the case at hand. This is not in line with the 
Belgian regulatory framework that requires option 1 or 2 for the considered 
building configuration. However, the design with only a sprinkler system is in 
line with the New-Zealand C/VM2 regulations [10]. 
 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to analyse the applicability of the method for 
different case studies, concerning a simple and a more challenging building 
configuration. The simplified and comprehensive QRA methods were tested 
and a comparison was made between the results. 
For the simple case, the results are very similar. A systematic difference was 
observed between the simple and comprehensive method, the simple method 
providing more conservative results. It can be concluded that the simplified 
method can be applied to simple cases, that do not deviate too far from the 
analysed cases, because the results are slightly more conservative. 
For the complex case, the results differ more strongly. A systematic difference 
was observed again, the simple method again providing for more conservative 
results in the order of 20% to 50% higher risk levels. This seems to be a high 
error. However, because of the logarithmic scale, the analysis can still provide 
useful results to give a coarse estimate of the location of the FN-curve with 
respect to the acceptable risk level. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
simplified method can be applied to challenging cases to provide a good first 
estimate of the safety level. It should be noted that in principle, this conclusion 
is only valid for similar cases. When the scope would be significantly different, 
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 Introduction  
In the previous chapters, the full and simplified QRA methods were developed, 
validated, and tested on the basis of multiple case studies. The final objective 
of the QRA method is to quantify the fire safety level of a building design and 
evaluate the calculated safety level against a predefined acceptable risk 
criterion. In Chapter II, three methods to quantify the risk level were defined: 
the failure probability in terms of the probability of fatality, the individual risk 
and the societal risk. In Belgium and most other countries, no specific fire risk 
criteria are defined. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to investigate 
possible acceptable safety levels which can be used to evaluate the fire safety 
level of challenging building designs by means of a full probabilistic fire safety 
analysis. Firstly, the risk criteria tolerable and acceptable risk are discussed. 
Secondly, important factors for quantifying life safety are analysed. Thirdly, 
acceptance criteria based on different methods are investigated. Finally, the 
quantification of fire safety designs in different countries for the same case 
study is analysed.  
 Tolerable and acceptable risk criteria 
When making a fire safety design compliant with the pre-defined performance 
criteria, it is assumed that the design is at is minimum tolerable within the 
considered context. The tolerability limit of a design is the combination of the 
possible consequences and their associated occurrence probabilities. For 
individual risk and the probability of having a fatality, this means the 
multiplication of both terms and summating up to one term. For societal risk, 
the tolerability of a design is a function of the severity, and ensures that societal 
differentiation between high consequence and low consequence events is taken 
into account [1]. This is presented by a FN curve (Chapter II). 
In addition to the tolerability limit for societal risk, defined by means of an FN 
curve, a second threshold can be defined to make a distinction between the 
region on the FN diagram that can be considered as negligible and the region 
that can be considered as the ALARP zone [2]. Between these limits the design 
is only tolerable if the fire safety engineer proves that the risks are reduced as 
low as reasonably practical. An example is given in Figure VIII.1. 
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Figure VIII.1: Generalised representation of the ALARP principle. Taken 
from [1]. 
 Important factors for quantifying risk 
acceptance criteria  
When determining the acceptable risk, different aspects must be considered. In 
this part, several factors that can have an important impact on the quantification 
of the acceptability limits are discussed. Four factors are analysed: assumptions 
in regulatory frameworks, voluntariness, age, and geographic impact. 
 Assumptions in regulatory frameworks 
An important aspect in prescriptive fire safety legislation is that the acceptable 
safety level, which is represented by the regulation and code requirements, 
takes into account the degradation of the safety level over the lifespan of the 
building. This degradation can be caused by multiple factors: 
- Design of the scope is not compliant with the pre-defined safety level. 
- Construction and installation errors made on site. 
- Administration errors and change of function during the life cycle of 
the building. 
- Lack of proper maintenance and inspection of the systems. 
A visualisation of these factors is given in Figure VIII.2. In case one or more 
of these factors are taken into account in the risk model, the acceptable level 
needs to be reviewed. This means that the acceptable level can be adjusted 
towards a higher or lower acceptable risk, depending on what is taken into 
account.  
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Figure VIII.2: Levels of fire safety and the reduction due to the different 
processes. Taken from [9]. 
 Voluntary and involuntary risk. 
One important aspect is the willingness of taking the risk. Bohnenblust and 
Slovic [14] suggest that when the risk is voluntary, e.g. sports or driving, the 
upper limit of probability of fatality per year is defined as 10-2. When the risk 
is not voluntary (e.g. using public transport or flying) then a probability higher 
than 10-4 is not tolerable while risk below 10-6 are considered negligible [11]. 
Other research confirms this reasoning that the public accepts voluntary risks 
in the order of 100 to 1000 times greater than involuntary risks [12].  
The reason for the difference is originated in the public’s perception of risk. 
When a person is able to take charge over an activity such as driving a car  then 
this person will be more inclined to accept more risk than he would drive along 
with somebody else or ride with public transport. When the person is able to 
make their own risk vs. benefit analysis they are more likely to take that extra 
risk to obtain extra benefit. On the other hand, in case a person needs give 
control away to another person then this individual will be less inclined to give 
control away because there is no possible choice involved. Another aspect is 
uncertainty. When a person can take charge of a situation, this person will be 
more aware of what is going on and knows its own capabilities and limitations. 
However, when losing control, the person will be more uncertain about the 
person who is taking control (e.g. public transport).The same is true for public 
buildings. People feel less in control when a fire occurs in a non-familiar 
building. Therefore, the acceptable risk will be different between criteria in 
domestic housing and public buildings (UK regulations). 
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 Age difference 
Another important factor is age difference. Some countries put emphasis on 
different acceptability rates for building types with specific age groups (e.g. 
day-care and elderly homes). For example, the Netherlands set a fixed tolerable 
criterion based on the age group with the highest life expectancy [13].  
Meacham discusses that from a regulatory point of view, the suggested method 
is relatively easy to implement because only one fixed criterion should be taken 
into account. However, he discusses that a fixed value will be much easier to 
reach when the background risk of a specific age group (e.g. children) is low 
while it will be much more difficult when the background risk of a specific age 
group (e.g. elderly) is high. This means that significantly more safety measures 
need to be taken in an elderly home than for a day case. Therefore, Meacham 
suggested to take a dynamic acceptable limit into account by using 1% of the 
background risk depending on the age of the focus group [13]. 
In figure VIII.3, an example is given of the background risk for males in 
Australia based on statistical data. It can be observed that the background risk 
for an 85 year old is about 1000 times higher than for a 10 year old.  
 
Figure VIII.3: Background risk for males living in Australia. Taken from 
[12]. 
Meacham discusses that by adopting a target safety level of 1% (0.01) of the 
background risk, the risk contributed by the building would not be expected to 
be more than around 10-3 for people in their eighties, for people between 15-
45, the acceptable risk would be around 10-5, for infants the criterion would  be 
10-4 and for young children 10-6.  
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 Geographical 
Similarly to the age factor, the geographical factor can be applied as a uniform 
value or as a varying parameter depending on the geographical location. When 
a fixed value would be considered based on the average background risks then 
regions with higher risks like earthquake or cyclone sensitive regions would 
demand less safety measures to be implemented. While regions with a lower 
environmental impact would ask more implementation of safety measures than 
if only the risk of that specific region would be taken into account [13].  
 Quantification of risk criteria 
In the next sections, several methods to determine the acceptable risk are 
discussed. The purpose is to analyse the different methods and make 
suggestion for further implementation in the developed QRA-method. 
 Acceptable criteria based on recent mortality rate 
data 
The most simple approach to assess the overall consequences and the 
acceptable risk is a frequentistic approach [15]. According to De Smet [16], 
the basic acceptable level of risk is usually defined in a situation of permanent 
exposure, where the danger and the risk are always together. The community 
is prepared to accept the risk when the probability of fatality is less than 1 per 
million persons per year. In case the exposure is not permanent, the risk will 
be more easily accepted. This is more suitable for fire related risks. In 
European countries, the average number of deaths in buildings caused by fire 
is somewhere between 4 and 15 per million habitants per year [16].  
Data from the UK proves that mortality rates decrease steadily from the first 
observations in the 1980 [17]. In buildings other than dwellings, mortality rates 
decreased to 20 fatalities in 2017. Given that the population of the UK is about 
66.02 million and that at least 99% of the population visits buildings other than 
dwellings, the calculated mortality rate is 0.3 * 10-6. Fire related injuries were 
estimated about 1.5 * 10-5. These results are in line with older data from the 
PD 7974-7 for probabilistic risk assessment [19]. The USA obtained similar 
rates of about 90 fatalities per year. Given a population of 328 million and that 
98% of the population visits buildings other than dwellings, the calculated 
mortality rate is 0.27 * 10-6. 
In Belgium, only data between 2016-2018 of domestic fires was found, the 
average rate of fatalities was 62 [19]. Based on a population of 11.35 million 
inhabitants, a mortality rate of 5.5 * 10-6 is calculated.  
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 Acceptable criteria implemented in regulatory 
frameworks and standards 
Another method to obtain acceptable risk criteria is to choose criteria from 
other countries and sectors. The first acceptable risk criteria were developed 
for nuclear industries to map the risk levels for these special facilities [3]. Later 
on, countries like UK, Netherlands, Sweden, NSW, Switzerland, China, Hong 
Kong, and Australia developed specific risk criteria in their standards and 
codes. Most of these criteria are for more general purposes and industrial 
facilities.  
The regulatory body for major hazard industries in the UK is the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). They have both a statutory role for enforcement with 
major hazard industries and an advisory role in respect of land use planning 
(LUP). For the individual risk, the HSE makes a distinction between risk at 
home and other sleeping accommodations with 1.5 * 10-5 and other buildings 
with 1.5 * 10-6 [18,19] (Table VIII.1).   
Table VIII.1: Proposed BSI risk criteria. Taken from [19]. 
Category Probability 
Max tolerable risk to indiv. 10-4 fat/year 
General accepted risk to indiv. 10-6 fat/year 
Individual risk from fires only:  
At home or sleeping 1.5*10-5 per indiv./year 
Elsewhere 1.5*10-6 per indiv./year 
Risk of multiple death from fires only 
 
 
> 10 Fatalities 
 
5*10-7 per indiv./year 
> 100 Fatalities 
 
5*10-8 per indiv./year 
 
For the societal risk, the HSE suggested that the risk of an incident causing 
more than 50 fatalities or more people in a unique event should be regarded as 
intolerable if the frequency is estimated to be more than one in five thousand 
per annum for dangerous facilities. This criterion fixed one point and the HSE 
adopted a risk neutral concept by applying a slope of -1 (Figure VIII.4). An 
ALARP region is suggested in which the curve is shifted downwards by a 
factor of 10-2. For fires specifically, the BSI proposed two societal risk criteria, 
for 10 and 100 fatalities based on fire statistics.  
250  Chapter VIII 
 
 
Figure VIII.4: Representation of the acceptable risk criterion by HSE. Taken 
from [3]. 
The Dutch government incorporates historical risk data in its tolerable risk 
level [22]. The criteria based on the population with the highest life 
expectancy, which are 14-year-old children, are used. This life expectancy was 
reflected by a minimum death rate of 10-4 per year. The Dutch government 
imposed that the tolerable safety level for a dangerous situation should be 
reduced to only 1% of the existing probability to die that year,  or 10-6 per year 
[23,24]. This was set for risk associated with new facilities. For existing 
facilities, the risk of dying was set at 10-5 per year. For the societal risk, the 
Dutch define the tolerable risk for hazardous installations by means of an FN 
curve presented in Figure VIII.5. 
 
Figure VIII.5: Representation of the acceptable risk criterion. Adapted from 
[22]. 
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In 2004, Belgium experienced a major gas pipeline explosion in Ghislenghien, 
near Brussels, that led to about 24 fatalities and injured 122 people. Because 
of this major incident issued guidance for QRA in Seveso studies in 2009 [3]. 
The department of  Environment, nature and energy demands an independent 
QRA analysis for higher risk Seveso Directive companies. The considered 
risks are evaluated for individual and societal risk.  For the individual risk, the 
maximum location-specific risk on plants boundary line is 10-5 per year, at 
residential areas it is 10-6 per year, and at vulnerable areas it is 10-7 per year. 
For the societal risk, the tolerable risk for dangerous zones is presented by 
means of an FN curve in Figure VIII.6.  
 
Figure VIII.6: Representation of the acceptable risk criterion. Taken from [3]. 
The Australian government does not provide any risk data. However, efforts 
are done to implement risk criteria in their future building code. Based on 
statistical data, the government chose that the risk of death from disease is 
chosen as a psychological yardstick for establishing a level of risk acceptability 
in terms of fire and disasters. Meacham proposed to implement a regulatory 
benchmark such that the maximum contribution to risk to life, as related to all 
building features regulated by the National Construction Code (NCC), is no 
more than 1% of the background risk for new construction and no more than 
10% of the background risk for existing buildings [13].  
New South Wales (NSW), a state in Australia, issued specific guidelines for 
individual and societal risk [25]. In Table VIII.2, the individual risk criteria 
suggested by the guidelines are presented. The criteria are based on the 
principle set out above by the Australian government.  
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Table VIII.2: Individual risk for NSW. Taken from [25]. 
Category Probability of fatality 
Hospitals, schools, child-care facilities, elderly 0.5 * 10-6  
Residential, hotels, motels, tourist resorts 1 * 10-6 
Commercial developments including retail 
centres, offices and entertainment centres 
5 * 10-6 
Sporting complexes and active open space 10 * 10-6 
Industrial 50 *10-6 
 
For the societal risk, the suggested criteria take into account the fact that 
society is particularly intolerant of accidents which have a potential to create 
multiple fatalities. Therefore, the guidelines propose a slope of -1.5 (Figure 
VIII.7). The guidelines suggest that the criteria are broadly consistent with 
those adopted in a number of other jurisdictions and have been refined by 
consideration of the results from land use safety studies conducted by the 
department in and around the industrial installations in industrial areas [25].  
 
Figure VIII.7: Societal risk criteria. Taken from [25]. 
The Hong Kong land use planning proposes an individual risk limit of 10-5. 
For the societal risk, a risk neutral principle is applied with starting point N = 
1 with a probability of 10-5 and a cut off at n = 1000. The ALARP region is 
shifted with a factor of 100 [26]. The FN curve is presented in Figure VIII.8. 
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Figure VIII.8: Societal risk criteria Hong Kong. Taken from [1]. 
In Sweden, there is no formal approved criteria for risk criteria in generic 
building types. Some international criteria that may be used if ”approved” by 
the stakeholders, which are, principally the project owner and any relevant 
authority. Research was done suggesting risk criteria for rail tunnels and for 
bus stations. An individual risk of 10-6 was suggested [30]. For rail tunnels, the 
societal risk was defined on the risk per train kilometres driven and is presented 
in Figure VIII.9. 
 
Figure VIII.9: Societal risk for rail tunnels in Sweden. Taken from [27]. 
The Swiss government proposes an individual risk limit of 10-5 [28]. For the 
societal risk, a risk adverse principle is applied (slope = -2) with starting point 
N = 1 with a probability of 10-5 and a cut off at n = 1000 [28]. The FN curve is 
presented in Figure VIII.10. 
For Denmark, only a societal risk was found. The risk adverse principle is 
applied (slope = -2) with starting point N = 1 with a probability of 10-2 [28]. 
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The State California in the USA proposes an individual risk of 10-6 [28]. For 
the societal risk, the state differentiates between on-site and off-site risk. For 
both types, the risk adversity principle is applied in which the slope of the FN 
curve equals -2. The on-site risk has a starting point N = 1 with a probability 
of 10-1 . The acceptability of the off-site risk is 100 times less.  
 
Figure VIII.10: Societal risk limits for California, Denmark and Switzerland. 
 Acceptable criteria based on prescriptive and PBD 
regulatory frameworks 
From a general point of view it is believed that risk is considered only 
acceptable when society accepts it [14]. Therefore, it is considered that 
regulative and international organisation bodies are responsible for providing 
engineers with regulations, recommendations and guidelines. Included in their 
responsibilities is the task to determine what levels of risk should be considered 
acceptable. For regulatory purposes, prescriptive and performance-based 
legislation can be considered as accepted frameworks. 
In Belgium, a prescriptive legislation is applied that defines the prescriptive 
safety level depending on the type of building. The acceptable safety level will 
be variable and case dependent. If the developed comprehensive QRA method 
is applied on buildings that fulfil these regulations, the obtained risk profiles 
could be applied to quantify the acceptable risk criteria. For every building 
type, a risk profile can be determined based on the average profile of multiple 
case studies. Similarly, for PBD codes, the reference level can be determined 
for different buildings codes. In the next part, the case study of the shopping 
mall is designed according to the fire safety codes in three different countries, 
both prescriptive and PBD. Each fire safety design is analysed by the QRA 
method to show the acceptability limits for that specific building. 
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 Assessment of case study acceptability 
A case study is performed and designed against multiple regulatory 
frameworks. The case study of the shopping mall is used and designed to be in 
conformity with the regulatory frameworks of three different countries, both 
prescriptive and PBD. For the prescriptive, the building is designed according 
to the Belgian legislation. For the performance-based principle, the building is 
designed according to the New-Zealand and Swedish regulatory framework. 
For the performance-based countries, the designs were checked against the 
predefined fire scenarios and performance criteria. The fire safety design of 
each country is analysed by means of the QRA method to show the societal 
risk corresponding for that specific building type and inherently accepted as an 
acceptable risk limit though the regulatory framework in place. It is important 
to mention that for this case study the four staircases are considered as 
protected compartments and free of smoke.  
The main design differences in the study was the difference in the assignment 
of occupant densities, exit and stair widths and implementation of safety 
systems. These are presented in Table VIII.3. The table shows that the Belgian 
legislation requires to take more occupants and more exit and stair width per 
occupant into account. Therefore, the Belgium case can be considered the most 
conservative, which should be reflected in the results (e.g. lower FN curve). 
Table VIII.3: Major design differences for the three countries. 
Characteristic NZ Sweden Belgium 
Area for occupant density gross net gross 
Occupant density  1 p/3.5 m2 1 p/2 m2 1 p/3 m2 
Occupant density  0.29 m2/p 0.50 m2/p 0.33 m2/p 
Total occupants  7622 8003 8883 
Hor. width of escape routes 7 mm/p 6.7 mm/p 10 mm/p 
Vert. width of escape routes 9 mm/p 6.7 mm/p down: 12.5 mm/p 
up: 20 mm/p 










The results of the analysis for the failure of fatality and the individual risk are 
presented in Table VIII.4. The results show that the Belgium case is the most 
conservative and the New Zealand case is the least conservative.  
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Table VIII.4: Case study results for the probability of fatality (TE) and the 
individual risk (IR). 
Option Fire safety design TE [-] IR [-] 
1 Belgium 3.8 ∗ 	10yß 2.1 ∗ 10y® 
2 New Zealand 3.5 ∗ 	10y¶ 2.9 ∗ 10yß 
3 Sweden 2.9 ∗ 	10y¶ 1.2 ∗ 10yß 
  
In Figure VIII.11, the societal risk is presented in terms of FN curves. Similarly 
to the individual risk, the Belgium case is significantly more conservative 
comparing to the other two cases. The results of the safety level of the Swedish 
and New-Zealand case are close to each other. The Swedish case is slightly 
more conservative than the New Zealand case due to the wider exits. With 
respect to the definition of acceptability limits, it appears that acceptability 
limits which would correspond to the cases study for the Swedish and New 
Zealand can be considered more or less on the same level. The level of 
acceptability in Belgium is much more conservative compared to the other two 
countries. With respect to the safety level of other countries, the three case 
studies would be tolerable in Hong Kong, Denmark, UK and NSW. In the 
USA, Switzerland and the Netherlands the three designs would not be 
acceptable. This is mainly related to the risk averse slope of the curve. The data 
from the other countries were not applicable for this case study. 
 
Figure VIII.11: Representation of the societal risk for the three countries by 
means of FN curves corresponding to the shopping mall case study. 
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IV.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to asses acceptability limits for analysing fire 
safety designs. The literature study of risk criteria showed that statistical data 
is most often used for defining acceptability limits. Based on this reasoning, 
the latest available mortality rates (2016) in Belgium can be analysed to 
determine the background risk [29]. In Figure VIII.12, the mortality rates for 
men and women are presented. The risk to women is significantly lower. 
Between 5- and 80-years old people, the risk to life for men is almost a factor 
2 higher. 
 
Figure VIII.12: Risk to life in Belgium in 2016. Taken from [29]. 
For determining the tolerable/acceptable risk, the average mortality rate for 
people between 20 and 50-60 years old is determined. The background risk 
varies between 7.9 ∗ 	10y• and 1.5 ∗ 10y]. Therefore, it is suggested to define 
an average rate of 10y]. Similarly to the reasoning discussed by Meacham [9], 
an acceptable risk of 1% of the background risk for people in new buildings is 
suggested. Therefore, a starting point for the FN-curve of 10-5 is chosen. 
Although, most countries use a risk averse slope, for the visualisation of the 
FN curve, to take into account the indirect costs and reduce the impact on 
public opinion, here, a risk neutral slope of -1 is suggested. The reason for this 
is suggested by Maes et al. [26], who suggested that the true societal 
preferences correspond with a risk-neutral evaluation (where events with the 
same risk indicator are similarly valued). In principle only a risk-neutral 
Men 
Women 
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position can be justified for a societal decision-maker to objectify the fire 
safety designs [5]. Van Coile suggested that, because societal resources are 
limited, safety investments are necessarily limited as well, and a balance 
between different safety investments is required [1]. Sunstein suggested that 
real risk aversion does not exist, since some of the money spent on the over-
valued low-probability vs. high-consequence events could be put to better use 
elsewhere and therefore saving more lives [27]. 
In Figure VIII.13, the proposed acceptable risk is presented together with the 
upper and lower limits found in the discussed literature. The proposed curve 
lies between the two limits and is close to the upper limit for lower number of 
fatalities and tends to go to the lower limit for a higher number of casualties. 
People younger than 20 years and older than 60 years should have different 
acceptable risk criteria because of the significantly different background risk. 
 
 
Figure VIII.13: Summary of FN-curves. 
In case the proposed tolerable societal risk limit is compared with the shopping 
mall case study for the three countries in Figure VIII.14, the Swedish and New 
Zealand case would not be tolerable. The FN curves of the two designs are 
close to the tolerable limit. Therefore, relatively small additional efforts can be 
done to fall below the tolerable limit. An example would be to increase the 
redundancy of the sprinkler system (Chapter III). If the reliability of the 
sprinkler system would be increased from 0.95 to 0.98 for the Swedish case 
UK-HSE 
Switzerland 
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and to 0.99 for the NZ case, the FN-curves of the two countries would be within 
the proposed acceptability limit presented in Figure VIII.14. Another 
possibility to reduce the societal risk can be to improve the reliability and 
efficiency of the SHC system. Both parts of the effectiveness can have a major 
impact on the risk level. 
 
Figure VIII.14: Representation of the societal risk for the three countries by 
means of FN curves with improved sprinkler reliability for the SW and NZ 
case. 
From the applied methodology it can be concluded that the choice of the 
acceptable limit has an important impact on the acceptability of the fire safety 
design. In order to make the chosen acceptable limit and historical accepted 
designs compatible, more acceptable designs should be analysed and a 
calibration should be made in future steps.   
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 General conclusions and recommendations  
Life safety design in case of fire is one of the main tasks in Fire Protection 
Engineering. A lot of consideration and effort is usually required to find 
sufficient and cost-effective solutions to reduce the risk of life loss to a pre-
defined acceptable level. In order to find a suitable methodology for this 
process, this thesis proposed a new framework for quantifying the fire safety 
level of new and existing buildings.  
First, in Chapter II, a closer look was taken at the term risk, which can be 
interpreted in many different ways. In order to constitute a basis for further 
considerations, risk concepts and possible quantification methods were 
discussed. Several existing risk multi-models were analysed. Strengths and 
weaknesses were investigated to incorporate the better parts of these models 
into the methodology. 
Based on the literature study, a deterministic and probabilistic framework was 
developed. In Chapter III, the deterministic models were developed and 
discussed. The focus was on a holistic approach of multiple submodels to 
combine the different influence factors from safety systems, design scenarios, 
evacuation, smoke spread, and consequence modelling in one framework. In 
Chapter IV, the probabilistic framework was developed. The method consists 
of multiple probabilistic techniques to quantify the safety level on a reliability 
and risk-based level. Three criteria were defined: a probability of fatality, an 
individual and a societal risk for quantifying the risk level. The core of the 
method consists of a response surface model in combination with sampling 
techniques and convergence methods. The outcome was a computationally 
efficient model to accurately quantify fire safety designs. In order to further 
optimize the computational model, in Chapter V, a ‘simplified’ model was 
proposed, with simplified submodels for smoke spread and evacuation 
analysis. For smoke spread, a zone model was proposed instead of a field 
model. For evacuation, an in-house network model was developed, instead of 
a continuous model.  
In Chapter VI, an extensive verification and validation analysis of the full 
probabilistic and simplified model has been performed. Through a set of 
verification tests, the model proved to give a good representation of the 
modelling accuracy of the RSM and evacuation submodel of the simplified risk 
model. The validation tests show good agreement with the theoretical and 
experimental cases.  
The objective of Chapter VII was to analyse the applicability of the method for 
different case studies. Two case studies were chosen: a simple configuration 
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and a more challenging building configuration. The simplified and 
comprehensive QRA method was compared for both case studies. The results 
revealed that for simple configurations both the simplified and comprehensive 
method provide accurate results. For more challenging case studies, only the 
comprehensive method obtained accurate results. The simple method showed 
errors up to 50%. However, because of the logarithmic scale, the analysis can 
still provide useful results to give a coarse estimate of the location of the FN-
curve with respect to the acceptable risk level. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the simplified method can be applied to challenging cases to provide a 
good first estimate of the safety level. 
The final objective of the thesis was to quantify the fire safety level of a 
building design and evaluate the calculated safety level against a predefined 
acceptable risk criterion. Therefore, in Chapter VIII, a proposal was made for 
an acceptable risk level, as presented in Figure IX.1, together with acceptable 
designs for the shopping mall case study designed for three different countries.  
 
Figure IX.1: Representation of the Societal risk for the three countries by 
means of FN-curves with improved sprinkler reliability the SW and NZ case. 
 Limitations 
The conclusions resulting from the application of the QRA framework 
developed in this thesis should always be analysed alongside the underlying 
assumptions and simplifications, as discussed in the related chapters. Note that 
the models have been developed for Belgian conditions and may not represent 
a realistic fire situation in other countries. Despite the developed risk models 
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being intended to represent the fire situation as realistically as possible, the 
main focus of this thesis was to demonstrate the application of the introduced 
framework for risk-based decision-making. 
 Suggestions for future research 
Future work directly in the line of this dissertation concerns improving the 
different submodels, performing additional validation for specific submodels 
and testing the method for different building types by means of multiple case 
studies.  
More specifically, the in-house developed evacuation network model should 
be further validated for its different parts (e.g. effect of smoke on walking 
speed vs occupant density). Also, the implementation of human behaviour 
during evacuation should be analysed more in depth to provide for more 
realistic and accurate results.  
The efficiency and reliability of several fire safety systems should be further 
investigated. An example is the effectiveness of pressurization systems, which 
is proven to depend significantly on the applied code or standard.  
Another important gap is the lack of data in the fire safety community. While 
there are large advances in the physical representation of fire scenarios by 
engineering models (e.g. combustion models, computational fluid dynamic 
models or evacuation models), there is a considerable amount of missing basic 
data to accurately represent the uncertainties associated with the fire situation 
when aiming at a full probabilistic representation. Finding this data will be an 
important challenge for future researchers. 
The QRA methodology should be tested for more case studies and different 
building types in order to analyse the applicability and to obtain a global idea 
of the overall safety level of new and existing buildings. More specifically, the 
simplified QRA method should be analysed for more challenging case studies 
to confirm that it always provides for an overestimation of the risk level and 














A IGNITION FREQUENCY 
A.1 Objective 
The objective of this study is to give an overview of the existing literature 
regarding the determination of the ignition frequency for different building 
types. 
A.2 General  
For quantitative estimation of fire risks, it is crucial to obtain reliable 
information on ignition frequency derived from relevant building stock and 
fire statistics. The probability of a building catching fire has been known to 
depend not only on the building use types under study but also on the size of 
the building itself. The larger the building, the smaller the likelihood of a fire 
to take place per unit floor area per year. This tendency is based on statistics 
from nations as the UK [1,2], Finland [3,4], Japan [5] etc. In order to confirm 
these findings, a comparative research study is performed in this chapter. In 
total, seven fire frequency data studies are analysed and discussed. 
A.3 Fire frequency data studies 
A.3.1 Historical development 
The first findings of the interaction between fire frequency and surface 
originated in 1907 when Professor Sergius von Sawitsh expressed that fire 
insurance claims frequency had a linear relationship with volume or value at 
risk [6]. Then, in 1937, Berge demonstrated, on the basis of Swedish dwellings, 
how the claims frequency and the fire loss ratio increase with the size of the 
house [6]. Professor D’Addario [7] followed in 1940 by expressing claims 
frequency,	&(ı), of the Swedish statistics explained by Berge, as a function of 
the size (s, sum insured) as: 
 &(ı) = Y	ıê  (A.1) 
where A and α are empirically fitted coefficients. This power law model is 
currently in use in PD [8] . 
In 1968 Ramachandran combined national fire statistics, developed by local 
authority fire brigades, with financial loss data from British Insurance 
Association. Ramachandran estimated, for different occupancy types, the total 
number of fires and the total cost in thousands of pounds [9] for large fires. In 
the following years, he developed a brief analysis of large fires from 1965 to 
1968 where the total number of fires and the total cost in thousands of pounds 
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for different occupancy types was expressed. In the 1969 research, fire 
frequency, place of origin, source of ignition, material first ignited, age of the 
building, number of storeys, spread of fire, attendance time and fire protection 
devices [10] were also assessed. In 1970, Ramachandran produced fire loss 
indexes defined as loss per square foot of floor area or loss per hundred pounds 
of value at risk [11]. 
A.3.2 Rutstein (UK 1979) 
In 1979, Rutstein [12] affirmed that the risk of fire (probability of fire and its 
consequence) can only be expressed in probabilistic terms and can be estimated 
by examining past fire incidence data. Furthermore, Rutstein determined the 
probability of fire by comparing the number of fires reported by the fire 
brigades divided by the total amount of property at risk, determined from 
survey data of manufacturing industry undertaken by the Home Office 
Scientific Advisory Branch in 1977. The fire probability, F, is described with 
a power law according to the total area of the building A: 
 ˜ = -	YR  (A.2) 
where A is the total floor area (m2) of the building and a and b are constants 
for buildings of different occupancies. The constants a and b were estimated 
using statistical regression analysis. The constants determined for different 
occupancies are given in the table below. The above equation reveals that the 
probability of fire in a building does not increase proportionately with the 
building size. In other words, a building twice the size of another building does 




Table A.1: Fire frequency data parameters Rutstein. Taken from [12]. 
 
A.3.3 Centre de Recherches (France 1999) 
In 1995, with help of the French fire brigades data of fires in the country was 
collected [13]. The statistics were used to give the number of fires per building 
class. The total floor area of different occupancies at risk were estimated. Since 
the number of fires in different occupancies for one year and the combined area 
of each occupancy are known, the average ignition frequency [1/ym2] can be 
estimated (Table A.2).  
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A.3.4 Tillander (Finland 2003) 
Tillander et al. generalized the theory of Ramachandran and analysed data 
from the national accident database Pronto [3]. They used mathematical 
functions from fitting models to the statistical data by means of the Barrois 
model. In this model, two power law functions are summed up and fitted to the 
statistical data. The frequency of ignition, &Z" , is then: 
 
 &Z" = 65	AD + 67	AB	  (A.3) 
where A is the floor area and c1, c2, r and s are coefficients. The coefficients 
were determined experimentally from observations for different building 
categories. Tillander et al. explained why the ignition frequency is higher in 
small buildings than in larger. Since the larger buildings have more planned 
fire safety measures and precautions against fire, they have more stringent 
rules than smaller buildings. This definitely affects the ignition frequency. 






A.3.5 Sandberg (Sweden 2004) 
Sandberg did a full review on ignition frequencies in his thesis [14]. He 
developed ignition frequencies per unit area for specific building types.  
Table A.4: Fire frequency data parameters Sandberg. Taken from [14]. 
 
A.3.6 Lin (Taiwan 2005) 
Lin studied fire frequency data from the Taiwanees Centra Police University 
was studied [15]. The data shows high frequency data between 0.0015-0.0279 
fires per year depending on the building type. The data is presented in the 
figure and table below. In comparison to other frequency data, the frequencies 
are orders of magnitude higher. Therefore, this data is not considered to be 
valid. 
Table A.5: Fire frequency data parameters. Taken from [15]. 
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Figure A.1: Fire frequency data in Taiwan between 1985-2001. Taken from 
[15]. 
A.3.7 Ghosh (New Zealand 2008) 
Gosh presented the results of an NZ study from NZFIRS [16]. The data is 
presented in the table below. Similar to [15], the fire frequencies are orders of 
magnitude higher than the other studies. Therefore, this data is not considered 
to be valid. 
Table A.6: Ignition frequencies from 2003-2004 in New Zealand. Taken from 
[16]. 
Property type 
No. of fires 
[-] 




Singe house 1657 248720 0.00666211 
Apartment 260 78666 0.003305113 
Hotels/motels 26 123918 0.000209816 
Restaurants, Pub, Taverns 61 42816 0.001424701 
Shops, malls, supermarkets 92 114141 0.000806021 
Services, repair, drycleaners, etc. 27 8666 0.003115624 
Office, bank, etc. 36 94309 0.000381724 
Industrial 126 419510 0.00030035 
Storage warehousing 53 34147 0.001552113 
Educational 104 86362 0.001204233 
Hospital, rest homes 26 25764 0.00100916 
Prisons 3 12250 0.000244898 
Stadion, theatres, etc. 42 20853 0.002014099 




A.3.8 Fischer (Switzerland 2012) 
Fischer et al. analysed data from insurance companies. From the research a 
correlation based on volume is proposed [17]:  
 λ =	xê ∗ "0;U	  (A.7) 
Were S en l are the correlation parameters. The parameters implemented in  
the formula are presented in the table below.  
Table A.7: Fire frequency data parameters Fischer. Taken from [17]. 
 
A residential building with a volume of 1000 m3 (typical single-family 
dwelling) results in an annual fire probability of 3*10-3 per building or of 3*10-
6/m3, so it burns about every 300 years. For a volume of 2000 m3 there is a 
probability of 5.8 10-3 per building or 2.9 10-6 / m3. The fire probability per m3 
is approximately constant for large volumes when the model parameter b  is 
close to unity. 
 
Figure A.2: Fire frequency per unit volume. Taken from [17]. 
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A.3.9 Kobayashi (Japan 2017) 
Kobayashi did a review of Japanese structure fires from data obtained from 
local fire brigades assembled in a national database [5]. He developed a 
formulation based on the following equation: 
 






Z[  (A.5) 
 
Where 
 Φ: the standard normal CDF 
 x: base-10 logarithm of severity measure 
µ5, ï5: mean and standard deviation corresponding to the primary 
floor area model 
µ7, ï7: mean and standard deviation corresponding to the secondary 
distribution 
α ratio of the secondary model to the overall distribution 
The values for the different parameters are shown in the table below. 




Table A.9: Fire frequency data parameters Kobayashi part 2. Taken from [5]. 
 
Fire frequencies are provided in function of structure size for different building 
types are provided in the figure below. The results show, initially, an inverse 
correlation between surface area and frequency per unit area. For larger areas, 
the correlation becomes more constant. 
 
Figure A.3: Examples of fire frequencies per unit area for increasing building 
surface. Taken from [5]. 
A.3.10 FIRS (USA 2018) 
An in-depth investigations performed to evaluate the current frequency data of 
the PD 7974-7 [8] and determine new frequencies based on more recent 
frequency data [18]. The study showed that for non-residential buildings, fires 
are more frequent in Food and drinks premises, hotels and communal living 
(4.61%) in in the UK; and in the US fires are more frequent in educational 
premises (5.51%) and Entertainment, culture and sport spaces (5.45%). 
Analysing the NFIRS in the USA fire statistics, it is possible to attribute the 
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high fire frequency in educational premises to open flames (potentially due to 
arson) with related high financial losses. The lowest percentages in the figure 
below are in offices and call centres; retail premises (0.37%) in UK and other 
public buildings and services (0.06%) in USA. 
 
Figure A.4: Fire statistics USA. Taken from [18]. 
Table A.10: Overall probability of fire starting in various types of occupancy. 
Taken from [18]. 






In the figure below, a comparative example is given of the ignition frequency 
per unit area for a retail building. The results show that two correlations have 
no dependence on building area while three correlations have a negative 
correlation between ignition frequency per unit area and the building surface 
area. The results show to differ up to an order of 200 for higher building areas. 
This might be due to the lower fires in large retail buildings which can give 
non reliable data. It is suggested to apply the average of the four curves (yellow 
curve) and the outer boundaries as uncertainty. The older data provided in [12] 
is not taken into account. It is important to emphasize that the frequency should 
be calculated per building and not per compartment.  
 
 
Figure A.5: Ignition frequency per unit area for a retail building. 
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A.5 Case study - Shopping mal 
The shopping mall has a floor area of 5*5000 m2, a total height of 5*4m and 
is a considered a commercial building. The ignition frequency for the different 
methods is depicted below.  
Table A.12: Fire frequencies for the shopping mall case study. 
 Methods Frequency [y-1] 
1 Rutstein P(A) = 0.000066	A5 = 1.65 
2 CdR P(A) = 0.000022	A = 0.55 
3 Tillander &Z" = 65	AD + 67	AB = 0.00007	Ayô.ß¶
+ 0.000006	Ayô.ô¶ 	= 	0.093 
4 Sandberg P(A) = 0.000016	A = 0.4 
5 Lin P(A) = 0.0024	A = 60 
6 Ghosh P(A) = 0.00074	A = 18.5 
7 Fischer λ =	eê ∗	VolU = ey©.™©	(5000 ∗ 20)ô.••¶ = 0.021 
8 Kobayashi T. = 0.054 
9 USA 2018 P(A) = 4.18 ∗ 10y5® ∗ Y] − 4.61 ∗ 10y57 ∗ Y7 + 2.25
∗ 10y® ∗ Y + 0.0008 = 0.0043 
 
The case studies show significant differences in fire ignition frequency. The 
difference between the lowest and highest value is a factor of 15349. The 
reason for the difference can be related to different issues: 
- The data from Lin and Ghosh shows unrealistic high fire frequencies 
and are omitted from further analysis. Omitting this result gives a 
maximum ratio of 79 times difference between the highest and lowest 
frequency. 
- The data from Rutstein does not allow for high commercial area 
spaces. The power law 1 is probably an overestimation for larger 
building sizes. Therefore, this value is considered an overestimation. 
- The data from Sandberg and Centre de Recherches are in the same 
order. However, the frequency per unit area is independent from 
building size. Therefore, this might data be an overestimation for 
larger buildings sizes. 




- The data from the USA are recent data pointing towards the trend of 
less fires because of increased investment in fire prevention. 
A.6 Conclusion 
In general, it can be concluded that the larger the building the higher the 
probability of ignition. However, from the analysed research, it is possible to 
conclude that the effect is nonlinear and that the non-linearity could be 
attributed to two main reasons: 
- There may be a scale effect: if a building is enlarged to double its 
original size, not all the services would double in size or in fire risk 
so that the risk of fire in a larger building would be less than two times 
than the original building. 
- Composition of the sample: it is expected that larger buildings (non-
industrial) increase their effort in terms of fire prevention 
management (e.g. prevention officer) or first aid firefighting 
capability. The awareness is increased and therefore the expected 
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B GLASS BREAKAGE DYNAMICS 
The objective of this study is to give an overview of the existing literature 
regarding the determination of glass breakage in compartment fires. 
B.1 Background 
In case of under-ventilated burning is the size (more technically, the heat 
release rate) of fires is limited by the flow of oxygen available to it. In all 
except very rare circumstances, the flow of oxygen into a room comes largely 
from open doors and open windows, and to a slight extent from any mechanical 
ventilation systems and from building leakage. Once a fire gets going, 
however, windows previously closed may crack and break out. The results will 
often be drastically different, depending on whether the windows break or not. 
Thus, it becomes of significant interest to be able to predict if, and when, glass 
may break out. 
When a window pane of ordinary float glass is first heated, it tends to crack 
when the glass reaches a temperature of about 150 – 200°C. The first crack 
initiates from one of the side edges. At that point, there is a crack running 
through the pane of glass, but there is no effect on the ventilation available to 
the fire. For the air flows to be affected, the glass must not only crack, but a 
large piece or pieces must fall out. 
B.2 Types of glass 
Glass in a window or curtain wall system can present a route for flames to 
spread should the glass break and fall from its containment or framing system. 
Today’s windows and curtain wall systems use a wide variety of glass types 
and framing methods (vinyl, wood, aluminium). Glass can be of a variety of 
colours, opacity, area, varying sheet thickness and with or without multilayer 
construction (e.g. single, double, or triple glazed). Glass panels may be 
annealed or float glass, heat strengthened, tempered/toughened, reflective, 
laminated, or wired. The complexity of glass installations from building to 
building can vary significantly and the current state-of-the art available to 
predict glass breakage is limited with high degrees of uncertainty given the 
possible configurations and variations in window and curtain wall 
construction. 
In Belgium, most public buildings such as offices, commercial, assembly 
spaces, etc., contain mostly double or triple layered glass for energy purposes. 
Additionally, for safety purposes, the standard NBN S23-002 [19] is 
considered a rule of good practise for determining the glass type of outer and 
inner windows. In the building envelop, mostly layered glass with special 
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interlayer protection is applied. Inside the buildings, depending on the location, 
size, etc. also tempered glass can be found and under specific conditions 
(outside human activity zones) regular glass can be used.  
B.3 Types of thermal exposure 
It must be realized that there are at least two distinct types of thermal exposure 
to glass that is involved in fires: 
1. A window is inside a room in which a fire is taking place. The window 
is being subjected to immersion heating from one side. The local gas 
temperature and the radiating temperature are rather similar. There 
may be a gradient of temperature and heat flux from the top down to 
the bottom. 
2. A window is exposed to an outside fire, typically a wildland or bush 
fire. In that case, there may be relatively little difference in exposure 
between the top and the bottom of the window. The heating is 
primarily by radiation. Local gas temperatures may be near-ambient, 
since flames are not directly washing against the window and there is 
a convective cooling flow along the surface. 
 
The focus of the current research is on the first type of exposure. 
B.4 Types of breaking mechanisms 
The thermal breaking mechanism of glass can be categorized in the following 
categories [20]:  
- Intensive heat flux: if an intense heat flux is suddenly applied on one 
side of a glass pane, a steep thermal gradient will be created across 
the thickness of the layer. This phenomenon is called ‘’thermal 
shock’’ and causes thermal stresses which could break the pane; 
- Thermal gradient: a thermal gradient over the thickness of the pane 
will cause the planar plane to deform. The boundary conditions (edge 
conditions, glass type etc.) will cause stresses which are larger in the 
corners of the plane. These stresses could become particularly high in 
very small panes, controversially for the larger panes which are more 
flexible; 
- Non-uniform heating: thermal stresses and tension will occur when 
the glass pane is not uniformly heated. This situation occurs when 
parts of the glass are shaded from radiation, which is the case for the 
shielded edge of the window by the shading of the frame. As a result, 
the maximum stress will always occur at the rim of the pane. The non- 
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uniform heating between the central glass pane and the shaded area 
will be addressed in this study as the temperature difference (ΔT). 
 
Besides the higher stresses along the edges of the pane, the area can also 
contain micro cracks due to the cutting process. These manufacturing 
imperfections can also contribute to cracks and eventual early fallout of the 
entire window. The non-uniform heating is in practice the most normative 
parameter during a fire. Additionally, pressure variations could also potentially 
affect the failure of glass planes. However, the influence of pressure lies 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
B.5 Literature 
Most research has been done regarding glass breakage of single glazed 
windows. These types of windows are applicable for inner windows between 
rooms and hallways. Double and triple glass are used in the building envelop 
and for inner windows for safety purposes.  
B.5.1 Single float glass 
The earliest guidance to be found in the literature on the question of when glass 
breaks out in fires comes from the Russian researcher Roytman [21] who notes 
that a room gas temperature of around 300°C is needed to lead to glass 
breakage.  
In [22], a series of experiments in a half-scale fire test room using 0.9 x 1.6 m 
single-glazed windows where they created a natural top-to-bottom temperature 
gradient in the room and in the glass. At the time the first crack occurred in 4 
or 6 mm thick glass panes, gas temperatures in the upper layer of 323-467°C 
were recorded. By the end of their 20 min tests, gas temperatures were at ca. 
500°C. Yet in only 1 of 6 tests there was there any fall-out of glass. 
Temperature differences between the glass exposed surface and the shielded 
portion ranged between 125°C to 146°C at the time of crack initiation. These 
temperatures were about twice that predicted from the no-vertical-gradient 
theories. The authors do not give the exact room fire temperature at which the 
glass fall-out began in the one test where this occurred, but this had to be higher 
than 431°C (crack initiation) and lower than ca. 450°C (end of test). One can 
put these data together, then, to conclude that at a room gas temperature of 
around 450°C the probability is 1/6 for glass to break out. In [23], further tests 
were conducted using a room with three windows glazed with 6 mm thick 
panes. Glass fell out when the exposed surface temperature reached 415 – 
486°C on the average. But there was quite a lot of variability and individual 
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values ranged from 278 to 615°C at failure. It required a heat flux of around 
35 kW m-2 for fall-out to occur. In a follow-on test series [24] it was noted that 
the lowest temperature of the glass at fall-out was 447°C. 
B.5.2 Single tempered glass 
Small scale tests have shown that heat strengthened and tempered glass 
survived 43 kW/m2 for 20 min without breaking while reaching temperatures 
of 350°C [25]. In large scale tests with panes up to 0.91 x 1.5 m2 no cracking 
occurred up to 29.2 kW/m2 [26]. 
Unlike common float glass, tempered glass falls out upon cracking and does 
not exhibit a cracked-but-still-in-place condition. This is due to the large 
stresses induced in the glass [27].  
On the basis of experiments [28] of the breakage behaviours of toughened glass 
with thicknesses of 6 and 10 mm, it is suggested that a critical temperature 
difference, between the inner and outer pane, is required for the crack and 
fallout of toughened glass with a certain thickness. The results from the 
experiments show critical temperature difference for the 6mm-thick toughened 
glass of about 330-380°C. For 10-mm-thick toughened glass, a critical 
breakage temperature difference of approximately 470-590°C is measured. It 
was observed that flashover conditions need to occur in order for the tempered 
glass to break. The 6 mm glass required around a 330-380°C temperature 
difference to fail, while for the 10 mm thick glass it was 470-590°C [28]. 
From research it was concluded that tempered glass is not likely to break out 
until after room flashover has been reached [27]. 
In case of large glass panes, caution should be taken when using the discussed 
data. Safety margins should be taken into account or special measures should 
be implemented to reduce the thermal stresses in the window pane.  
B.5.3 Double layered glass 
Double-glazed (or triple-glazed) windows can be expected to survive much 
longer in a fire without breaking out [29]. The spectral radiant absorption 
characteristics of window glass are such that there is a very high transmission 
within a certain wavelength region that encompasses the visible and the near 
infrared parts of the spectrum. Outside of this region, glass is essentially 
opaque. Thus, in a double-glazed window, the radiation transmitted through 
the first pane is transmitted only in the spectral regions where the second pane 
also shows nearly no absorptivity. The consequence is that the second pane is 
not appreciably heated as the first pane is warming up. This behaviour means 
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that the second pane will probably never break out in a fire of short duration 
or will break out much later in a long fire. Experimental results confirm this 
reasoning. Shields, Silcock and Hassani [30] exposed two sizes of double-
glazed windows to room fires. The glass thickness was 6 mm. The room fire 
reached a peak of 750°C and no glazing fell out up to the peak. However, 
during the decay part of the fire, in one of 3 tests with the larger-size window 
(0.8 x 1.0 m) fall-out of the inner pane occurred at 21 min, when the 
temperature had dropped to 500°C. Glass did not ever fall out from the outer 
pane, nor did any fall-out occur in the smaller (0.8 x 0.5 m) window, nor did 
any fall-out occur in the other two tests. In another test [31] involving double-
glazed windows with 6 mm-thick panes, the authors found that a heat flux of 
around 70 - 110 kW m-2 was needed to cause a substantial amount of both panes 
to fall out and a through-opening to thereby be created in a 0.85 x 1.9 m high 
window. A smaller, 0.85 x 0.85 m window, however, broke out its second pane 
a long time after the heat flux peak had been reached and the fire had 
substantially decayed. 
The Loss Prevention Council of the UK [32] studied room fires which were 
providing fire exposure to a multi-story facade test rig. Double-glazed 
windows were examined, with each pane being 6 mm thick. Using 3 MW wood 
crib fires, it was found that temperatures of at least 600°C had to be sustained 
for 8 - 10 min before glass started falling out sufficiently so that fire venting 
would occur. When tests were repeated using a fully-furnished office room 
arrangement, however, glass broke out at 5 min after the start of fire. In that 
test, the temperature was also about 600°C at the time of failure, but occurred 
immediately as the temperature was reached. Thus, the findings lead to the 
conclusion that double-glazed windows using 6 mm thick glass will fail at ca. 
600°C and that, if the fuel load is significant, the failure may be expected to 
occur essentially at the instant that 600°C is first reached. 
In other large scale tests [26], double-glazed windows (panes up to 0.91 x 1.5 
m2), they found that fluxes between 20 and 30 kW m-2 were required to cause 
fall-out in both panes. 
From experiments [33] with double and triple (4 mm) glazing was observed 
that the double glazing assembly did not experience major glass fallout before 
a gas temperature of 350°C. These results are in the same trend as discussed 
above. The composition with triple glazing did not experience major glass 
fallout before a gas temperature of 450°C (Figure B.1). For both type of 
experiments an average of no more than 50% of the glass fell out. However, in 





Figure B.1: Average glass fallout as a function of gas temperature. Taken 
from [33]. 
B.5.4 Double glazed curtain wall systems 
In the past decade, several high-rise buildings were constructed with curtain 
wall systems because glass curtain wall systems have low costs and give a good 
visual effect. In these cases, breakage mechanisms can be divided into two 
different thermal stress. The first mechanism is due to thermal stress of the 
glass by temperature differences in glass. The second is due to thermal 
deformation of the frame. 
B.6 Suggested parameters 
Based on the literature study, critical gas temperature with associated glass fall 
out is suggested in Table B.1.  
Table B.1: Suggested critical gas temperatures and fall out for different 
window types and thicknesses. 











Single float 4 50% 360 - [34] 
Single float 6 50% 450 35  [24] 
Single tempered 6 100% Flashover 43 [27] 
Double layered 4 50% 375 25 [33] 
Double layered 6 50% 600 35 [32] 
Triple layered 4 20% 475 30 [33] 
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C HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 
The objective of this section is to investigate the main aspects of human 
behaviour during emergency evacuation. The primary focus of human 
behaviour in fire research and its application in evacuation modelling is to 
minimize the risk to people from fire. It is a much investigated and discussed 
matter that is still in an early stage of development [35–39]. The purpose of 
implementation of human behaviour in risk and evacuation models is to give a 
more accurate representation of evacuation behaviour during fire and model 
the delays that go with it.  
Research has shown that human behaviour aspects can cause for significant 
delays and increase exposure during evacuation [37,40]. Current state of the 
art models try to take into account the main behavioural factors such as 
response to fire cues, affiliation, interaction with fire, route mapping, etc. In 
all these cases, simplified models are developed due to limited research, lack 
of computational power and to make the models practical for projects.  
In the next sections, several important aspects with respect to human behaviour 
in emergencies are discussed. First, the main human behaviour influence 
factors are discussed. Secondly, behavioural uncertainty is discussed. Next, the 
focus is put on two important parts of human behaviour modelling. These are 
occupant response (pre-movement time) and exit choice modelling. 
C.1 Human behaviour influence factors  
In order to properly address the impact of human behaviour in fire. The most 
important influence factors are analysed. A brief review is given below: 
- Environmental influence factors: Building layout and situational 
conditions (e.g. smoke, lighting, etc.) impact both behaviour and 
movement [41,42].  
- Social influence: The influence of others and social norms have 
proven to cause delays in evacuation behaviour [43,44]. 
- Activity: focus and awareness are key factors to observe and interpret 
cues [35]. 
- Individual characteristics: The perception and assessment of cues are 
individual characteristics of occupants. Perception also depends on 
physical and cognitive abilities [38,41]. 
- Affiliation: Both social (group) and place affiliation are important 
factors to determine pre-movement time and exit choice [45–47] [48].  
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- Role and function: The influence of role and leadership have 
important impact on the occupant himself and others to start 
evacuation and exit choice [45], [46].  
C.2 Behavioural uncertainty 
Two sources of behavioural uncertainties have been defined: intrinsic 
behavioural uncertainty, and perceptions and preferences behavioural 
uncertainty [49]. Intrinsic behavioural uncertainty captures the fact that (a) the 
choices taken by different decision-makers perceiving a situation in the same 
way may be different (i.e. evacuees having the same risk perception of 
evacuation scenarios can act differently depending on their risk aptitude); and 
(b) the same decision-makers could choose different actions when they face 
the same situation at different times. Perceptions and preferences behavioural 
uncertainty is related to different decision-makers’ perceptions (i.e. different 
decision-makers can have different quantitative estimates of the same factor) 
and preferences (i.e. a certain factor may have different importance to different 
evacuees) concerning the variables that influence the choice. Therefore, the 
source of behavioural uncertainty explains why evacuees/pedestrians do not 
always make the same decisions under the same circumstances. 
C.3 Human behaviour and affiliation 
Only little data is available on affiliation towards familiar exits during 
emergencies in case of fire. The most important experimental results regarding 
exit choice is discussed below. Experiments preceded by a number are already 
elaborated in the section on pre-movement times. Only the relevant 
information regarding exit choice is repeated.  
1. Retail area (2000) [50]: From experiments in large retail areas in England it 
was observed that between 61% and 72% of the occupants chose a familiar exit 
when no additional safety measures were implemented. When additional safety 
measures were taken, in this case guidance of staff (50% alerted by staff) and 
automatically opening of emergency exit doors, the majority of the people 
tended to evacuate towards the closest exit.  
2. Furniture warehouse area (2001) [51]: Unannounced evacuation 
experiments were performed in three different Swedish IKEA warehouses with 
low occupant densities. People tend to use known exits in a very high degree. 
Many customers, therefore, walked very long distances before they came to an 
open exit. There were cases where people moved more than 75 meters even if 
they initially stood next to an emergency exit. In the evacuation from the 
Älmhult store some particular emergency exits were used by a high number of 
customers. What distinguish these exits from other emergency exits is that they 
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are located so they face the customers as they walk along the path in the 
warehouse. The exits are in the line of sight and clearly visible as the customers 
arrive to the area. 
6. Industry with office (2007) [52]: During experiments in an industry hall with 
offices was observed that the majority of the people chose the nearest exit. 
Only a very small part of the occupants chose the further familiar main exit. 
The reason for the observed exit was that the low population density and the 
occupants were properly trained and familiar with the exits.  
7. Office and cinema (2008) [43]: From experiments in an office building and 
a cinema theatre it was observed that the majority of the occupants chose a 
familiar (main) exit (>80% for office and 100% for cinema) when no additional 
safety measures were implemented. When green flashing lights were 
implemented near the exits, more people were attracted to the emergency exits 
with flashing lights. The effect in the office building with high familiarity was 
limited. Only a small increase of 11% to 19% was observes. The effect in the 
cinema with low familiarity was significant. An increase from 0% to 100% 
was observed. This could indicate that the safety measure flashing lights is 
more affective for non-familiar occupant types. For familiar occupant types 
other measures such as training could be more affective. 
8. Hotel (2010) [42]: From experiments in a hotel it was observed that during 
evacuation trails without smoke people tend to take familiar exits (55%). While 
in similar trials with smoke people tend to go to the nearest exit (64%). In a 
third scenario with smoke and improved exit signage, it was observed that the 
majority of the people took the closets exit (75%). This could indicate that the 
perception of risk, related to smoke present, has an important impact on exit 
choice. Secondly, the effect of properly designed signage has an important 
impact on exit choice.  
University (2013) [53]: During evacuation experiments in a university it was 
observed that people tend to evacuate towards the familiar route (>90%) when 
they are unaware of other available routes. When they are more familiar with 
the other exits they tend to evacuate towards the closest exit.  
University (2016) [54]: Evacuation experiments were performed in a 
university building. Results showed that people tend to evacuate towards the 
familiar staircase (62-87%). However, the impact of changing the 
configuration of alarm was significant.   
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C.4 Occupant pre-evacuation modelling 
C.4.1 General 
The purpose of most building occupant response sub-models is to take into 
account the pre-movement time of these occupants by providing a proper 
representation of the occupants’ responses and actions during a fire evacuation 
emergency. The response of these occupants to a fire represents a complex 
interaction between the occupant behaviour, the physical environment and the 
development of the fire. In the past, it was assumed that people evacuate a 
building immediately upon hearing an alarm bell or seeing smoke [55]. These 
explanations of occupant evacuation motivation were based on stimulus and 
response theory. Psychological studies from past decades have illustrated that 
motivation is not produced by discrete factors but is derived from information 
processing and decision making [56–59]. Occupants are alerted by different 
cues such as auditory, visual, olfactory and tactual cues. They then become 
involved in the process of information search, interpretation and appraisal, and 
decision making from which evacuation may emerge as the coping strategy 
[60,61].  
C.4.2 Importance of pre-evacuation time 
The pre-movement time is an important parameter in the deterministic model 
because it will may have a significant impact on the total evacuation time 
[42,60,62–65]. From experiments and incidents it was found that the pre-
movement response times following central alarm sounding accounted up to 
2/3 of the total evacuation times [47,66]. Therefore, in the next sections, a 
literature review is conducted regarding sub-models and calculation methods 
to determine the pre-movement time based on occupant response behaviour. 
C.4.3 Main factors influencing pre-evacuation time  
The pre-evacuation time is generally dependent on the nature of the occupancy, 
the state of the occupants, the quality of the management system, the type of 
alarm system in place, even the time of day and the presence of additional 
supporting cues such as the presence of smoke or instructions from a member 
of staff. 
C.4.4 Statistical data  
Various studies and experiments have been conducted to assess pre-movement 
times in different buildings types. A brief review of several relevant 
experiments and research studies concerning public buildings is given below.  
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1. Multifunctional retail area (2000) [50]: Experiments were performed in four 
English retail stores of M&S with an average occupancy of 518 customers. 
During the experiments on average 81% of the occupants were females, 61% 
was between 15-65 years, 64% was accompanied and 98% visited the shop 
more than once. It was observed that the most people needed multiple cues to 
evacuate. About 33% of the occupants only needed one cue, i.e. the alarm bell 
(Type W3 [67]), to understand the seriousness of the situation. Others needed 
prompting by staff or needed to see others evacuating. Average pre-movement 
times between 25 s and 37 s were observed. 
2. Furniture retail area (2001) [51]: Unannounced evacuation experiments 
were performed in three different Swedish IKEA warehouses with low 
occupant densities of less than 1 occ. per 20 m2. The evacuations were initiated 
by a normal escape alarm in each warehouse. All escape alarms were assisted 
by pre-recorded messages with information about what the customers should 
do. The pre-movement time was considered low, less than one minute as an 
average value. Most customers responded within a 30 second period. People 
staying in the cash desk queue showed a longer pre-movement time, as they 
were more reluctant to leave the place in the queue.   
3. University lecture building (2001) [68]: Three unannounced evacuation 
trials were performed in New-Zealand University buildings. Occupant loads 
varied from 278 for the single-story building to 716 occupants for the eight-
story building. The buildings were equipped with an alarm and voice 
communication system. Average pre-movement times were recorded between 
19 s and 38 s.  
4. University library (2003) [69]: An unannounced trial evacuation of an 
English university facility was performed. 361 occupants (90% students) were 
present with an average density of 1 occ./10 m2. The university employed a 
procedure whereby once the alarm sounded nominated members of staff swept 
each of the rooms. It was found that pre-movement times ranged from around 
10 to 200 seconds. The greatest proportion (54%) of individuals undertook two 
actions prior to commencing to evacuate. Of the remainder, 28% completed 
one or no actions, and 18 % completed three or more. The range of prior actions 
analysed comprised of: evacuate immediately, perform a computer shutdown, 
disengage socially, collect items, including bags, coats, paperwork etc. and 
investigate the incident. Additional findings: 
- The Pre-evacuation time is strongly linked to the role of the occupant. 
Staff warning students have longer pre-movement times (µ = 85 s σ 
= 65 s) than staff considered to evacuate immediately (µ = 32 s σ = 
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60 s). The most important aspect of this analysis is that the staff pre-
evacuation distribution can be further refined, according to their role. 
- Several students needed to be encouraged in order to evacuate. 52% 
of the students did not need prompting (µ=65 s), 10% needed 
prompting from other students (µ=92 s), 38% needed prompting from 
staff members (µ=82 s). The pre-movement time for these students 
was then dependent on the time taken for staff to reach the students 
in the course of completing their sweep of the building. The figure 
below, the pre-movement times are depicted in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure C.1: (a)Pre-evac. times and (b) Frequency distribution according to 
prompting. Taken from [69]. 
5. Hospital (2003) [69]: An announced evacuation experiment was performed 
in an English hospital department. The compartment contained 14 staff 
members and 19 non-ambulant patients (outpatients). The results showed that 
patients only started to evacuate after being prompted by the staff. The average 
patient pre-evacuation time was 59.1 seconds, while the staff members were 
seen to act after 45.0 seconds.  
6. Industry with office (2007) [52]: Experiments were performed in an industry 
hall with offices (NZ) containing 256 occupants (low density) with high 
familiarity and even proportion between male and female. Pre-evacuation 
times between 20 s and 180 s were estimated. The main indication for longer 
pre-evacuation times were due to focus and shutting down equipment. 
7. Database USTC (2009): A database was developed in China based on 
western data sets. The Database includes data on pre-movement times, exit 
choice, walking speeds, actions and delay, etc.  
8. Hotel (2010) [42]: Three experiments were conducted in a hotel in the 
Netherlands during night time with occupant groups between 24-39 people. 
The alarm was given by an individual telephone call in order to not awake any 
other participants. For the three experiments a mean pre-movement time of  
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103 s was observed. The main delay time was due to changing clothes and 
gathering of belongings. 
9. Database NRCC (2010) [70]: A database was developed to give an overview 
of pre-movement times in different occupancy types (office, hotel, stores, 
apartment, etc.) for different heights. For each data set, additional factors 
concerning cues prior knowledge, etc. was given.  
10. Database SFPE Handbook (2016) [71]: An extensive summary of pre-
movement times is presented in the SFPE handbook for fire engineering. For 
each event the most important results are discussed. 
C.4.5 Methods 
A great number of evacuation models have been developed to predict 
evacuation time [38]. In these models, movement dynamics have been fairly 
well modelled. However, pre-evacuation response behaviour is rarely 
explicitly modelled. Often the modeller needs to model pre-evacuation 
behaviour implicitly by implementing a pre-movement time. In general, five 
approaches are adopted to take model pre-evacuation behaviour. 
The first approach sets the pre-movement response time as a fixed value 
specified by the user, as used in Fluid Model [72] and Magnetic Model [73]. 
While this approach is fairly simple to perform, it completely ignores the 
probabilistic characteristics of the perceptions and actions of occupants and the 
effects of fire detection and alarm systems on perception time.  
The second approach specifies pre-movement response times as a distribution 
or a random number. This approach is used in models such as EvacuatioNZ  
[74]. The approach is an improvement with respect to the first approach. 
However, it is still not a general model since the effects of fire severity and fire 
detection and alarm systems on occupant response are not reflected. 
In the third method, the pre-evacuation behaviour is partially implicitly  
modelled. The model assumes that occupant response is probabilistically 
related to the perceived level of fire severity. This approach is used in risk 
models such as CRISP [75] and Evacsim [76]. While this approach is more 
advanced compared with the first and second method, aspects such as 
perception time, perception probability, random actions, and the effects of fire 
detection and alarm systems are not considered.  
The fourth approach involves the user assignment of sequences of pre-
evacuation actions. The simulated evacuees move to different parts of the 
simulated building to perform their activities. Each action has a pre-defined 
specific duration for each evacuee.  
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The fifth approach considers occupant response and evacuation as a result of a 
PIA process, i.e. Perception, Interpretation, and Action, which may interact 
with each other. It was proposed to be incorporated in a risk-cost assessment 
model [77]. This approach relates the variation of response probability with 
time to fire severity. According to the relationship between the occupant’s 
location and the compartment of fire origin, occupants in a building are 
classified into three groups, i.e. occupants in the compartment of fire origin, 
occupants in the same level as the compartment of fire origin, and occupants 
in other levels. Occupants perceptions consist of occupants' direct perception, 
warnings from fire detection and alarm systems, and warnings from other 
occupants and the fire department. Following  their perceptions, occupants will 
interpret their perceptions and take various actions including commencing 
evacuation. The calculation of the perceptions of occupants in all 
compartments is related to fire states in the compartment of fire origin. This 
may not be appropriate, as occupants generally perceive a fire from in their 
own environment. Additionally, the classification of occupants into three 
groups makes the approach not appropriate to be applied to buildings with 
more than two storeys.  
C.4.6 Decision models 
C.4.6.1 Traditional models 
Almost all modern numerical evacuation models require the implementation 
of a user pre-defined pre-evacuation time. This in the form of a constant value 
or distribution. From research it is observed that most evacuations models, 
despite the use of different distribution laws of probability, predict similar 
evacuation times [78]. 
C.4.6.2 Choice action model 
In [79] research was done identify the sequence of actions taken in different 
types of fires. Based on a study in the UK, decomposition diagrams were 
generated for various types of fire events that identify the sequence of actions. 
The study included results for domestic fires, multiple-occupancy fires and 
hospital fires. In the figure, the dashed circles indicate the acts which occurred 
with a lower frequency. The relationships between acts are indicated by 
arrows. The numbers next to an arrow refer to the strength of the association. 
The higher the association number, the greater the association is, i.e. the more 
likely it is that given the performance of one act, the next action will follow. 
The challenge of the model is to couple time delays to every event. Secondly, 
the probability of every event will depend on the occupant in relation to the 
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location of the fire. Occupants closer to the fire will have different response 
than occupants on another floor. 
C.4.6.3 CUrisk occupant response model 
The developers of the CUrisk developed an occupant response model to 
determine the pre-movement time for evacuation of apartment and office 
buildings. The model simulates the basic processes of human responses by 
implementing the concept of the PIA process, i.e. Perception, Interpretation 
and Action [77]. The processes of perception, interpretation and action interact 
with each other resulting eventually in the response of evacuating the building. 
The model calculates during each timestep the probability of evacuation for 
each occupant during each time step.  
An update of the occupant response model was done and discussed in [40]. 
Several improvements were implemented to give a better representation of 
reality. More specifically, detection data was replaced by heat detection 
calculations and probability data was updated based on statistical data. 
Additionally, delay times based on experiments were included.   
C.4.6.4 The PADM concept 
The Protection Action Decision Model (PADM) is a social psychological 
conceptual model [80]. The model provides an explanation of the meaning-
making process in crises to disaster situations. The model (Figure C.2), which 
is based on over 50 years of empirical studies of hazards, disasters and theories 
provides a framework that describes the information flow and decision-making 
that influences individual protective actions taken in response to natural and 
technological disasters. This framework shows that cues from the physical 
environment as well as information from the social environment (i.e. 
emergency messages or warnings), if perceived as indicating the existence of 
a threat, can interrupt normal activities of the recipient. Depending upon the 
perceived characteristics of the threat (e.g. assessments of risk to themselves 
or others), certain types of actions will be performed. The PADM is the 




Figure C.2: The Protective Action Decision Model. Taken from [80]. 
C.4.6.5 The EDK concept 
The Erica Dawn Kuligowski (EDK) concept is a pre-movement behaviour 
concept for developing egress behaviour [39,81–84]. The main focus of the 
EDK model was to understand the actions performed during the pre-evacuation 
period of the WTC disaster and the process by which evacuees decided upon 
these actions. The EDK concept gives guidelines for the model developer to 
which behaviours and models should be implemented for accounting the 
different occupant behavioural aspects. 
The EDK model was further developed in [39], to develop a general structure 
for the modelling of both the pre-evacuation and evacuation phase in case of 
fire. The translated EDK model is depicted in Figure C.3. The concept consists 
of three phases. The Cue Processing (CP), Situation Assessment (SA) and the 
Response Selection (RS) phase. External cues are provided to the Cue 
Processing phases in which the cues are assessed. If these cues are deemed 
credible the situation is interrogated. Depending on the experience of the agent, 
the threat is assessed or a direct response is generated. Next, the agent selects 
a response in the RS phase. During each timestep of the (pre-)evacuation, the 
model is constantly looped so that the output of the RS provides input for the 
external world and the CP phase.  
 
Figure C.3: Translated EDK model. Taken from [39]. 
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C.4.6.6 Evacuation Decision Model 
The Evacuation Decision model (EDM) is a pre-evacuation human behaviour 
that introduces a differential equation model calculating the level of perceived 
risk, which allows estimating the behavioural state of evacuees among three 
possible states, namely: normal, investigating and evacuating [85]. The 
differential equation defining the relation between perceived risk level	W1(:) 
and the cues is: 
Ṙ>(t) 	= f(n)R>(t)	 (C.1) 
where Ẇ1(:)	 is the rate of increase/decrease of perceived risk over time and f 
is a linear function of all the n environmental and social influence affecting the 
risk variation, which can vary over time. 
C.4.6.7 RUT evacuation decision-making model 
Random Utility Theory or RUT is the most common theoretical 
framework/paradigm, which has been used over the last 50 years to develop 
discrete choice models. In [86–88], a RUT model is developed for the 
simulation of (pre-)evacuation behaviour. The proposed model represents the 
evacuation behaviour of simulated occupants considering three behavioural 
states: normal, investigating and evacuating.  
The model is developed to take both deterministic and behavioural uncertainty 
into account. Therefore, it is assumed that the utility of each alternative for the 
decision-maker consists of two terms: a deterministic "1Ö and a random 
component ‰1Ö. The random utility is calculated: 
U>_ = V>_ +	ε>_ (C.2) 
The calculation of the two components is given in [49]. For each time step, 
each occupant revaluates the utility of every alternative exit and  adapts his 
choice depending on the circumstances.  
The model simulates the probability of choosing to start investigating and 
evacuating in relation to physical and social environmental factors as well as 
personal occupant characteristics. The main difference between the developed 
model and existing predictive-based models is that it is data-driven. The model 
is calibrated for a theatre compartment environment and shows good result. 
The disadvantage of the model is the lack of data and the fact that calibration 
is only valid for very specific circumstances.  
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C.5 Occupant exit choice modelling 
C.5.1 General 
The purpose of the occupant exit choice model is to determine the exit choice 
for every occupant in the building during emergency evacuation. In the past, 
exit choice was mainly an optimization problem. Models were designed to 
assign agents to a certain exit depending on the shortest travel time. These 
algorithms give the shortest evacuation times. However, research has shown 
that people do not always know all exits, or have a clear overview of the fastest 
route [49,89]. 
C.5.2 Importance of exit choice 
The selection of an emergency exit is an important parameter in evacuation 
modelling because it will may have a significant impact on the total evacuation 
time. From modelling research it was found that uneven distribution of exit 
selection can significantly increase [90,91].  
C.5.3 Main factors influencing exit choice  
In order to develop an exit choice simulator, a model should be developed that 
takes the most significant parameters into account. Past research has shown 
that the most important influential environmental factors for exit choice are 
distance from the exits, queuing time, fire conditions (e.g. visibility of an exit) 
and indication by emergency lighting [41]. Different types of social influences 
can also affect exit choice leading to different behaviours: herding behaviour, 
leader-follower behaviour, cooperative behaviour and competitive/selfish 
behaviour [92]. Besides the environmental and social factors, personal factors 
can affect exit choice. The most influential personal factor is the familiarity of 
the decision-maker with an exit (place affiliation) [93].  
C.5.4 Statistical data 
Only little data is available on affiliation towards familiar exits during 
emergencies in case of fire. The most important experimental results regarding 
exit choice is discussed below. Experiments preceded by a number are already 
elaborated in the section on pre-movement times. Only the relevant 
information regarding exit choice is repeated.  
1. Retail area (2000) [50]: From experiments in large retail areas in England it 
was observed that between 61% and 72% of the occupants chose a familiar exit 
when no additional safety measures were implemented. When additional safety 
measures were taken, in this case guidance of staff (50% alerted by staff) and 
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automatically opening of emergency exit doors, the majority of the people 
tended to evacuate towards the closest exit.  
2. Furniture warehouse area (2001) [51]: Unannounced evacuation 
experiments were performed in three different Swedish IKEA warehouses with 
low occupant densities. People tend to use known exits in a very high degree. 
Many customers, therefore, walked very long distances before they came to an 
open exit. There were cases where people moved more than 75 meters even if 
they initially stood next to an emergency exit. In the evacuation from the 
Älmhult store some particular emergency exits were used by a high number of 
customers. What distinguish these exits from other emergency exits is that they 
are located so they face the customers as they walk along the path in the 
warehouse. The exits are in the line of sight and clearly visible as the customers 
arrive to the area. 
3. Industry with office (2007) [52]: During experiments in an industry hall with 
offices was observed that the majority of the people chose the nearest exit. 
Only a very small part of the occupants chose the further familiar main exit. 
The reason for the observed exit was that the low population density and the 
occupants were properly trained and familiar with the exits.  
4. Office and cinema (2008) [43]: From experiments in an office building and 
a cinema theatre it was observed that the majority of the occupants chose a 
familiar (main) exit (>80% for office and 100% for cinema) when no additional 
safety measures were implemented. When green flashing lights were 
implemented near the exits, more people were attracted to the emergency exits 
with flashing lights. The effect in the office building with high familiarity was 
limited. Only a small increase of 11% to 19% was observes. The effect in the 
cinema with low familiarity was significant. An increase from 0% to 100% 
was observed. This could indicate that the safety measure flashing lights is 
more affective for non-familiar occupants’ types. For familiar occupant types 
other measures such as training could be more effective. 
5. Hotel (2010) [42]: From experiments in a hotel it was observed that during 
evacuation trails without smoke people tend to take familiar exits (55%). While 
in similar trials with smoke people tend to go to the nearest exit (64%). In a 
third scenario with smoke and improved exit signage, it was observed that the 
majority of the people took the closets exit (75%). This could indicate that the 
perception of risk, related to smoke present, has an important impact on exit 
choice. Secondly, the effect of properly designed signage has an important 
impact on exit choice.  
300 Appendix 
 
6. University (2013) [53]: During evacuation experiments in a university it was 
observed that people tend to evacuate towards the familiar route (>90%) when 
they are unaware of other available routes. When they are more familiar with 
the other exits they tend to evacuate towards the closest one.  
7. University (2016) [54]: Evacuation experiments were performed in a 
university building. Results showed that people tend to evacuate towards the 
familiar staircase (62-87%). However, the impact of changing the 
configuration of alarm was significant.   
C.5.5 Methods 
In literature, three methods exist for exit choice modelling in evacuation 
models [49]: 
- Agents (i.e. simulated evacuees) head towards exits predefined by the 
modeller (e.g. Pathfinder [94]) 
- Agents choose the closest exit (e.g. Simulex [95]) 
- Agents choose the exit considering environmental, social and 
personal factors (e.g. STEPS [96,97] JuPedSim [98], Building 
EXODUS) 
The first method is the most basic because it does not consider any evolution 
of the evacuating scenarios and the choice is a user input rather than an output 
of the model. In the second method, the choice is context-dependent. However, 
it is static and only based on the building layout. The third and most complex 
approach considers that each agent evaluates the features of the simulated 
environment and takes decisions based on the perceived information. In these 
models, the chosen exit can change during the evacuation process if the 
evacuation conditions change and a range of factors can be considered (e.g. 
presence of smoke, visibility, familiarity with an exit). The simplest and most 
common model of the third category is the time-based one, in which the agents 
choose the exit th at requires the lowest evacuation time [38].  
A second classification of exit choice models is the difference between 
deterministic and stochastic approaches. Deterministic approaches have been 
derived from different decision theories, such as the game theory [99] or the 
utility maximisation theory [98]. The advantage of deterministic models is that 
they are efficient and reasonable accurate. The disadvantage is that they can 
only represent average behaviours. Stochastic models take the uncertainty of 
different parameters into account. In [100], an exit choice model as introduced 
in which the ‘base probability’ of using an exit is defined by the modeller. A 
second example is the Random Utility Theory  (RUT) model developed in [49] 
which combines deterministic with random choice to take uncertainty into 
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account. In the next paragraphs, analysis is done of several evacuation models 
and a literature study is performed regarding data with respect to exit choice. 
C.5.6 Exit Choice models 
C.5.6.1 Traditional models 
The majority of modern numerical evacuation models requires the 
implementation of a user pre-defined exit selection in form of an exit 
familiarity (distribution) or unavailability (locked or smoke blockage). From 
research has observed that most evacuations models using this method predict 
similar evacuation times despite the use of different distribution laws of 
probability [78]. Examples of these models are JuPedSim, Pathfinder, Steps, 
etc. 
C.5.6.2 MASSEgress model 
The exit choice algorithm in MASSEgress is a rule based model taking 
multiple rules into account depending on the stress level [101]. When a low 
stress level is assigned, the occupant checks for the shortest familiar exit. If not 
found, the agent explores and takes the shortest exit. Under high stress levels, 
herding behaviour will become more important than familiarity. 
C.5.6.3 SCT model 
Social Comparison Theory Fridman proposed a theoretically-based crowd 
modelling algorithm whose development was inspired by Festinger’s social 
comparison theory (SCT). The agents within this model base their decisions 
on the desire to be in and act as a group through comparison of their 
actions/attributes with those around them adjusting them accordingly  [102]. 
Therefore, the behavioural driver is convergence to the social environment 
rather than an assessment of the perceived influence of the social, physical, 
procedural and environmental conditions. 
C.5.6.4 FDS+EVAC model 
In the FDS+EVAC model exit choice is based on four criteria: fastest route, 
visibility, familiarity of the exit and fire conditions [37]. The agents select an 
exit with the smallest preference number based on the familiarity and visibility. 
If two or more exits share the smallest preference, the decision between these 
is made by minimizing the estimated evacuation time. It is assumed that people 
change their course of action only if there is an alternative that is clearly better 
than the current choice, i.e. when an exit becomes visible or smoke appears 
from an exit. 
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C.5.6.5 Building EXODUS 
The buildingEXODUS evacuation model is a grid based model composed of 
five core interacting models [89,103] These are the Occupant, Movement, 
Behaviour, Toxicity and Hazard models. In the behaviour model, the exit 
choice sub-model is implemented. The sub-model choses the fastest exit out of 
a set of predefined known exits. During the evacuation simulation, for every 
timestep, the occupant re-evaluates his/her exit choice based on the influence 
of dynamic factors such as population size and environmental factors (smoke 
signage, etc). The occupant may redirect due to higher expected queuing times 
or unavailability due to smoke. For a thorough appraisal to take place, the 
occupant has to be in visual contact with the exit, to examine the surrounding 
population, environmental conditions, etc. If the exit is not within visual range, 
the occupant has to rely solely on his recollection of exit details from memory, 
such as position and distance, or possibly from information communicated to 
them from the surrounding population or from a procedural influence such as 
an intelligent alarm system.  
C.5.6.6 RUT Model 
In the RUT framework, the decision-maker assigns to each route or exit an 
utility. The option with the highest utility is more likely to be chosen.  
The validation results of case studies show that the method provides more 
accurate predictions of local exit choice. On the other hand, important factors 
such as number and position of the exits, affiliation, etc are not considered. 
Additionally, the model is only validated for very specific cases. 
C.5.6.7 JuPedSim 
The exit choice model in JuPeSim [98,104] applies a combination of the 
shortest and quickest path algorithm. The pedestrians are first routed using the 
shortest path, global or local depending on their knowledge about the location. 
Depending on the visibility of an exit, familiarity, travel time and queueing 
time a cost benefit analysis is performed to determine whether the occupant 
should reroute its exit choice. The algorithm is being extended by means of 
interaction of smoke [105]. Exits blocked by smoke are less favoured than 
other exits depending on the optical density of the smoke.  
C.5.6.8 Real-time evacuation model 
A real-time evacuation model was developed for sparsely populated enclosures 
such as industry halls [106]. The implemented model determines the most 
optimal evacuation based on the route that produces the minimum evacuation 
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time, while keeping occupants away from the hazard. The advantage of the 
model is that it takes the location of the fire into account. The disadvantage is 






D SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
D.1 The purpose of sensitivity analysis in fire safety 
engineering 
Challenging building designs and complex regulations drive engineers towards 
quantitative risk analysis (QRA). An important aspect of quantitative risk 
methods concerns taking into account the variability of the design parameters. 
In QRA for life safety in case of fire, one of the main reasons to take probability 
and variability into account is to analyse a sufficient number of deterministic 
fire scenarios in order to give an acceptable representation of reality. These 
objectives implicate two key research challenges, i.e. the extensive number of 
different variables and the complexity of the multiple submodels. It is of 
importance to determine the most influencing input parameters. Therefore, a 
significant part of the risk assessment is the preceding sensitivity analysis 
(SA). This is expected in order to reduce the number of variables within the 
submodels. In the present study, several methods are suggested which are able 
to deal with high demanding computational models. Focus is put on SA 
methods from other fields of research. The evolution from calculating the 
elementary effects with the Morris method towards radial design with Sobol 
sampling is investigated.  
D.2 Introduction to sensitivity analysis 
Generally, sensitivity analysis (SA) are performed to determine how 
uncertainty in the model output can be attributed to different sources of 
uncertainty in the model input [107]. The main objective of the preceding 
sensitivity analysis in fire safety risk assessment is to reduce the dimensionality 
of the problem formulation [108,109]. The larger the number of random 
variables, the more the increase in the amount of necessary solver evaluations. 
Considering the computational effort of several submodels, such as CFD and 
evacuation models, the dimensionality of several submodels needs to be 
reduced.  
Before discussing different techniques in sensitivity analysis. Two main types 
can be considered [107,110,111]: 
- Local sensitivity analysis is carried out to determine the local impact 
of parameters in the model (Figure D.1). The partial derivatives of the 
output function are determined with respect to each input parameter. 
This can be analytical or numerical by means of One at a Time (OAT) 
measures. Usually, local SA is practicable only when the variation 
around representative values of the input factors is small. The main 
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drawback of this approach is that interactions among factors cannot 
be detected, since they become evident when the inputs are changed 
simultaneously. A possible way to overcome this problem is to 
include multi-dimensional averaging of local effects [112–114]. This 
type of analysis will not be used because the local effects will be 
modelled with the discussed surrogate model. The results of these 
experiments can be visualised in tornado diagrams [115]. 
- In global sensitivity analysis, the emphasis is on apportioning the 
output uncertainty to the uncertainty of the input factors. Global 
measures offer a comprehensive approach to model analysis, since 
they evaluate the effect of a factor while all others are varying as well, 
exploring efficiently all dimensions of the input space. A wide range 
of global SA methods is available, ranging from qualitative screening 
methods [112,116,117] to quantitative techniques based on variance 
decomposition [118,119]. Secondly, techniques can be used to 
determine interaction effects between input factors. This is important 
to completely assess the model prediction. The former mentioned 
method aims at giving an indication of the correlation effects between 
input parameters. 
 
Figure D.1: Schematic decomposition of the responses for the one-
dimensional case. The dotted line represents the smoothed responses. Taken 
from [120]. 
The choice of an appropriate sensitivity analysis technique depends on several 
factors [121]: 
- Computational cost of running the model: CFD models take much 
more time than zone or network models. 
- The number of input factors: In early stage of the design many factors 
are possibly of interest. Factorial and screening design can be used to 
determine the most important parameters.  
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- The degree of complexity of the model coding. 
- The amount of analyst’s time involved in the sensitivity analysis. 
- The objective of (the analysis (e.g., factors’ fixing, mapping, etc.).   
In Figure D.2, a graphical representation is given for choosing an appropriate 
type of sensitivity method. At the first stage of the analysis, the model is 
located in the top right corner of the graph because of the high number of 
variables and the extensive computational time per evaluation. The suggested 
automated differentiation is not suitable for numerical models such as CFD. 
This because of the time and geometry dependence and the implicit problem 
formulation of the submodel equations [122,123]. Fractional factorial as used 
in [124] is a possibility however, a high number of solver evaluations would 
be necessary to have an interest in interaction effects. Therefore, a radial design 
and/or screening designs is suggested. In the next chapters, this type will be 
analysed. After reducing the number of variables, the type can be switched to 
meta-modelling in order to perform reliability analysis on the studied models. 
In [110] variance based methods are investigated. However, the application 
was studied on zone-models which are significantly less computationally 
expensive in comparison to CFD models. 
Another way to deal with the issue of computational  effort is to initially use 
simplified models (Chapter V). The location shifts in Figure D.2 then form top 
right to top middle.  
 
Figure D.2: Representation of the balance between sensitivity analysis and 
computational efficiency. Taken from [121]. 
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D.3 The elementary effects methodology 
The elementary effect method (EE) is a simple but effective factor screening 
method which can be used for computational affording models [125]. This 
because the total number of runs is a linear function of the number of examined 
factors. This in contrast to other schemes such as fractional factorial design or 
central composite design. The method is considered as good practice by 
experts in the field [111]. 
D.3.1 Methodology 
D.3.1.1 The Morris method 
The method is designed by Morris [112] and is composed of individual 
randomized  designs, in which the impact of changing the value of each factor 
is evaluated in turn. The region of experimentation Ω	is a k-dimensional unit 
cube (standardized) over which the input vector x is uniformly distributed. This 
is achieved by means of the probability integral transformation [126]. In the 
simulation each of the components xi takes one of the p values 
{0, 1/(É–1), 2/(É–1),…	,1} with equal probability. Morris defines the 
elementary effect of the ith factor at a given point x as: 
	ˇ 1̌ = 	
Œ(25, … , 21y5, 21 + ∆, 21ö5, … , 2b) − Œ(å)
∆
 (D.1) 
with Δ a predetermined multiple of 1/(É–1)	and x is any value in c	selected 
in such a way that the perturbed point å + d is still in c. Δ can be chosen as 
1/[2(É–1)]. This choice has the advantage that, although the design sampling 
strategy does not guarantee equal-probability sampling from distribution, at 
least a certain symmetric treatment of inputs is ensured [116,125]. The 
distribution of elementary effects can be denoted as 1̃ and can be obtained for 
the /De	input factor is by sampling 2 from c. The mean μ and standard 



















where . is the number of trajectories. A high mean indicates 	a factor with an 
important overall influence on the output. A high standard deviation indicates 
either a factor interacting strongly with other factors or a nonlinear factor. The 
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main disadvantage of the method is that individual interactions among factors 
cannot be estimated. It can provide an overall measure of the interactions of a 
factor with the rest of the model, but it does not give specific information about 
the identity of the interactions. 
 
Figure D.3: Morris’s OAT design in k = 3 dimensions with p = 10 
trajectories. Taken from [112]. 
D.3.1.2 Improvement by Campolongo 
Campolongo et al. [116] proposed replacing the use of the mean μ with μ*, 
which is defined as the estimate of the mean of the distribution of the absolute 










The purpose of î∗	is to prevent Type II errors which fail to identify a factor 
with considerable influence on the model [116]. This in case the model is non-
monotonic or has interaction effects. 
D.4 Sampling strategy 
D.4.1 Basic strategy 
In order to estimate the sensitivity measures for the distributions Fi and Gi, the 
design needs to sample a number r of elementary effects from each Fi. In theory 
if the computation of each sampling point requires two sampling points, the 
design would require	2.? sample points. Morris suggested a more efficient 
design that builds r trajectories of ? + 1 points for the input space, each 
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providing elementary	? effects, which gives in total .(? + 1) evaluation 
points. The design produces a trajectory of (? + 1)	sampling points 
å(ì), å(∫), … , å(g+ ì) with the key properties that two consecutive points 
differ only in one dimension and that every dimension is addressed at least 
once to increase by d. An example of a trajectory for ?	 = 	3 is illustrated in 
Figure D.3. 
 The technical scheme to generate the sampling trajectories can be seen in the 
form of a matrix, h∗, with dimensions	(? + 1)	2	?, whose rows are the vectors 
x(1), x(2), …, x(k+1). The first step is to build the matrix h with same dimensions 
and holds 0’s and 1’s and the property that for every column index 
i, i	 = 	1, … ,?, there are two rows of h that differ only in the jth entry. A 







0 0 0 … 0
1 0 0 … 0
1 1 0 … 0
1 1 1 0 …






The matrix	h’ is given by  
h’ = lbö5,b	å∗ + ∆h (D.6) 
where lbö5,b	is a (k+1) x k matrix of 1’s and å∗ is a randomly chosen base 
value of +, is a potential candidate for the desired matrix, but it has the 
limitation that the	?De  elementary effect is produces would not be randomly 
selected. A randomized version of the sampling matrix is given by: 
h∗ = (lbö5,5	å∗ + X
∆
∫
Z mª∫h− lbö5,bºn∗ + lbö5,bo)	p∗ (D.7) 
Where n∗ is a k-dimensional diagonal matrix U which each element either +1 
or -1 with equal probability, and p is a k by k matrix random permutation 
matrix. 
D.4.2 Campolongo improvement by maximizing distance 
Campolongo [116] suggested an improvement of the sampling strategy which 
increases the scanning of the input domain without increasing the amount of 
solver evaluations. The trajectories are selected in a way to maximize their 
spread in the input space. The design is executed by first generating a high 
number of trajectories and then selecting the subset of r with the highest spread 




















Where k is the number of input factors and (v
(1)(Ï) indicates the zth coordinate 
of the ith point of the mth trajectory. dml is the sum of the geometric distances 
between all the pairs of points of two trajectories. The most optimal trajectories 
are selected by maximizing the distance dml between possible pairs of 
trajectories belonging to a certain combination. In the figure below, two 
samples are given of four trajectories in which the left figure shows a set of 
four random trajectories and the right figure shows an optimized subset from 
a larger set of trajectories. 
 
Figure D.4: (left) Original vs (right) optimized trajectory (p=4,r=4 & m=6). 
D.4.3 Suggested improvement by optimal spread of sample 
points 
After implementing the method, it is observed that using the optimization of 
Campolongo does not always give the most optimal configuration of the input 
trajectories. In the figure below, the optimization is used with all possible 
combinations. Due to the maximum distance criteria, the trajectories are 
pushed to the outside. This does not give a satisfying spread of input 
trajectories.  
In order to deal with the problem stated above, a second criterion is advised in 
which a penalty method is used to spread out the input trajectories. The method 
starts from an Optimal Grade Spread (OGS): 
Ky, =
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5  
Figure D.5: Optimized trajectory with all possible combinations (left) 
trajectories pushed to the outside (right) optimized trajectories with second 
criterion (p=4,r=4 & m=6). 
In the above equation, the numerator gives the total number of samples. Next, 
all possible combinations of trajectories are determined by r and m. For every 
combination of trajectories, each possible coordinate, determined by p, and 
each variable, the OGS is subtracted from the number of times that coordinate 
is used. From this, a penalty matrix ($DZ	2	1) is determined which gives the 
penalty for every possible combination of trajectories. 













Where #$0 is the number of combinations. The combination with the lowest 
penalty gives the most optimal spread. The quadratic exponent is used to 
optimize the spread. In practise, often, multiple combinations will give the 
lowest penalty score. Therefore, the criterion of Campolongo can be used as 
second criterion. In the figure above, the method is put into practise. In this 
way, the spread of coordinates is optimal. The left configuration gives a 
penalty of 8 and a maximum distance of 16.05 units while the right 
configuration gives a penalty of 0 and a maximum distance of 18.46 units. 
Because of this result for the maximum distance, the first criterion is 
recommended to be the penalty method. The method selects first the 
combination of trajectories based on the lowest penalty. In case multiple 
trajectories have equal lowest penalty, the second criterion of distance can be 
used.  
D.4.4 Graph theory sampling 
The original method doesn’t give a clear indication of second order effects. 
Campolongo [127] suggested an update to the Morris method. In addition to 
the ‘overall’ sensitivity measures, the new Morris method offers estimates of 
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mŒª2 + x1∆1 + x¢∆¢º − Œ(2)o
∆1∆¢
 (D.11) 
The local measure of the magnitude of the effects on the output, due to the 
interaction between the i-th and j-th input factors, is given by the two-factor 
interaction effects: 






ˇ ¢̌| (D.12) 
To determine these effects, the sampling strategy is revised and updated by 
means of the ‘handcuffed prisoners [127]. The method defines the sampling 
matrix in such a way that the interaction effects of each couple of variables can 
be determined (see figure).  
 
Figure D.6: The handcuffed prisoners method for sampling techniques [127]. 
D.4.5 Radial sampling 
Radial design has been firstly presented in [128] and further investigated in 
[111,129]. Both radial and the former discussed trajectory sampling (Morris) 
are represented in the table below. The table shows how, starting from the first 
row made of elements from matrix A, a step in the X1 direction (second row) 
is generated by drawing a row from the re-sample matrix A(1), where all entries 
are from A but the first which is from B. Likewise the third row is from matrix 
A(2), the fourth from A(3) and so on till the last row is selected from matrix A(k). 
In this way k steps have been generated in directions from X1 to Xk. All steps 
involve the first point (a1,1,a1,2,a1,3,...,a1,k). A full sensitivity analysis will be 
composed by N such blocks, the total cost of the analysis being thus Ntot = N(1 
+ k). From the described method can be concluded that a radial design is 
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nothing else than an iterated ‘One factor at a Time’ (OAT) approach. OAT is 
a radial design of size one.  
 
Table D.1: Difference between radial and trajectory sampling for k random 
variables. 




















The radial strategy can be combined with random sampling and one of the 
above motioned improvements in terms of maximizing distance. However, in 
[111], a sampling strategy based on Sobol’s numbers [130] is suggested. This 
sampling method allows performing screening experiments first and then, if 
the computational cost of the model allows it, moving towards a quantitative 
experiment without the need to discard any model run. In the figure below, the 
difference is shown between random sampling and Sobol sampling. From 
research has been shown that the Sobol’s sequences outperforms crude Monte-
Carlo sampling for estimation of multi-dimensional integrals [129]. 
 
Figure D.7: Random vs quasi-random sampling with Sobol. Adapted from 
[25]. 
The vector matrices }	and	~ for r repetitions are obtained by designing an r x 
2k Sobol matrix. The left half is used for matrix  and the right half is used for 
h. It is suggested to discard the first 4 rows of the auxiliary matrix h in order 
314 Appendix 
 
to prevent repetition in the coordinate samples [111]. In the figure below, an 
example input plot is shown for a two-dimensional case. Notice that compared 
to the Morris sampling strategy discussed before, the random points a and b 
are such that the steps taken by different factors can be different. 
 
Figure D.8: Input 'star' plot with Sobol sampling for k = 2. 
As mentioned above, unlike the traditional elementary effects method, in radial 
design each effect is computed over a different step size, equal to the distance 
between e.g. 2(Q)2(Q)) and 2()2(Q) which is to say the difference between x(u) 
and	2(), where u and v denote two rows of the sampling matrix chosen as 
described above. Under this notation, the absolute value of the elementary 
effect has been computed as [111]: 










(Ç) Ä (D.13) 
The measure î∗ can be taken as the average r of these effects. If the 
computational cost of the model allows it, the modeller can increase r, the 
number of repetitions, up to achieve a sample size compatible with the 
estimation of the Total sensitivity index (ST). In this case one must replace the 











The estimator for ST can be calculated by means of the Janssen estimator 
[131]: 
 
Appendix  315 
 











(¢), … , 01





D.4.6 Sobol filtering for analysing limit state design 
If a particular region in the space of the output, e.g. above or below a given 
threshold is of interest, then Monte Carlo filtering can be applied [107]. This 
is the case for the targeted situation with the aim for limit state design [132]. 
FED values close to and larger than unity are of interest. Therefore, it is not 
relevant to perform a sensitivity study on the entire input space. It is suggested 
to perform the sensitivity analysis with samples in the input space which obtain 
results for FED values between 0.9 and 1.1. No higher value because those 
sensitivities are not of relevance anymore because of high probability of 
fatality.  
The radial sampling method can be used for generating samples. However, 
samples not located in the expected region of interest (Figure D.9) should not 
be evaluated. The method starts with evaluating the sample y1. The result is 
not in the region of interest. Therefore, samples in the blue forward hatched 
zone will not be further evaluated. Similar, results higher than the forward red 
hatched zone will not be evaluated. This way, the zone of interest is analysed 
this will reduce the number of necessary solver iterations. 
 
Figure D.9: Sobol filtering method. 
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E PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORK 
DETAILED EXAMPLE 
In this part of the thesis, a worked out example is give of the framework 
discussed in Chapter IV and the challenging case study in Chapter VII. The 
different steps are discussed and elaborated more in detail. The fire safety 
design with sprinklers and smoke and heat control is chosen to elaborate. 
The start is chosen at step 5.1 of the probabilistic framework presented in figure 
IV.3. Three representative design scenarios are considered (Figure E.1): a fire 
in the open commercial area (1); a fire in a small storage room (2); and a fire 
in the restaurant (3). The main reason for the differentiation between 1 and 2 
is to consider different ventilation conditions and delayed second detection. 
Additional design scenarios can be a scenarios of fires in evacuation routes, 
staircases and technical rooms. For reasons of simplification, this is not 





Figure E.1: Example of the setting for three different design scenarios. 
For evacuation, only one main design scenarios are considered. This is a 
scenario where both the shopping mall and restaurant are open. Other scenarios 
with one out of two open are not considered in the analysis. 
The input variables (step 5.2) are all taken from table IV.1. For the restaurant 
and the storage rooms different fire growth rate, HRRPUA, Max area, 
occupant density and pre-evacuation time. 
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In step 5.3 the bow-tie model is developed. The bow-tie model for the design 
scenario retail is constructed from the following variables which are 
considered discrete variables:  
- Location: 3 locations per floor and 5 floors gives 15 locations 
- Detection: optimal detection (fast 2 detections) and delayed detection 
is considered.  
- Sprinkler activation:  Failure and success is considered 
- Smoke and heat control: Failure, 50% success and 100% success are 
considered 
- Ventilation conditions: In case of small room the limited ventilation 
conditions are taken into account. 
- Smoke barrier: in case of compartmentation, the connecting doors can 
be considered open or closed. Similar to the staircases. The door 
barrier can fail. However, the latter is not taken into account.  
In total are 180 scenario for the first five discrete variables should be analysed. 
However, several scenarios were taken together to reduce the number of event 
tree scenarios so that only 64 event tree branches were analysed. The scenario 
of a fire on the ground level in the lower left corner of the floor, with sprinkler 
failure and SHC activation at 0% performance is taken into account. No limited 
ventilation conditions are considered. 
 
Figure E.2: Location of the fire.  
As discussed in Chapter VII, an important boundary condition of the case study 
is that the staircases are considered smoke free during the evacuation for all 
scenarios. This is a limitation of the model because failure of a fire door causes 




The fire frequency, necessary as input for the event tree, for the whole building 
was based on the estimated fire frequency for retail and restaurants: The fire 
frequency for the retail is estimated at 0,05 fires per year and for the restaurant 
0,012 fires per year. This gives a total of 0,062 fires per year.  
The probabilities associated with the elaborated branch scenario is presented 
in the table below. It should be noted that the other scenarios might have the 
same outcome in terms of smoke spread. For example, when detection initially 
fails, the SHC system does not activate. 
Table E.1: Frequencies and probabilities for the corresponding scenario.  






Detection success 0.99 
Alarm success 0.8 
Sprinkler failure 0.05 
SHC failure 0.4 
Fuel controlled fire 0.9 
Total 5.13 * 10-5 
 
In step 5.4 the RSM is chosen. For this case the IMLS model is chosen. Next 
the support points are generated in step 5.5. the limits and values suggested in 
table IV are used. No correlation is applied. In step 5.6 the support points are 
deterministically evaluated by means of the CFD model FDS. The results of 
the deterministic scenario for the sample combination S=0,12 kW/s2, 
HRRPUA = 450 kW/m2 and Amax = 100 m2 is presented in the figure below.  
 
Figure E.3: Deterministic evaluation of a fire scenario on the ground floor in 
the smoke spread model. 
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The IMLS model elaborated in section IV.4.7.2 is applied to determine the 
RSM. The same number of coefficients are implemented. The toxicity, 
temperature and radiation concentrations are calculated at multiple locations. 
Next, the DoE experiments are determined to obtain a uniform representation 
of the analysed domain (step 5.8). The Sobol Sampling method is chosen. For 
each scenario 100 samples are simulated in step 5.9. The results are provided 
as input for the evacuation analysis (loop to step 5.5). The support points for 
the evacuation RSM are generated (step 5.5) based on the support points 
discussed in table IV.8. The sample is analysed by means of the evacuation 
model Pathfinder (step 5.6). The results of the deterministic scenario for the 
sample combination of fast second detection, affiliation = 50/50 and occupant 
density = 1pp/3m2 is presented in the figure below. 
 
Figure E.4: Deterministic evaluation of an evacuation scenario time around 
480s. 
Next the results of the evacuation analysed locations data is coupled with 
toxicity, temperature and radiation data from obtained from the RSM for 
smoke spread. For every deterministically simulated evacuation scenario (42), 
the results of the 100 Sobol samples are analysed. This means that up till now 
about 1600 scenarios represent the chosen branch scenario. For every occupant 
in every scenario, the model obtains a minute by minute dosage of all the 
concentrations, temperature and radiation.  
In step 5.8 DoE is generated for the probabilistic consequence analysis. In total 
100 sobol samples for the variables CO-yield, HCN-yield, HoC, susceptibility 
and VE rate are generated. This means that now about 160 000 samples are 
generated. Next the FID values are calculated in step 5.9. For every occupant 




The result of one of the sample cases for the top exit (Ex31) indicated on figure 
E.4 is presented in figure E.5. For every exit such an FID curve is generated. 
Typically, the results obtained for the FID values do not provide a smooth line. 
Therefore a curve fit is performed and presented by means of the blue line.   
 
Figure E.5: Example of continuous increase in FID values for a group of 
people at an exit door. 
The FID-curves of exits connecting to a staircase are then taken together in one 
FID-curve. This means that for every sample in the current case study, in total 
4 FI-curves (stairs) and 4 FID-curves for the other exits on the ground floor are 
generated. 
Once the curve fitting is performed, the procedure loops back to step 5.7 and 
the RSM for evacuation is developed. The RSM is applied in two phases for 
the evacuation data. Firstly, the RSM is conducted for determining the number 
of people evacuating towards each exit. Secondly, the RSM is applied for 
implementation of the other variables.  
In the first phases the RSM is applied to de determine how many people will 
evacuate at each exit for each sample scenario. This is determined by 
evaluating the number of people evacuating at each exit for each support 
sample. For every new sample generate from the Sobol sampling technique, 
the number of people are determined by searching for the corresponding point 
on the RSM. This has to be done first to continue. Otherwise interpolation will 
be done between different population sizes.  
Next, for every exit in every support sample scenario, the FID curves are 
rescaled to the number of occupants estimated before. An example for a set of 
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six support points is given in Figure E.6. Originally, these curves were fitted 
for different occupant sizes. However, interpolation between them would not 
be possible. Therefore, a scaling algorithm is implemented to rescale every 
curve to the desired number of occupants.  
 
Figure E.6: Rescaled FID curves for a support sample of a particular exit and 
scenario. 
In step 5.8, the DoE is generated for the probabilistic evacuation analysis. This 
means that samples are generated for the parameters occupant density and 
affiliation by means of Sobol sampling. Only a part of the domain is analysed 
as discussed in section IV.4.16. Samples with low occupant densities will not 
give a significant added valued to the results. Therefore, it is chosen to narrow 
the domain and give a weight to the results. The weight factor is later on 
multiplied by the branch probabilities. In total are 106 Sobol samples are 
generated for the chosen branch scenario. 
Once the input combinations are chosen, the samples are evaluated by means 
of the response surface model for evacuation in step 9.9. In Figure IV.21 E.7 
an example is given of the estimation of an FID curve by RSM. The red line is 
the estimated curve and the blue line is the real value. Two support samples 
are presented in green to illustrated that the new samples are interpolated 




Figure E.7: Estimated FID curves for a new sample for a particular exit and 
scenario. 
In the next step, the total risk is calculated by, calculating the number of 
occupants with FID ≥ 1 for every sample and multiplying the consequence of 
every sample by the actual frequency of the corresponding branch scenario 
which is in this case 2.12 * 10-12. The branch frequency divided by 106 and 
multiplied by the weighting factors ˆ˜̄ ¯ = 0.044 and ˆ #̃[C = 	0.94. The 
risk of all the samples is summed to obtain the total risk for that branch 
scenario. The risk of the branch scenario is about 2.5*10-8. 
In order to calculate the failure probability of the branch scenario, the number 
of samples with FID ≥ 1  is summed and divided by 106. A failure probability 
for this branch scenario is calculated of about 1.5*10-8. 
To calculate the individual risk, the IR is calculated on the probable worst 
locations (in principle the most distant from the exit). An example of IR for 
different zones on a floor is given in figure E.8. The IR for the specific branch 
scenario is not calculated because it does not give a good representation of that 
locations. The final IR are presented in Chapter VII. 
 
E.1 Zoning of individual risk.   
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F MOVEMENT DYNAMICS 
Occupant movement is an important factor in evacuation modelling. Two main 
parts can be considered significant parameters for evacuation time modelling 
[136]. These are the (free) movement and flow through constraints. Both are 
influenced by individual characteristics, building layout and environmental 
conditions (e.g. smoke, visibility, etc.). Both movement and flow are 
considered from an individual and a group dynamic point of view.  
In general, in case of low densities, travel speed is more important for 
evacuating towards an exit. When high occupant densities and bottlenecks are 
expected, flow dynamics become more important.  
F.1 Movement 
Walking speed of occupants has been extensively studied in the past [35]. In 
[137], a review of walking speeds in different models is performed. The main 
influence factors for walking speed can be divided in internal and external 
factors. Internal factors are due to the occupant individual characteristics (age, 
fitness, focus, etc.). External factors are mainly due to occupant’s density, 
visibility/toxicity in smoke and building configuration (Slope, stair, etc.). The 
effect of these parameters gives a wide range of possible average walking 
speeds between 0.5 and 1.7 m/s applied in evacuation models. This as a fixed 
value or a probability distribution [35]. 
F.1.1 Importance of movement in evacuation modelling 
From research is observed that a change in walking speed has a significant 
impact on the evacuation time [136]. In the study, a sensitivity analysis is 
performed with a mean walking speed of 1.19 m/s and a variation between 0.3 
- 1.9 m/s (Figure F.1). For high walking speeds, the effect is low. This because 
the limiting factor for higher walking speeds are the bottlenecks and flow 
becomes important. However, for lower walking speeds, the variation is far 




Figure F.1: Variation of evacuation time. Taken from [136]. 
F.1.2 Effect of occupant characteristics 
The impact of occupant characteristics in evacuation modelling is generally 
implicitly taken into account by providing an overall walking speed 
distribution. This walking speed distribution should represent the entire 
occupancy type. However, for specific occupancy types (schools, elderly 
homes, ect.), an adjusted distribution is more appropriate. In this section, three 
parameters are analysed that have an important effect on walking speed. These 
are age, body size and impairment.  
F.1.2.1 The impact of age 
Age is directly related to a deterioration in physical, mental and neurological 
functions which impacts negatively on individual movement, e.g. speed and 
stride length [138]. Figure F.2 is shows that ‘elderly’ (over 65s) walk 
approximately 20–25% slower than adults in the age range 18–40 years. A 
study from NIST [139] indicates that the rate at which elderly people descend 
stairs (assisted or unassisted) can be much lower. Estimates are at a 50% 
reduction compared to healthy adults. Also for young people (< 10 year), 
reduced average walking speeds are observed. 
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Figure F.2: The relationship between walking speed and age on a level 
surface. Taken from [138]. 
Recent studies [140] have quantified the impact of population age on crowd 
speed (Figure F.3). Three population types were included in the study: adults, 
children and elderly. The figure shows reduced speeds for elderly and children. 
 
Figure F.3: Walking speed vs density for different age demographics, from 
Kholshenikov data. Taken from [140]. 
F.1.2.2 The impact of body size 
The effect of body size on walking speed has been proven to have significant 
impact on walking speed dynamics [140]. The actual impact of the increasing  
proportion of obese people has yet to be properly considered with respect to 
crowd movement. However, from initial research [35,141], it is estimated that 
increased body size can reduce the movement speed and flow rate up to 25%.  
F.1.2.3 Impairment 
Research has shown that about 15% of the population live with some form of 
disability and that between 2-4% have very significant difficulties in 
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functioning [142]. Impairments in the form of visibility, hearing, physical 
impairments, etc. have an important impact on human behaviour and 
movement dynamics. From past incidents it is observed that in case of 
emergency a large part of people with disabilities will attempt to use stairs 
irrespective of their limitations [143]. This is of particular importance because 
these people will cause bottlenecks which will slow down the evacuation of 
other people.  
It is suggested to take these effects into account by analysing specific scenarios 
with special attention for evacuation of people with reduced mobility and 
scenarios of people with highly reduced mobility in which evacuation through 
of stairs is not possible [35].  
F.1.3 Effect of occupant density on horizontal and vertical 
walking speed  
Extensive research has been conducted regarding the effect of occupant density 
on walking speed [35]. Experiments show an inverse relationship between the 
two parameters. The waking speed decreases as the occupant density increases 
(Figure F.4). An important limitation of this relationship is the exclusion of 
body size. The real density might vary depending on the body size (small 
children vs obese adults). A possible adaption could be to represent the 
correlation in terms of occupant coverage per square meter. 
 
Figure F.4: Relation between walking speed and density through doors, on 
stairs and slopes. Taken from [35]. 
Movement on slopes, stairs and escalators presents a different challenge than 
horizontal movement, given the extra degree of freedom available in the 
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movement. The constraints imposed by the stair design and the additional 
effort required to traverse the stair component. Extensive research was done in 
[144], [145], giving a wide range of results depending on density and floor 
levels. A mean movement speed of 0.48 m/s ± 0.16 m/s was obtained in [145]. 
In Figure F.4, several correlations for walking speeds on stairs are suggested. 
Distribution is recommended for application.  
F.1.4 Effect of smoke on movement 
The presence of smoke during an emergency has been shown to have a range 
of different effects upon evacuee performance [35,146]. These effects may be 
psychological, physiological and physical and affect the performance in a 
number of ways: recognition and response (pre-evacuation), redirection for 
movement (exit choice), reduced movement ability and posture change 
(crawling). The effect of reduced movement ability is studied below.  
The main principle of the empirical correlation between the smoke extinction 
coefficient and walking speed is to lower the walking speed of the evacuating 
occupant due to the direct effect, i.e. lower visibility and irritancy of the gases. 
Due to the lower walking speeds, the occupant will be longer exposed for a 
longer time to the asphyxiant gases such as CO, HCN, etc. (see consequence 
model) which will have an additional negative effect on movement and 
decision making.  
The effect of smoke on upright walking speed has been analysed in multiple 
experimental studies [147–156] of which only the first one is performed in 
smoke from actual fires. The other experiments are performed in artificial 
smoke in which sometimes irritancy products are added. Additional studies 
have analysed and reviewed these data sets [157–160]. From this research is 
concluded that the main factors influencing walking speed are: 
- Occupant characteristics (internal): Different occupants have 
different characteristics which result in a different response to the 
external factors. This causes differences in reduced walking speeds 
and differences in minimum walking speeds. Fitness is an important 
parameter for performance and susceptibility. In [151] is observed 
that elderly people walk slower in dense smoke compared to younger 
people.  
- Smoke density (external): Reduced visibility by increased smoke 
density is proven to have a negative impact on walking speed (Figure 
F.5.). Literature shows that walking speed is reduced by increasing 
extinction coefficient up to a certain point (Cs = 1-2 m-1) [154]. It is 
argued that after this point, the effect might be flattened out. 
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- Smoke irritancy (external): Irritating effects of smoke have a negative 
impact on walking speed mainly due to loss of visibility (closing eyes) 
and trying to cope with the irritating effect itself  [147].  
- Presence of guidance and complexity of the building (external): The 
presence of guidance by a wall or handrail has a positive effect on 
walking speed and wayfinding [35,161]. In [147] was noted that most 
subjects moved for part of the distance by feeling their way along the 
walls, and that those subjects doing this for more than 2/3 of the total 
distance had a greater average speed. It is proven that without 
visibility and guidance, occupants unfamiliar with the building get 
easily lost [35]. Especially in buildings with complex layout. 
Therefore, guidance is considered critical for obtaining a minimum 
walking speed in dense or/and irritating smoke.  
Figure F.5: Velocity as a function of the extinction coefficient for different 
experiments. Taken from [149]. 
In [157], research is conducted regarding the modelling of walking speeds in 
smoke conditions. Two sub and three main parameters are analysed. The sub 
parameters are walking speed (0.25 - 1.25 m/s) and extinction coefficient (0.5 
- 1 m-1). The main parameters are: two data sets [147,148], five modelling 
techniques (correlation interpretation) and six evacuation models. The results 
showed a minor effect of different evacuation models for different walking 
speeds and extinction coefficients when the same data set and coloration 
interpretation method is applied. However, a major impact is observed when 
different data sets and coloration interpretations were varied (factor 2). For 
lower initial walking speeds (0.25 - 0.5 m/s), the correlation method is the most 
sensitive parameter. When larger initial walking speeds (>0.75) are 
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implemented, the data set is the most sensitive parameters for different 
extinction coefficients.  
In  [149,158], is recommend that walking speed in smoke is represented as a 
distribution considering the uncertainties in the data (Figure F.5.), i.e. using 
both mean values ± and standard deviations for defined extinction coefficient.  
F.2 Flow and congestion 
Flow of occupants through geometrical constraints has been extensively 
studied in the past [35]. The main influence factors affecting flow performance 
can be distinguished in internal and external factors. Internal factors are due to 
the occupant individual characteristics (age, fitness, focus, etc.). External 
factors are mainly due to occupant density, merging and building configuration 
(slope, stair, etc.). The effect of these parameters show a wide range of possible 
average flows between 0.0 and 2.0 pp/m/s applied in evacuation models [35].  
F.2.1 Importance of flow in evacuation modelling 
Research observed that flow properties have a significant impact on modelling 
evacuation time for higher occupant densities [136]. This because exits and 
stairs create bottlenecks causing longer exposure of occupants.  
F.2.2 Effect of occupant characteristics 
F.2.2.1 The impact of age 
Experimental studies have quantified the impact of population age on crowd 
flow rates studies [140]. Three population types were included in the study: 
adults, children and elderly. Figure F.6 shows reduced flow rates for elderly 





Figure F.6: Crowd flow rate vs density for different age demographics, from 
Kholshenikov data. Taken from [140]. 
F.2.2.2 The impact of body size 
Research observed that a change in boxy size has a significant impact on 
modelling evacuation time. In [136], a sensitivity analysis is performed with a 
mean body size of 0.46 m diameter and a variation between 0.3 - 0.7 m (Figure 
F.7). For smaller body sizes, the effect was small. For larger body sizes, a 
variation up to 50% for higher body size is expected. This because the flow is 
heavily reduced.  
 
Figure F.7: Sensitivity analysis to size. Taken from [136]. 
The impact of significantly higher proportions of obese people has yet to be 
properly considered with respect to crowd movement. However, from initial 
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research [35,141], it is estimated that increased body size can reduce the 
movement speed and flow rate up to 25%. 
F.2.3 Effect of occupant density on horizontal and vertical 
flow 
Experiments show a parabolic relationship between occupant density and flow. 
The flow first increases from low to medium densities up to 2 p/m2.  Secondly, 
the flow decreases from a maximum value to 0 for higher densities around 4 
p/m2.  
 
Figure F.8: Specific flow as a function of population density. Taken from 
[35]. 
The effect of different merging dynamics in staircases can have a significant 
impact on the exposure time of occupants in the incident compartment to the 
effluents of a fire. In [90] is described that most experiments show merging 
flows in the order of a 50:50 ratio. In these circumstances the top floor empties 
first and then the other floors, from bottom up, will be evacuated. In [162] was 
found that in the case of low occupant load and low densities, stair mergers 
seem often having priority over floor mergers (in the order of 60-70:40-30). A 
fictive example for different ratios is shown in Figure F.9. In [163] is discussed 
that the majority of the evacuation models approximate a 50:50 percentage 




Figure F.9: Floor evacuation time. Talen from [162]. 
F.3 Uncertainty and limitations in evacuation 
modelling 
F.3.1 Uncertainty 
In [164] uncertainties are distinguished in three different parts in evacuation 
modelling. These are the definition of the input, the evacuation modelling and 
the analysis of the output. Input uncertainty is associated with scenarios and 
input parameters. It encompasses the definition of relevant scenarios (e.g. 
occupant type, exit availability, fire conditions affecting evacuation 
behaviours, etc.) and parameters (walking speeds, occupant load, affiliation, 
etc.). The former is considered by developing proper evacuation scenarios for 
specific occupancy types and activities. The latter is tackled by implementing 
a probability density function in the models. 
The second type of uncertainty is associated with evacuation modelling which 
reflects intrinsic uncertainty (i.e., the uncertainty caused by the physical, 
mathematical, and modelling assumptions in use). This uncertainty is linked 
with the validity of the underlying equations or rules adopted by an evacuation 
model to represent movement and human behaviour. These uncertainties are 
validated by means of experiments.  
The last set of uncertainties are associated with analysis of the output 
(behavioural uncertainty) [165]. This uncertainty is associated with the impact 
of the range of possible behaviours of individuals on the simulation results. In 
[165], a functional analysis method is developed to analyse the convergence of 
the evacuation modelling.  
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F.3.2 Limitations 
An important limitation in evacuation modelling is lack of data considering 
human behaviour. While movement and flow are fairly well modelled, 
decision analysis regarding pre-evacuation and exit choice modelling is a large  
uncertainty. In the majority of the evacuation models pre-evacuation behaviour 
is implicitly modelled, while exit choice explicitly modelled. Both are user 
input and thus dependent on the FSE expertise.  
A second important limitation is the (mis)use of default values. In order to keep 
complex models practical, most models are provided with pre-defined default 
values. Although, this might make the modelling more efficient, these defaults 
are most of the time input values for optimal conditions (e.g. smoke free 
walking speed, nearest exit, etc.) which might give unrealistic results.  [166]. 
In order to deal with this problem, in [167], a new approach was suggest to 
provided conservative default values so that the modeller needs to understand 
and physically change the values.  
An important limitation of the current use of data is the lack of quantification 
of the changing population distribution [140]. Legislation, guidelines and 
numerical models still implement correlations for movement speed, flow rates, 
occupant densities, smoke effect, etc. developed more than 50 years ago [35], 
[168]. Experts in the field criticize that this data collected in the past might not 
be relevant anymore. The loss of confidence in the use of this older ‘uniform’ 
data is due to the recognition of the ever increasing proportions of elderly, 
obese and mobility impaired in our society [140,169,170]. From research is 
expected that by 2050, the ratio of people older than 65 years and people 
between 15-65 years will be about 50% [171]. Some recent studies have 
reviewed flow data and formulae for people of different ages on stairs [139]. 
The indications are that, while basic flow values for uniformly ‘healthy adult’ 
groups may not have yet changed significantly, there is a very significant drop 
in flow rate for primarily ‘elderly’ populations. These factors of change to age 
distribution, population physical size (overweight and obesity rates) and 
presence of disability are not accounted for in currently implemented speed 
and flow rate correlations for evacuation models and fire safety designs. In 
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